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JANUARY–FEBRUARY 1967

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COMMENTS AND OPINIONS

Michael Harrington

The New Shape of American Politics

The losers of the 1966 Congressional elections are easy enough to identify. They include the black and white poor, the Negroes generally, both unorganized and organized wage workers, people who live in cities, liberals, radicals, etc.

By and large the Dixiecrat-Republican coalition, the legislative majority party in the United States from 1938 to 1964, triumphed. Many of the reasons for this disaster have already been copiously annotated in the daily and weekly press: a general feeling of unrest symbolized by the issues of Vietnam and inflation; a natural swing of the pendulum after the Democratic landslide of two years ago; the personal vigor and attractiveness of many of the Republican candidates; ghetto riots; and so on. Yet in this analysis of what the new Congress will mean, I propose to stay away from most of these familiar points and concentrate instead on supposedly un-American considerations of political program.

For the current Congress is, in part at least, a consequence of the exhaustion of the Kennedy-Johnson program (this happened, of course, when it was passed into law) and the absence of any real Johnson program. Moreover, there is now, for the first time in decades, the possibility of a realistic, coherent but reactionary alternative to the moderately liberal welfare statism which has dominated American life since the days of Franklin Roosevelt. And these programmatic comings and goings obviously have a profound relevance to the way in which the democratic Left is going to regroup its scattered forces and prepare for the two gloomy years that lie ahead.

First, over and beyond Vietnam, inflation and all the rest, the recent election reflected a lack of Presidential leadership.

In *The Making of a President 1964* Thedore White relates a revealing little anecdote. By September, 1964, he writes, the Johnson camp knew that it could beat Goldwater running, as LaGuardia used to say, on a laundry ticket. The issue was how to win, and there was a split on the question among the President's staff people. One group simply called for the largest possible vote, a massive, irrefutable consensus against Goldwaterism. But another group, White says, was in favor of reducing the margin of victory—of consciously sacrificing some votes—in order to give the Johnson mandate greater political content. They wanted, in short, program and content, not just consensus. White contends that the President took the

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advice of both factions, that he developed his political ideas at the same time that he fashioned his stunning majority. But, in reality, that was not the case.

In point of fact, the Johnson legislative program which won the President such praise for his mastery of the 1965 Congress was, by far and large, the work of John F. Kennedy and, in the notable case of Medicare, of Harry S. Truman. With his lopsided majorities in the House and Senate, Johnson was able to pass into law just about the entire *old* domestic program of Amercian liberalism. In effect, all of the ideas that the Dixiecrat-Republican coalition had frustrated during the previous quarter of a century were approved.

But then, a turn to the Right in American politics began, not in November of 1966 but almost a year earlier. For the very same Congress which had said yes to all the Kennedy-Johnson items defeated the Johnson proposals on civil rights and 14B, attacked the poverty program, cut back on the enforcement of the 1964 and 1965 Civil Rights Acts, and almost defeated the Demonstration Cities bill. Why?

In part, the war in Vietnam made the political atmosphere of the nation more conservative than it had been a year earlier; in part, some people had been convinced that the passage of inadequate solutions to problems that had been ignored for a generation constituted excessive political action. But in addition, Johnson had not really made his mandate specific and precise in 1964. He had contented himself with (often excellent) sweeping phrases. And he did not really have a program that he had presented to the people. He had renewed an old consensus but he had neglected, for all the wheeling and dealing, to shape a new consensus. For that would have required conflict.

II

The most fascinating demonstration of this point has come from the Republican party. Because now, for the first time in recent memory, the GOP is beginning to come up with a conservative alternative that amounts to something more than a litany of negatives addressed to the modern world. And the most significant thing about this new program of theirs is that they are borrowing it from Johnson himself.

In some of his philosophic speeches of two years ago, the President spoke of "creative federalism." It is reliably reported that the phrase was invented by Richard Goodwin but, more to the point, it was picked up by Max Ways in a very important article in *Fortune* last year. There are no more class and ideological conflicts, Ways argued, for we now confront problems rather, than fight over issues. And therefore businessmen should follow Mr. Johnson's lead and contract with the government to solve the various problems of the nation. It was this kind of thinking which led U.S. Gypsum, to take one case recently reported in the *Wall Street Journal*, to start experimenting in the slum rehabilitation business. For, as the *Journal* explained, federal legislation may now make it possible to make an 8 to 10 per cent profit in such do-gooding.

One of the key notions in this approach centers around Comsat, the public-private corporation which re-

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ceived a free and profitable gift of all the tax-supported space research. Now the Creative Federalists are calling for Comsats to rebuild the cities, to end poverty, etc. The government is to underwrite a guaranteed money-making scheme in which business men would design a better urban environment and, presumably, social order.

There are, to be sure, liberal versions of this scheme which might offer hopeful points of departure for social change. Walter Reuther and Robert Kennedy have both spoken of nonprofit corporations doing work in the slums. But the conservative, Creative Federalist line takes the communication satellite give-away as its model and not, say, TVA or the cooperative movement. And it also lays a major stress on promoting profits for, as Mr. David Rockefeller candidly told Senator Ribicoff, big money is not interested in social problems on any other basis. So the executives are to be made city planners—if the price is right.

But, and perhaps this is the most crucial criticism of this whole approach, all the Comsat talk evades a most basic issue. "Rehabilitation" is the key word these days and it suggests a utopia in which the crisis of the cities will be solved with a little paint, pre-fab kitchens, and rat poison. Practically no one mentions that the rehabilitation strategy will only work if three-quarters of the people now living in the tenements are evacuated to *new* housing, for the old units can only be made liveable if their density is drastically reduced before they are spruced up. And those new houses will require strong public sector action and even, as John Kenneth Galbraith told the Urban America Conference last year, an attack on the very idea that the market mechanism is the best way to determine the social and aesthetic uses of land. Such stern necessities, however, are not talked about in the new anti-slum idyll of the corporate theorists.

The third basic idea of Creative Federalism has been taken from Walter Heller. The former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers is generally credited with originating the idea of returning a specified percentage of federal tax revenues back to states and municipalities. This tactic, according to the Republican philosophers, will revitalize local democracy in the United States.

In the debates within the Kennedy Administration, Heller had stood for a tax cut and against direct social investments as proposed, for example, by Galbraith. And his tax rebate proposal, at least in the form in which the Republicans are picking it up, once again charts a conservative and business-oriented course. The power of the federal government is now desperately needed to help redesign the antiquated structures of state and municipal government. Megalopolis does not obey the jurisdictions created in the Northeast by the politics of the late eighteenth century. It can only be dealt with on the basis of regional and national planning. Moreover, as the U.S. Conference of Mayors itself observed this year, there must be an end to the scandal of awarding huge grants so that suburbs can create middle-class enclaves with lilywhite schools, federalized expressways and comfortable, segregated houses built with credit supplied by Washington.

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III

The only hope of developing regional planning authorities and forcing the suburban middle class into a modicum of responsibility (to match their maximum of federal subsidies) is by having Washington specify that its mighty resources are only available on the condition that the localities and states change their ancient ways. For if these various new proposals for social renewal are left to the tender mercies of those currently in charge of the "grass roots" power structures (real estate men, bankers, department stores, rich farmers, etc.), then the outrages of Title I housing and Urban Renewal will simply be repeated on a much grander scale.

But these old horrors are, precisely, the "Creative Federalist" vision of the future. The Republican party is now going to adopt a program of "reactionary Keynesianism," that is, of business-directed and profit-producing state intervention into the economy. The key ideas in this approach—contracting social problems out to the corporation, the Comsat organizational structure, artificial respiration for the anachronistic structures of state and local government—have all been taken from the Johnson consensus. The single virtue of Goldwaterism was that it was impossible, a fantastic mood rather than a program. But if the Dixiecrat-Republican coalition adopts a version of "Creative Federalism" they will have come up with a workable and reactionary alternative to social progress.

In 1964 a basically conservative version of Keynesianism could rally Henry Ford and Walter Reuther, Senator Long and Martin Luther King Jr. in the same camp, because the Goldwater alternative on the Right was utterly intolerable. But in 1966 the Republicans by far and large returned to a moderate position and there was nothing to frighten the people into the Democratic column. Mr. Johnson's war and economic policies had vaguely disenchanted a significant portion of the electorate, yet there was no "Great Society" thrust to counterbalance this uneasiness. So the Republicans, and their Dixiecrat allies, were given a magnificent new chance and there are signs that they will take advantage of it with greater sophistication than in the past. Mr. Johnson's opponents may be about to steal a large chunk of Mr. Johnson's own program.

In this situation, the programmatic imperatives of the democratic Left are clear enough—and tactics are all in a muddle.

A. Philip Randolph's Freedom Budget is a clear alternative to Creative Federalism. It stresses direct social investment; it faces up to the government's responsibility ($185 billion of it); and it stresses the need for an enormous expansion of new low-cost housing. In addition to these points, there is now a new relevance to the question of the role of private profit in social change. There is, alas, no possibility of completely transcending the profit motive in the immediate future. But there is going to be a very serious debate over whether it is necessary to guarantee the corporations a tax-paid bonanza in order to get Americans decently housed. And here again there is an obvious and wide-ranging agreement on this point on the democratic Left.

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IV

The problems arise, however, when one turns from program to strategy. For important elements on the Left have apparently adopted the reactionary notion that the nation now faces a choice of guns or butter.

There are forces which are essential to any new liberal-Left majority in the United States but which also support the President's Vietnam policy; these, most notably, are the bulk of the labor movement. And, on the other hand, a majority of the middle-class liberals and radicals plus some of the most militant Negroes are deeply opposed to the military commitment in Southeast Asia. There is no possibility that this divergence can, at this moment, be resolved by discussion and debate. For better or worse, it will probably continue as long as the war itself.

But how, then, do those groupings which differ on foreign policy relate to one another on domestic issues? The most intransigeant trade unionist supporter of Mr. Johnson in Vietnam is also opposed to cuts in the war on poverty, favors the Freedom Budget, and so on. In the name of "radicalism" some on the anti-war wing of the democratic Left (and on the Vietnam issue, that is where I take my own stand) have settled this complexity by the simple expedient of agreeing with the Rightists thesis that as long as the Vietnam war continues, just so long is it necessary to postpone social programs. The Leftist version of the thought went: only an opponent of the war can genuinely advocate social programs because there must be peace before anything can really be done to do away with poverty, the slums and all the rest of the domestic scandals. Therefore, the supporter of the war is not to be opposed simply in the area of foreign policy; he is to be shunned on domestic questions as well.

The harm that such a tactic could work in the coming period is incalculable. Given the backlash, the disarray within the civil rights movement, and the legislative reconstitution of the Dixiecrat-Republican coalition, the unions, the Negro movement, the churches, and the liberals must not allow differences with regard to Vietnam to shatter their essential agreement on immediate domestic problems. If this happens, the worst of all worlds will be assured. Of course, war makes internal progress infinitely more difficult, and on a large scale, perhaps even improbable. But the democratic Left should be united at least to the extent of saying that *if the war is going to go on, then the black and white poor should not be made to pay for it.* For this nation does have the resources to build in Harlem and Watts and Appalachia even as it destroys in Vietnam. The fact may be seen as ironic, or even tragic; but it is a fact.

Or let me put it another way. As a participant (mainly through SANE) in the movement to end the war, I do not want to say to slum dwellers and migrant farm workers, "You must wait for your houses and your food and your dignity until my friends and I succeed in forcing the President to make peace." The poor have problems enough without having their fate made dependent on the effectiveness of the current campaign for a negotiated peace in Vietnam.*

* "In economic measure, the war is small. Its cost for 1966 may run about $12 bil-

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There is a clear democratic Left program for the coming Congress. Given the mathematics of representation, it is unlikely that it will be passed into law. And yet it is imperative that a struggle begin, for new ideas such as those expressed in the Freedom Budget, even though they will not immediately prevail. This country cannot continue to live off the accomplishments of the last generation's liberalism; it needs programs that are much more specific than the rhetoric of the Great Society. It must come to reject conservatism in the guise of "Creative Federalist." And for all the gloom in the present situation, the task of the democratic Left is quite clear.

lion. But U.S. personal consumption spending will be in the range of $465 billion and private investment (domestic and foreign) in the range of $125 billion. The American economy . . . is a lavish consumers' and investors' economy, where the President even chose to spend nearly $6 billion, in the single fiscal year just closed, for the bauble of space exploration. Only a convergence of imbecilities brings the light-minded Left to concur with the hard-faced Right in asserting that the Vietnam War imposes [that is, requires—M. H.] neglect of the poor."—Oscar Gass, *Commentary*, November 1966.

Irving Howe

A Traditional Class Issue

Let me add a word to Mike Harrington's valuable comment.

It has become clear that—in the long run—the established interest groups and power blocs in American society seem to be weakening, perhaps disintegrating. This is a fact that those of us committed to the strategy of "coalition politics" will have to consider very seriously.

In the last election it became clear, for example, that labor could not necessarily deliver the votes assumed to be at its disposal. Also, there are major counter-pressures (e.g., "white backlash") which can lure people into voting against their own interests. And most important, there seems to be a growing section of the population, especially among the young, who respond to politics in terms not of interest groups but of political "styles" and moral or pseudo-moral appeals.

We will have to come back to this theme. But right now the country faces a political-social issue which largely, as it happens, takes on the traditional character of a struggle between class interests. Simply put, the issue is: Who will pay for the Vietnam War? More urgently put: Will we be conned into the outrage of having the war used as a *pretext* for the reduction

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of social needs and the dismantling of the already inadequate poverty program?

Pretext is exactly the word. There are non-military items in the federal budget, such as the $70 billion five-year space program (announced as projects "beyond the moon") and the plans for supersonic airliners, which remain untouched in President Johnson's budget projections. These "prestige" items are, in the present political climate, less vulnerable to attack than is help to the run-down cities and the rotting ghettos. In the *New York Times* (December 7, 1966) James Reston lists a number of "fat cat subsidies" which could be cut from the federal budget —these range from $160 million a year to provide services for private aircraft run by corporations, to over $100 million a year in services to large factory farms, to more than $500 million a year in subsidies to the merchant marine. (How curious that opponents of "welfarism," like the tumid William Buckley, fail to muster indignation in regard to *these* hand-outs.) And finally, in case of a tax increase, there will be the urgent problem of who gets taxed most: those who have or those who haven't.

Now, the people like ourselves who remain opposed to the Vietnam War have every obligation to keep pressing for steps that will bring peace. We need to explain how this war poisons the whole social atmosphere of the country and serves as an impediment to further advances in domestic life. But it would be disastrous if—in our revulsion from the human and social waste that this war entails—we were to accept the reactionary argument that the country must choose between guns and butter. That argument was open to attack even during the Second World War, when it was used to justify profiteering on top and constrictions upon labor below; it certainly has no merit now.

The issue is of a kind on which the trade unions, whatever their faults, can effectively pressure—it lies within their realm of experience. The issue also vitally affects the Negro movement, all wings of it. And even some of the more progressive or worried mayors, like Lindsay of New York and Cavanaugh of Detroit, have begun crying out against "short-changing the cities," which is to say, against projected budget cuts in the inadequate present levels of federal aid for housing, education, and other programs to help the declining cities.

What is obviously required here—and in their testimony before Congress, A. Philip Randolph and Bayard Rustin have given a lead—is to reactivate the kind of limited-issue coalition which led in the past to the passage of the education bill and the Civil Rights Act.

The peace movement should be mature enough so that, while maintaining its full independent voice on the Vietnam War, it will be ready to join such an alliance in behalf of a budget which does not penalize the poor. And the problem will also be confronting the "New Left" students, those who have been properly eloquent about participation of their poor in the antipoverty program but were not overwhelmingly visible during last year's campaign to raise minimum wages. Perhaps they will discover that a struggle for increased social outlays, even if conducted with segments of the populaiton not yet fully enlightened on every-

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thing, may prove to be more fruitful than "nose to nose" confrontations with Ronald Reagan.

As I say, the issue is decidedly old-fashioned, a clear-cut division of class interests. It does confront "alienation." It cannot cope with psychic malaise. It will not clear up the Oswald case. It may not bring "meaning in depth" to the bored and the empty. But it does vitally and immediately affect the lives of millions of human beings—and that is partly what being a radical means: to *care* about the immediate condition, as well as the long-range fate, of those millions of human beings. The coming months may prove a test.

Stephanie Harrington

Why We Lost the Review Board

Under New York City's *ancien régime*, presided over by the amiable Bob Wagner, political hot potatoes were handled by appointing committees to study them until they were cold and dead. A year ago New York voted for a change—a change it may not be prepared to cope with. It elected a mayor who is young, energetic, and as moral—at times overbearingly so—as his predecessor was pragmatic.

It elected John Lindsay after he had campaigned for a civilian-dominated police review board. Being a moral man, he interpreted his election as a mandate to fulfill his campaign promises—including that of a review board. So he set one up, thereby making the Policemen's Benevolent Association unhappy enough to call for a referendum and landing himself in the most impolitic of political positions—i.e., smack in the middle of a campaign for a good but unpopular cause, scarcely a year after the electorate had deigned to give him a try. Putting principle before pragmatism, he ended up out on a limb, and New York elected to leave him there. Why?

The answer is that while New York is sentimental about youth, beauty, vigor, and vitality, its citizens are also singularly tough-minded about their individual interests. And the PBA convinced them that their individual interests depended on a police force unchecked by anyone.

The PBA's argument against "tying the hands of the police" carried as far north as Harlem. In Frank's Restaurant, where Harlem's "elite meets to eat," a straw poll was taken and one third of the patrons came out against the review board.

> The Negro middle class [says Bayard Rustin], took the view of the middle class in general—more police protection, and not less. They fell for the PBA's line that

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the review board would tie the hands of the police. And since, true to the culture of the ghetto, Negroes prey most on other Negroes, the Negro middle class does not want the police to be hampered in breaking up the Harlem numbers racket or in getting the addicts off the streets.

[There was also the other side of the coin in Harlem—what Rustin calls "politics of despair." This was practiced by people who said,]

"Why bother voting? The Review Board is only advisory anyway." And then after the Review Board was defeated, these same people turned around and said, "See, the white folks got the power and you can't do nothin' about it."

Rustin himself feels that the struggle for the review board was worthwhile, not because it could fundamentally change the pattern of urban life, but because it was "psychologically necessary." Among those who agreed with him and who went out onto the streets on this issue were Jesse Grey; Minister Farakhan, leader of Malcolm X's Muslim Temple Number Seven; Roy Wilkins of the NAACP; Floyd McKissick of CORE; and African nationalist leaders Ed Davis and James Lawson. But the SNCC-oriented Black Panther party took the position that the review board was useless and not worth bothering about.

In the Puerto Rican neighborhoods, the language problem became paramount. It was crucial to make people, whose English was imperfect, understand that voting yes meant no review board and vice versa. Lindsay staff members estimate that about 50 per cent of the Puerto Ricans voting against the board meant to vote for it.

The frustration was stacked against Lindsay. Voter registration in Harlem was extremely low. Even taking into account that this was not a presidential year, Harlem's registration was, in Rustin's view, inordinately low. (And the turnout for the review board was much better in Harlem than in Bedford Stuyvesant.)

But—and purists must remember that New York is THE city run on ethnic politics—it was not the timid middle-class Negroes or despairing lower-class Negroes and Puerto Ricans who lost us the review board. According to the strategists involved in the pro-review board campaign, the decisive swing vote that most decidedly swung the wrong way was that of middle-class Jews. The middle- and lower-class Italians and Irish were mostly written off to the backlash from the start. But the Jews are the basis on which liberal causes in New York are won or lost. This year, in the Bronx and Brooklyn, the Democratic gubernatorial candidate, O'Connor (who supported the review board), won by nearly 50,000 votes and 76,000 votes respectively, while the board lost by 107,000 and 212,000.

In the jungle of cities these days no one feels safe, not the Catholic in Queens nor the Jew in Brooklyn nor the Negro in Harlem. And none of them is to be blamed. Muggings and murders do happen. New York's review board was simply the latest scapegoat for a nation that chooses not to spend the funds necessary to create the jobs, housing, and educational facilities that can change a mugger into a man with a stake in society. The review board

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would not even have dented these problems, but in the case of the most desperate of the poor—those whose lives are bounded by precinct house walls—it could have mitigated their alienation a little by giving them some recourse against the authority that runs their lives.

John Lindsay understands this. It's one reason he made so many personal appearances on the streets of Harlem and Bedford Stuyvesant. But even these gestures to assure slumdwellers they were not forgotten lost Lindsay support in the middle class. "People were grumbling," said a Lindsay aide, "that he was 'spending all his time in the ghetto with *them* while he's raising *our* taxes.' "

In Brooklyn Democratic party workers handed out pro-O'Connor literature together with anti-review board stickers. And a Lindsay staff man passed two Liberal party storefronts, one in Brooklyn and one on the Upper West Side of Manhattan, with anti-review board signs in the windows.

Money was another problem. The PBA, which is technically neither a political organization nor a union, is not required by law to account for its budget. It admitted to spending at least half a million on its anti-review board advertising, and the frequency of its television spots indicated that the financial score was probably a lot higher. By comparison the Federated Associations for Impartial Review ran a penurious campaign.

Moreover, its participating organizations were not, for the most part, political and were, therefore, not mobilized for the kind of intensive street campaigning that was necessary. John Lindsay, himself, carried much of the burden of street corner oratory. The political and trade union organizations that were involved in FAIR had to divide their labors between support for the board and support for individual candidates. The police, on the other hand, were mobilized around a single issue, and their agents, simply in the course of duty, were on street corners all over the city, many of them pushing their own cause and discouraging civilians from expressing hostile points of view.

Added to this were some glaring absences among review board proponents—most notably Harry Van Arsdale, Morris Iushewitz, and the New York City Central Labor Council. (In the face of the Council's foot-dragging, 53 local unions, under the aegis of the Jewish Labor Committee, did endorse the review board.)

The long-range lesson to be drawn from this defeat is, in Rustin's view, that "Negro leaders have a massive job ahead of them to educate the people in their communities on the power of the vote." The mass of middle-class Jewish, Irish, and Italian voters might also benefit from a little education. Their fears are real enough, but the negative solutions pointed to by their latest electoral performance promise only to reinforce the basis of those fears.

The defeat of the review board was scored as a political defeat for Lindsay. Some of his advisors fear the campaign cost him a good chunk of the electorate—permanently. Yet given the same choice, he would do the same thing again. A political defeat, perhaps. But a moral victory, certainly—and an example to a city that has seen less than its share of principle in City Hall.

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Henry Pachter

Mao vs. Marx in China

To those who force all political shadings into a Right-Left spectrum, China's "cultural revolution" looked like a further move to the "Left," a more radical expression of Communism. Such facile judgments should have been checked against the more detailed information that has come out of China during the last six months. This information points in quite a different direction, or rather in a number of conflicting directions:

- the involvement of the army in the newest stage of the revolution and the down-grading of the Communist party;
- the demotion of some of the oldest comrades-in-arms who had gone with Mao Tse-tung through the most difficult stages of his career and had consistently been on the "Left";
- the apparent isolationism of the present leadership which so patently conflicts with the "imperialistic" or world revolutionary ideas which Russian and Western propaganda ascribe to them;
- the virtual disestablishment of the entire propaganda apparatus which, one should think, has been more concerned with the ideology and revolutionary morale than any other element in the Party.

While certain intellectuals and university administrators seem to have joined the ranks of the purged, neither the economic, the military, nor the scientific experts have been molested. The evidence indicates that in their restricted domain managers, scientists, and other experts are not fulfilling their assginments. But they do not seem to constitute any organized opposition. The one class, however, that so far not only has resisted the "cultural revolution" but has met with it head-on in pitched battle has been the workers.

II

The following quote from the *New York Times* was based on a report from a Tokio paper whose Peking correspondent had quoted from the Red Guard newspaper *The East is Red* (this is the way we get information from Peking under the non-recognition policy):

> Students of an engineering school went to a tool factory to mix with the workers and try to stimulate greater production by propounding the thought of Mao Tse-tung. . . . But the factory closed its doors and loudspeakers ordered: "Do not let them in, shoot to kill." The students sent reinforcements . . . climbed over the walls after sunset and a battle started . . . fighting continued until mid-morning . . .

Some of our incorrigible ideologues needed a shock like this news item. Perhaps nothing less will convince them that Mao's revolution has nothing to do with the liberation of the people or, despite its continued use of Marxist language, with the class struggle and the emancipation of the proletariat. Perhaps they now will credit Mao Tse-tung's claim that his

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"thought" is not just a Chinese version of Marxism-Leninism, but is a new, original departure which asks for world-wide application and recognition.*

Two ideologists of the American "Left," writing in the journal *Trans-Action,* embroider on the totalitarian and militaristic trend in the "thought of Mao" with the glorious reminiscences of Puritan austerity. Mssrs. Alvin Gouldner and Irving Louis Horowitz declare that

> the Red Guards may . . . break the legitimation system of orthodox Communism. Instead of a system that operates through the organizational channels of the Communist party, the Red Guards symbolize a return to spontaneity and to the importance of ideological purity rather than party loyalty.

They still see Mao as the *noble sauvage* whose function it is to save the Western soul from the corruption of its civilization. But the enemy of this Maoist upheaval is neither the West nor the 5 per cent of the Chinese population who continue to live off their previous land and commercial holdings; it is neither the power hunger of the Party bosses nor the importation of Western fashions and middle-class ideals. The enemy is simply the great mass of the Chinese people, peasants and workers who—in the tender sociologese of our "New Left" philosophers—had to be "reorientated" because they resisted and continue to resist austerity.

The civil war in China is by no means over, 17 years after the defeat of the Kuomintang; only its locus has shifted. For as Hegel remarks, the total victory of one party is only the prelude to the emergence of factions and its eventual split. In China the interests of the people have been neglected and overridden, but its resistance has been so strong that eventually the administrators and Party bosses themselves had to call a halt. In 1959 the "Great Leap" was halted because the people were exhausted, and this year they probably opposed a new adventure of this type.

But in voicing their opposition the mandarins used different arguments, some "rightist" and others "leftist." They based their objections on technical grounds, or they pleaded for more aggressive policies that would rule out experiments with the patience of the people. Some arguments stressed the military situation, some the need to catch up with Western technology, and others the operational needs of administrating any new program. Between these councils of the Right and the Left, Mao Tse-tung has held a middle course, suppressing those who made a fetish of their expertise in a specialized field and others who would end all the regime's troubles by staging a suicidal attack on Western imperialism.

The revolution does not move to the Right or the Left; it spins off the so-called "deviations" to the Right and Left, forcing Mao Tse-tung to liqui-

* The claim has been recognized, at least in its application to Cuba, by Mr. James O'Connor in *Studies on the Left,* Vol. 6 No. 2, where he clearly states that "Batista's pro-labor policies" were a hindrance to a healthy capitalistic development, but that Castro "turned to the Communists in early 1960 when the revolution required disciplined, productivity-minded labor leaders." O'Connor also recognizes that the "identification of the worker with the Revolution" occurred through the militia, not through a class organization. And these people pretend to speak for the Left!

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date his oldest friends who are unfortunate enough to become the organizational focus of interests. In our last issue, I tried to show how in this process the revolution loses support and the leader, precariously balancing on a shrinking pinnacle, must seek a new power basis. For over a year now, we have witnessed this process, and the spiral of power still is contracting in China; after the bureaucrats and administrators had been fired, it was the turn of the Party bosses, and after the bosses came, or rather went, the turn of the propaganda directors. Whoever has a function, which demands consideration for people, suddenly finds himself at odds with the leadership that wants to whip the reluctant dragon to make a new "big leap." Liu Shao-chi, the President of the Republic; Teng Hsiao-ping, Secretary General of the Party; Peng Chen, once the powerful major of Peking; Lo Jui-ching, once head of the Secret Police and of the army staff; Hsiao Hua, once the mighty security director in the army and probably the one who first conceived the idea of making the army into an instrument of the "permanent revolution"; Chou Yang, once deputy director of propaganda and a member of the Central Committee which itself has been demoted from its strategic position to be a minor wheel in the complicated apparatus of revolutionary command—they have all been deprived of their ranks and influence, or their offices no longer are considered prestigious. Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao have chosen other instruments to carry the power of government.

III

This development is only logical. If office holders use their position to oppose the plans of the leader; if propagandists declare that the people will not hear of Mao Tse-tung's teachings; if administrators call for experts in engineering instead of zealous cadre workers; if the achievement of revolutionary goals is left in the hands of mandarins who look backward instead of forward; if urgent tasks are delayed because bourgeois sentimentalists fear to burden the people instead of inciting them to harder efforts—if all these deplorable elements of retardation develop in the very body of the Communist party, then, as Bertolt Brecht said in a comparable situation, it is time for the government to elect a new people.

What Mao Tse-tung is trying to bring off at this moment, indeed, can be compared only to those great moments in history when a leader chose a people and led it into the wilderness, inflaming it with the divine spirit of redemption and salvation. In this case the "people" whom Mao chose were The Young; not those elites which in some countries are called Young Turks —but students, children, inexperienced, essentially apolitical, fun-seeking rowdies who were but too eager to make a holiday out of government-sponsored demonstrations. Nothing quite like it has been seen since Dr. Goebbels ordered young hoodlums to assemble at 8 A.M. "spontaneously" to attack synagogues. Or perhaps since the Children's Crusade. The holiday became a sacred month and it has now lasted a half year, with periods of relaxation in between, to be sure. But we also witnessed a certain rhythmic sequence of wave after wave of revolutionary ardour, vilifying, demoting, or deposing officials, Party bosses, bureaucrats, and old-timers in high office. But the terror

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has struck in particular the editorial offices, theaters, and school administrations, the propagandists of the Party, and other purveyors of culture. Parents and professors, everybody who represented tradition and authority in authoritarian, traditionalist China came under attack, often with symbolically administered violence or ritualistic acts of desecration. The so-called "cultural revolution" strikes at the mighty ones and forces them to return to the simplicity of the Yenan days. It deprives officers of their insignia of rank, teachers of their quotations from the classics, the experts in all fields of their privileged standing, and the workers of their vested interests in jobs, vacations, home, and family. The "cultural revolution" is indeed so brutal because Chinese culture is so old and ineradicable.

Under a certain aspect, this Red Guard movement may be nothing but a tool in the power struggle between Lin Piao's clique and those whom he has temporarily vanquished (though not liquidated and not even ousted).

Such an explanation, however, really explains nothing: why could they not conduct the power struggle inside the Party? We must explain why the Party itself came under attack; for the conflict is now being fought out between the Party and other organizations. It has been remarked that the army has gained considerable influence in recent months, and notably that it has taken onto itself a considerable part of the educational program, as well as the recruiting of leading cadres. Moreover, the army acts as planning agency and Stakhanovist in the construction of "socialism."

Yet to play this role, the army had to be transformed from top to bottom; its officers had to be placed under the supervision of political commissars, privates were given political rights they have in no other army; insignia were abolished. In short, the army was remade into a militia which now is the powerful instrument of a quasi-military state. In China the reminiscences of oriental despotism are not dead.* I have already mentioned Shi Huang-ti, the builder of the Great Wall; I could have mentioned the military state of the Taiping uprising in the last century. The army today is a huge machine of conscript labor which also can be used to keep an eye on both the disgruntled peasants and "gruntled" Party bosses.

IV

Professor Franz Schurmann has suggested that in both the Red Guards and the new role of the army we might detect an element of class war. The army would probably include more poor people, more young people, more farm people, more people from the provinces, and it would naturally represent that spirit of austerity which still is the moral core of Mao's revolution. While this seems persuasive at first sight, I wonder how many other armies in the world would be covered by this kind of "sociological" description; it would apply notably to Spengler's model of "Prussian socialism." My analysis would rather start out from the nature and structure of the state in which that army plays a key role.

* I do not subscribe to Weber-Wittfogel's "hydraulic theory" of oriental despotism; the present case shows that this type of government needs no "materialistic substructure."

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Indeed, a totalitarian state may use the peasant's ferocity or the illiterate's resentment when it orders him to terrorize urban intellectuals, but that does not make him into a participant of class war nor that army into a proletarian militia. On the contrary, identification of the poor with the head of the state through the army is precisely what characterizes the totalitarian mentality and mode of operation. Those who have emphasized Mao's "idealism" or "voluntarism" are aware that Mao's revolution can no longer be understood in Marxian terms.

There is another important aspect to the role of the army. It may be clear from our analysis that China now has an army which is good for home use and perhaps for a quickie raid into India, but which is hardly equipped and organized for a conflict with one of the major powers. Mao's strategy in case of that American attack which he so fears, therefore, is indicated. He must fall back on the pattern of guerilla warfare which he knows so well and which he conducted so successfully against the Japanese. This simply follows from the kind of army he has. Some observers, however, have seen the connection in the reverse order. They have concluded that a decision on strategy entailed a decision on the political government of the country. Indeed, they have intelligence that Mao's strategy again will rely on "close combat" in tactics, on "defensive warfare" in strategy, and on the "amateur war" in propaganda. Significantly, he revived the slogan "everyone a soldier" in 1965 and assured the Chinese that they would be "spiritual and moral atom bombs." In keeping with these conceptions, the army was told to place "politics first," and the professional officers were overruled on all three counts: organization, defense, and foreign policy. The organization of the army is not in the hands of its chiefs of staff but in those of a powerful Military Affairs Committee with branches in each echelon. In foreign policy the army's advice, to improve relations with the Soviet Union in order to improve the defense posture against the U.S., was rejected; and in defense policies, the army is not preparing to encounter an invasion. From all this some observers have concluded that Mao's decision in favor of guerilla-type "amateur" defense also entailed the return to the austere style of life, the mobilization of the entire population for amateur participation in defense-related work, the militarization of the nation, and finally the purge of those who disagreed with the strategy and with the policies it entailed.

It seems to me that this is an inversion of cause and effect. In totalitarian countries military decisions always are a function of politics, who ever heard of a government that deliberately destroys the effectiveness of its army because it expects an invasion? Moreover, supposing that military considerations had prompted Mao to proceed ruthlessly, it still would be necessary to explain why this decision, which originally favored the Party over the Army, led to a power struggle in which the army now became the favored instrument of policy. Finally, there is no evidence to support the assumption that the dismissed leaders were opposed to Mao's defense conceptions. With the exception of Marshall Lo Jui-ching, who advocated a strong and "active" de-

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fense policy, most of the disgraced officials have argued for a political approach to defense problems. Nevertheless, since the Chinese probably tend to exaggerate among themselves the danger of an immediate invasion or attack by the U.S., it stands to reason that factions, once they have arisen and have been identified, also will tend to adopt distinctive lines in defense policy, and that such deviations then will tend to precipitate their fall. It also stands to reason that Mao's isolationist policies do not sit well with those among the Party nabobs whose responsibility and loyalty is still, in whatever distorted ways, to the world Communist movement.

V

For whatever it is worth, a historical parallel comes to mind—Stalin's "amalgams" in purging right-wing and left-wing leaders together, and his amalgamation of the theory of "Socialism in one country" with the theory of the "Third Period," one where allegedly class war was intensified to such a danger point that greatest care had to be taken not to expose the "socialist fatherland" to imperialist intervention. Mao's reasoning, however original in other respects, follows Stalin's very closely on the question of war and peace: the most immediate task is the construction of "socialism" in the only country where, according to the Chinese, the leadership has given it a chance. The Americans are hell-bent on intervention; hence one must avoid provocation—keep the Vietnamese war just hot enough to make Johnson wary and to prevent the Russians from rapprochement with America. The policy requires a certain truculence—as evident in the rejecting of the U.N. inquiry about possible membership—but forbids active immersion in world politics. It certainly was not due to the immensity of the Chinese effort that certain African governments tried to fall into Mao's orbit, but when this was checked, the Chinese simply picked up their marbles and left. Neither did they make any special efforts to stay, nor did Mao's prestige at home suffer from the "defeat." His African adventure was much more peripheral for him than, say, the Communist defeat in China was for Stalin in 1927.

While Mao follows the example of Stalin in the isolationist period of his foreign policy, in another area he anxiously eschews the example of his great teacher—the purges so far have not been bloody. No old comrade has been banished or exiled, and some who have been vilified and humiliated publicly still hold their office—only the office, not the man has been demoted. But Napoleon also avoided purges after he had become head of state.

As Stalin eschewed the parallels with the French Revolution, so Mao may try to do things differently from Stalin. Yet the parallelism is suggestive: Stalin responded to his defeats by making himself into the Great Oracle of world Communism: Mao's reply to his defeats is the adulation of "Mao's Thoughts." It is now a crime in the People's Republic to deny that Mao is the greatest teacher of all times for all nations. It is a crime to deny that zeal in the propagation of Mao's word can be a substitute for knowledge and skill. Yet this personality cult contrasts strangely with other signs indicating

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that the totalitarian structure is far from complete and that Mao is not in full command. It has happened that the Red Guards were called to assemble and then were sent home without having seen the leader; or that Mao appeared in public with one group of leaders, while another group, comprising all the disgraced persons, also appeared ceremonially, and neither group uttering a word. All this suggests that the struggle is not at all over. According to his own philosophy which requires him to "split the one into two," Mao has raised counter-forces against the ruling Party, but he has not been able or willing to destroy it. After all, it remains the Party which he had built himself and which is the only depository of his thoughts; he would be a very reluctant Bonaparte.

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WORDS TO THE GERMANS

Günter Grass

An Open Letter to Chancellor Kiesinger

Günter Grass, the famous writer, who urged the German Social Democratic party not to participate in the "Great Coalition," sent Kurt Kiesinger, the new Chancellor, the following last-minute appeal. We reprint this moving letter, which has been widely circulated in the German press.

My dear Mr. Kiesinger:

Before you are elected Federal Chancellor tomorrow, I venture a last attempt, before the widest public, to make you see reason.

I belong to that generation whose fathers, the men of your generation, wittingly or unwittingly participated in the crimes committed since 1933. I know that many German families have been able to overcome this schism between the two generations: the fathers have re-oriented themselves and the sons have forgiven. You, Mr. Kiesinger, joined the Nazi party in 1933 as a grown-up man and only the surrender of the Reich finally relieved you from your membership.

Allow me to speculate for a moment. Suppose you were my father and I asked you to explain your portentous decision of 1933. I would be able to understand; for the majority of my generation's fathers lost their best years in consequence of such miscarriages of judgment. But if you, my hypothetical father, were to ask me, your hypothetical son: "I have been asked to be the Federal Chancellor. I am passionately interested in politics. I always felt an ambition to deal in foreign affairs. I was a successful Governor in the State of Baden-Württemberg. People like me. Shall I accept?"

Then your hypothetical son's answer would be: "Precisely because you are passionately interested in politics, and just because you are ambitious in foreign affairs, you have to decline. For surely you ought to know that, in this divided country which lives without a peace treaty, the office of a Federal Chancellor must never be filled by a man who once before has acted in defiance of reason and has served crime, while others were perishing because they followed the path of reason and resisted crime. Common decency should tell you not to appoint yourself a resistance fighter as an afterthought."

You, Mr. Kiesinger, are not my father. I hope you have a son who resists your pernicious decision.

If you allow the office of the Federal Chancellor to be burdened by your grave past, then I ask you, what arguments will be left to the young people of this country who wish to answer the party of yesterday, which is today rising from the dead as the NDP (*Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutsch-*

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lands)? How are we to be true to the memory of the tortured and murdered resistance fighters, of the Auschwitz and Treblinka dead, if you, then a fellow-traveler, now dare direct German policy? What will our schools' history classes look like from now on? Has not Mr. Globke [Adenauer's assistant, who had written a gloss on the Nuremberg Laws] done enough damage? Are we to allow Ulbricht, the unreconstructed Stalinist, to point his fingers at us? Is there no one in the Social Democratic or Christian Social and Christian Democratic parties—not one man untainted enough to hold the office of Federal Chancellor?

I am forced to believe that the Social Democratic party has failed to remember the courage of Otto Wels [its chairman at the time of the Weimar Republic]; for it should have been its business to ask you the question that I now ask. So it is left to me, one man speaking for many, to voice at the last minute my indignant protest. The responsibility will be yours. But the consequences and the shame will be ours to bear.

Yours respectfully,
Günter Grass

(Printed, with permission, from the Aufbau. *Translated by Henry Pachter.)*

To Willy Brandt: A Note of Recollection

Dear friend,

This may be the right time to remind you of the occasion when we first met. I guess it was sometime in the middle of 1929, when worried young German Socialists convened a powwow to think of ways to save our party. We foresaw disaster. Our chancellor, Hermann Mueller, was then at the head of a "great coalition" whose survival depended on an odd assortment of republican, semi-republican, and poorly assimilated parties. His coalition partners put Mueller to one test after the other. Only a month after its formation, the government had to decide whether to build a battle cruiser, as the other parties demanded, or not to build it, as the Social Democrats had promised during the elections. God knows, we did not need a battle cruiser, but the nationalists considered it a symbol that Germany was liberating herself from the "fetters of Versailles." When the Socialist ministers agreed to circumvent their promises, a storm broke loose in the party; the opposition was capable of filling large meeting halls, and the Communists did not fail to exploit this new proof of "betrayal of the working class by the Social Democratic leaders."

On May 1, 1929, the party had to pay another price for maintaining the coalition: the Berlin police commissioner, a Social Democrat, forbade the customary May Day demonstration, and when the Communists nevertheless demonstrated, 29 civilians were killed.

But the partners were not satisfied; in December, Hjalmar Schacht, then President of the Reichsbank, forced the resignation of the Socialist minister of

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Finance, Hilferding, and the Catholic "Center" party threatened to withdraw from the coalition. Meanwhile, the depression had begun and forced the cabinet to review its financial and social policies. Over this, the Social Democrats were booted out of the cabinet in March, 1930. Nevertheless, in the eyes of the voters, the Social Democrats were guilty of doing nothing at a time of great distress, and in September, 1930, extremists on the Right and Left won 38 per cent of the vote.

These events led to the expulsion of the left-wing opposition from the SPD and the founding of the SAP (Socialist Workers' Party) of which you were to become a prominent leader.

Now, at a moment when difficulties begin to appear in the "economic miracle," and when German nationalism is stirring to shed a heritage of defeat, you are again forming a coalition government. Many of our friends in Germany say that we should not take responsibility without full power at such a moment. I do not say that history always repeats itself or that it necessarily teaches the same lessons. But the past of our shared youth is worth contemplating, and I thought it appropriate to recall events which some of our younger friends may never have learned of and some of our older friends may have forgotten.

Yours,
H. P.

P.S. Dec. 2—The "great coalition" between Christian Democrats and Social Democrats worked well for over a dozen years in Austria but has recently been dissolved. In Germany such a coalition could change the electoral law so as to practically eliminate all "third parties"; an American-type system of two consensus parties may be a safeguard against the revival of a Nazi party, but is it a safeguard against Franz Joseph Strauss? This energetic gentleman considers the great coalition as only a stepping stone to his own takeover.

Partly for this reason and partly because they feel that tactically this is a poor time for a coalition experiment, more than 50 Socialist deputees have not supported the government. They fear that they will be co-responsible for an unpopular budget while at the same time they may not come nearer the one goal they always claimed to have uppermost in their hearts—Germany's unification.

Meanwhile, as foreign minister, Willy Brandt could do something useful by ridding Germany of the Adenauer mortgages. He could abandon the untenable claim to territories east of the Oder; abolish the self-defeating Hallstein doctrine (which forbids the Federal Republic to recognize governments that recognize East Germany, whose government is referred to in West German officialese as "the Soviet-zonal authorities"). Finally, he might educate the Germans to recognize the historic fact that the Munich Agreements of 1938 have been superseded and that the expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia is final.

It has long been admitted that only a great coalition can do these things which may be painful for many Germans. But should the government fail to make public these renunciations, fail to abandon the ill-starred MLF project, and fail to adhere to a non-proliferation treaty, it will not advance either the cause of Germany or the cause of peace.

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Jeremy Larner

I.S. 201: DISASTER IN THE SCHOOLS

I. De-Integration

On the first day of the Spring semester in 1964, the New York public school system was struck by a boycott through which city-wide organizations managed virtually to empty every ghetto school. The object was integration; the results were eight schools paired on the "Princeton Plan," a raft of lofty proposals, and constant turmoil ever since.

Today the eight paired schools (in themselves a comedown from the sixty the Board of Ed first promised) are falling apart, decimated by attacks from reactionary parents' groups, losing their white students, and ignored by sloganeers. The fancy studies on "Educational Parks" make good reading, but the Parks themselves are twenty years from actuality, and untested at that. The most celebrated and expensive non-solution to the integration problem comes from State Commissioner James Allen, who got the Board of Ed to redesign its grade patterns from 6–3–3 to 4–4–4. The idea was to get the kids traveling to centralized schools after the fourth grade, rather than the sixth, and then on to four-year high schools a year earlier. What Allen failed to foresee was that 200 new Intermediate Schools would be required to replace the 140 Junior High Schools, each of them servicing a smaller geographic area and therefore even more segregated. Sure enough, the new Intermediate Schools are segregated, and most prominent among them is I.S. 201, which was designed as a $5 million showpiece but opened this fall to a furor of community hostility.

Some of the parents in Harlem have been fighting for integration since the Board of Ed first paid it lip service in 1954. They had children entering segregated first-grade classes who are now graduating (usually with non-academic diplomas) from segregated high schools. In 1958, when the present site of 201 was slated for a new Junior High, the parents warned that the mid-Harlem location guaranteed segregation, and in 1959 Supt. Theobald promised not to build there. But when the site was revived for 201, the same protesters met with evasion. The Board of

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Ed blandly assured them that a borderline site wasn't necessary—the school would be so good that white parents would send in their children.

The Board then began making plans for a model school, and the plans were relatively good, involving reduced class size, heterogeneous grouping, a vast array of educational equipment, and a specially-chosen staff. Yet when it came to consulting with parents, the Board merely put up a front. Asst. Supt. Daniel Schreiber of District 4 would meet with the parents and the local school board and try to say whatever might pacify them. The parents claim that he often failed to transmit their complaints to the Board, since they might have reflected on his administration of the district. The local board itself—which was supposed to have been given new powers in the past year—eventually resigned over the 201 affair, its members charging that they had been used to "create the picture that the Board of Education does consult with the community, when, in fact, it does not." On one occasion Mr. Schreiber appeared at a local board meeting to accept suggestions for naming the new school, when the Board of Ed staff paper had announced the final choice the day before.

Nevertheless, Mrs. Helen Testamark—President of the Parents Council, which consists of the Presidents of the 23 Parents Associations in District 4—succeeded in meeting with Superintendent Bernard Donovan as early as March, 1966, in order to press complaints against certain rumored choices for the principalship. Although the parents appear to have successfully vetoed some of the early candidates, Mrs. Testamark does not feel there was any real communication between herself and Donovan. "He hasn't ignored us," she says, "he's toyed with us. It's like saying you don't count."

Finally in June the parents and community groups pinned down Donovan on integration and were told the school would be integrated 50 per cent Negro and 50 per cent Puerto Rican. Immediately the parent and community leaders, backed by the local board, staged a well-attended sit-in in the District Office. Donovan's response to this was to send out pink leaflets to various other districts, asking for volunteers to send their children to the big new school in the middle of Harlem. Meanwhile the projected summer session was canceled, and the local groups announced that the school would be boycotted if it opened segregated in September.

By this time, as a teacher at 201 put it, "The parents had been lied to for years. They thought they were lied to because they were Negroes—but they got equal treatment. This is the way the Board of Ed always treats parents and teachers." Not sharing this perspective, the

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Negroes went about creating a solid black front. The Parents Council was swallowed up by a Negotiating Team chosen in a "closed room" but nonetheless representing the community groups active in the neighborhood and eventually including three parents out of ten negotiators. As the negotiators talked to Donovan, however, as many as 20 "observers" sat around the room, some of whom came from "black power" groups. The observers may have served not only to keep the rhetoric pure but also to keep out concerned groups from the larger community. Most notably, neither the staff of 201 nor the United Federation of Teachers was asked to participate. One parent told me that they simply assumed the teachers would "do their jobs"—an assumption based on a distrust of "outside" professionals and their standards.

For the first week of school the boycott was in force, the negotiators were meeting with Donovan, and the Board of Ed was avoiding a head-on confrontation by keeping 201 closed and sending its pupils (80 per cent Negro, 20 per cent Puerto Rican) back to the feeder schools they came from. And by Monday of the following week, lo and behold, Donovan and the Negotiating Team came to an agreement.

II. Images and Personalities

Most of the parents and community leaders do not regard themselves as black nationalists. David Spencer, for instance, who works for MEND, a local community action project, has one child in 201 and another in an integrated Junior High in Astoria. But Spencer, like most of the other leaders, has been negatively impressed by the slowness of integration in jobs and housing as well as in education.

> You say "integration"—that word has stopped a lot of things for us. The bills that had that tag got chopped up, but it seems the others slipped through. A man say integration, I say that's *your* worry, because you promised it. He say it's a two-way thing, I say I don't know, I want to see it.

In talking about 201, Spencer expresses an attitude that comes naturally to a man who works at helping the poor to help themselves.

> I don't want segregation, but if I have it, I want it on my own terms. I don't want anyone else coming in to tell me what's best for me. I feel *I* know what's best for me.

The negotiators wanted two things: a special council controlled by parents and community to run the school in joint control with the Board of Ed; and a black principal. The key to their first demand is *accountability;* for they had found that although 85 per cent of Harlem children are at least two years behind in reading levels, it was impossible

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for parents or parents associations or local boards to hold a teacher or a principal responsible. The average Harlem principal—as I reported two years ago* and as the principals themselves were to confirm by their response to Donovan's agreement—is a frightened mediocrity who runs his school like a fortress. The council Donovan agreed to would have had funds for outside evaluation and curriculum development; but more than that, it would have had the power to recommend and screen personnel. The agreement stipulated that a teacher would not be hired if either the Board or the council had a "sound, serious objection." The wording was vague and teachers might wonder what qualifications the council had for judging them. But no one could doubt that Harlem schools are full of a) inadequately prepared substitutes, b) arrogant incompetents, and c) unconsciously condescending prigs who simply cannot reach ghetto children. Concerned parents knew that their children weren't being taught, but the standard explanations place the blame solely on the children and their homes, and the bureaucracy is too vast and principled to permit a fruitful complaint.

The demand for a black principal also reflected the leaders' desire to make the school their own, to make it respect in its very structure the intrinsic human worth of themselves and their children. They wanted a black principal for an example to the children—what some of them call "a motivational image." They were mindful, too, that only four of New York's 870 principals are Negro, and not all of them have permanent appointments—a record that is surely attributable in some degree to prejudice, which manifests itself most clearly in the oral section of the licensing exam.

Yet to say that the demands were emotionally powerful and humanly justified is not to say that Donovan should have given in to them or that their ultimate fulfillment would have made 201 a better school. Not many good teachers are attracted to a school where parents can hire or fire, for reasons I will discuss later. As for the black principal, Donovan should have scoured the earth long before then to get the best one available. But he had already committed himself to a dedicated white principal, and to betray him at that point was to betray the parents, for a racial issue was raised which shattered the immediate prospects of parental participation and gave ammunition to racists of the Right and Left.

In the heat of battle, various community representatives impugned the ability of Stanley Lisser, who has had experience at two other Harlem schools. They claimed to have seven pages of complaints from parents, but refused to submit them to the then-existent Civilian Review Board.

* "The New York School Crisis," DISSENT, Spring 1964.

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It turned out that the complaints were compiled by a black nationalist teacher who first clashed with Lisser when the teacher insisted on the right to administer corporal punishment to his pupils. This reporter was unable to document one serious complaint against Lisser, whom he found to be a thoughtful, worried man devoted to the welfare of his pupils and staff. Despite his above-mentioned troubles as principal of P.S. 175, Lisser instituted a special reading program, which, though it had no chance to achieve sensational results in the short time it ran, still produced better reading scores than those at P.S. 119, where principal Elliot Shapiro enjoyed exceptionally good relations with the Harlem community.

Miss Beryle Banfield, one of Lisser's Assistant Principals, worked under Shapiro at P.S. 119, where she led a group of teachers and volunteers who produced a lengthy teachers' guide to Africa. Under Lisser at P.S. 175, Miss Banfield directed a similar group in the production of a history of Harlem, and it is worth noting that the latter is a sounder, more detailed document. If they chance to read it, members of the Negotiating Team may be surprised at Lisser's preface, where he writes:

> A people stripped of pride in their heritage and without accurate knowledge of their history are a people without a guiding light or a bedrock. Whether by accident or pernicious design, the true history of the Afro-American, both in Africa and the United States, has been omitted and ignored in our textbooks and our curriculum. Not only is there a lack of knowledge, but there is a vast amount of distorted history which must be rewritten.

III. The Crisis

Lisser and Banfield had picked their staff together, choosing entirely from volunteers, and ending up with 55 unusually committed teachers, nearly half of them Negro.

> When we picked teachers [says Miss Banfield], we wanted people who were aware that the parents needed a voice in decision-making. The parents were not kept properly informed—or they would not have produced a parent-teacher confrontation. These teachers want the same thing as the parents; we're on their side. The only shade of difference that might arise is in regard to professional matters. [But what a shade that little shade turned out to be!]

When the boycott became imminent this summer, the teachers met as a UFT chapter (all but one are members), and decided to honor the parents' picket-line. Lisser, in an act that set him apart from almost every other Harlem principal, promised to defend them against reprisals. "You

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don't have to come in," he is said to have told them. "You've got to understand how the parents feel."

While Donovan talked to the negotiators, the teachers baby-sat for their new pupils, who milled restlessly in the gyms, yards, and lunchrooms of schools that no longer had room to teach them. On the following Monday, both Donovan and the negotiators wanted the teachers to take the kids into P.S. 103, an old school that was empty because it was condemned. The teachers inspected the school and found that the Board had provided a minimum of books and a quick dusting. They voted 44–10 not to go in. "Our relationship with the kids had been jeopardized already by a week of sheep-herding," one teacher told me. "We knew that if we took them into 103, we'd have lost them for good." Here was that first "shade of difference" that caused the teachers to defy both Board and community. "We wanted a chance to prove that we could teach these kids," Miss Banfield said later. "We wanted 201 to be opened for these kids with this staff."

The teachers assembled that Monday at 201, where they were later informed that Lisser (under pressure from Donovan) had offered his resignation and that the school was to open with Miss Banfield serving as principal until an appropriate black male could be agreed upon. Whereupon Miss Banfield immediately announced—to the cheers of her colleagues—that she would not be chosen on the basis of color rather than competence. At least, those were the phrases the newspapers zeroed in on, hailing the statement as a victory over "reverse racism." Correspondingly, the Negotiating Team felt that "Beryle Banfield broke our backs." But both Miss Banfield's words and her motives were more complex than heretofore reported. She refused partly because she felt the offer was "fraudulent": she would be principal "in name only," without the license and therefore, she felt, with no more power than other temporary Negro principals she'd seen flounder, unable to command support, materials, or full decision-making authority. She refused also because she was part of a staff that had come to serve under Lisser, a staff she knew would not have been as good without him.

That the community could so badly misunderstand Beryle Banfield is one of the most painful ironies of a situation marked by an utter lack of communication between community groups and teachers. Beryle Banfield is hardly the prototype of the Tom teacher. When her first day as Asst. Principal happened to fall on Feb. 3, 1964, the day of the city-wide boycott, Miss Banfield stayed out of school and reported instead to teach at a "Freedom School"—thereby putting her new job right on the line. Herself a product of a completely segregated Harlem education

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(including P.S. 119), Miss Banfield is thoroughly committed to giving Harlem children—with whom she has an impressively open way of talking—"a sense of identity," which for her involves both the African heritage and the counteracting of what she refers to as "white values." Miss Banfield is currently writing a biography of Marcus Garvey, who she thinks has been badly misrepresented. No parent could have been more concerned than she that 201 be unblemished by "teachers who are threatened."

The next day the teachers picketed the Board of Ed and got Donovan —who had been roundly criticized in the press—to refuse Lisser's resignation. At the same time the Superintendents' Association issued to the media a set of holy principles decreeing no parents in the schools forever. Later that afternoon at UFT headquarters, the teachers met for the first time (and last, to date) some members of the Negotiating Team. Dorothy Jones of the Protestant Council admitted "we should have come to you," but said she was going to "stand my ground." Livingston Wingate of HARYOU gave a friendly lecture on the concept of Harlem as a colony which needs self-government. But any potential cooperation was stymied by Roy Innis of CORE, who denounced the white teachers for their "white values" and the black teachers for being "white-oriented." Once more the stage was set for the racist image-peddlers on either side to polarize the two groups who not only have ultimate goals in common but who are powerless without each other.

A parent delegate later referred to Wingate and Innis as "the headline-makers." "The newspaper people don't look down at the poor parent in the corner," he said, "because these fellows over-shout 'em." Another parent leader told me simply, "I knew Roy Innis when he was interested in Civil Rights."

IV. Plans and Slogans

The next day 201 opened for business with Lisser as principal and the Negotiating Team utterly betrayed. They had gone home thinking they had won an agreement and learned otherwise from press and TV, where they saw their defeat proclaimed "a victory over racism." They reacted with bitterness. "What we see happening in the schools is a result of racism," says Mrs. Babette Edwards of the East Harlem Protestant Parish, "but when we object, *we* are branded racist—by the same people who have always called us apathetic!"

The result was an unsuccessful attempt at a boycott, under the self-defeating slogan: KEEP 201 CLOSED/FOR EITHER DESEGREGATION/OR TOTAL COMMUNITY CONTROL. But only 40 pickets

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appeared, including a disproportionate number of nationalists, some of whom tried to prevent entrance with their bodies and were then thrown off by police. Meanwhile attendance inside the building approached 90 per cent—an unusually high figure for a Harlem schoolday—and a dozen parents interviewed by *The Amsterdam News* were all against the boycott.

For the next few nights, hectic meetings were held in Harlem, while, on the outside, Donovan was criticized for "handing over the school." Trying to come up with something acceptable, many of the protest leaders supported a new plan devised by Dr. Kenneth Clark, wherein the Board would "contract out" 201 to an "operations board" composed of community, parents, and Columbia Teachers College. This plan, too, ran into heavy opposition, mostly from the UFT, which had decided that teachers ought to be represented on any board. Moreover, said Al Shanker, President of the UFT, "we don't know where you get such confidence in Columbia—has it made such a good record in training our present teachers?" Shanker also had objections to "contracting out" schools—a problem I will take up later.

Others shared these objections. "The education colleges have not produced a single thing of value for teaching in the ghetto," says Herb Kohl, a Teachers College graduate and the best ghetto teacher I've seen —but the Union took the rap in the community. "It's because of you," said Clark to Shanker, "our children are being destroyed."

Meanwhile union leaders, along with some national civil rights leaders, were formulating an alternative plan that the Board might present to the protesters. This plan called for an "advisory board" that could not be accused of "taking over" the school, and which would consist of parent, teacher, and community representatives. Once more, poor communications prevented community groups from realizing how effective such a board might be; for the proposal called for the Board of Ed to supply funds with which the advisory board might hire its own staff and conduct its affairs independently. The advisory board would have become the first organized group to have complete access to achievement scores; it would have had the power to employ outside agencies of its own choice to evaluate the school; and it could have hired universities or other groups to develop new curricula and to run training programs. In short, the proposed board, while advisory, would have had considerable real power.

But once again the image of power proved more important than the actuality. The Board of Ed leaked the plan to the press, thereby preempting A. Philip Randolph and other civil rights figures who were ready to present it to the community. Moreover, the Board prefaced the plan

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with a long statement of all the wonderful things they had done for ghetto schools. The Board's image was that of a generous donor, buttressed as usual by fulsome editorials derived from the handouts of its every-busy publicity staff. The community had no choice but to reject the plan, despite a fairly positive statement from Clark. "Under the circumstances, I would've rejected it, too," said Shanker.

The outcome was that the community forces have hardened their line. "The Board of Ed says the community is uneducable," says Mrs. Edwards. "It doesn't blame itself in the slightest. Unless parents have a majority voice, I don't think any board is worthwhile."

The Board of Ed, under fire now from Mayor Lindsay, was reduced to a promise to appoint a "Task Force" of prominent citizens to investigate the whole problem of ghetto schools and to make recommendations for sweeping changes. The Task Force was supposed to have been appointed within 30 days, but as of early December no names had been announced. Mrs. Edwards and several other community leaders have turned down appointments because they don't want to serve as "buffers between the Board and the community."

V. The Union as Devil

"I think the Union is the Devil in this whole thing," says a wealthy white foundation director, safely echoing a fashionable Harlem opinion. He's forgotten, perhaps, that the UFT leadership came out in support of the parents' original demands to screen out teachers to whom they had "sound and serious" objections—adding only that the accused must have his "day in court." Al Shanker is well aware of the kinds of bad teachers who operate in Harlem and believes that parents have a right to do something about them. He also believes that positive steps should be taken to attract better teachers. At any rate, the stand he took brought him a deluge of complaints from the more conservative segment of his membership, who blamed Shanker for Lisser's firing. Within the UFT Shanker was skating on thin ice in his attempt to lead the teachers in a progressive direction, just as he had when he proposed that the UFT's delegate assembly endorse the Civilian Review Board. It is indicative of the strong conservative minority within the ranks of teachers that this measure passed by a margin of only 486 to 375, with two chapters taking ads in the *World Journal Tribune* to attack Shanker's leadership.

Shanker had to make it absolutely clear that the Union would not stand for any violation of a teacher's professional status, nor any hiring or firing done on the basis of color or any other non-professional criterion. This accounts for the Union's public rejoicing in a "victory" at the time when the community felt most defeated.

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Radical critics of the Union (and within the Union) tend to overlook the fact that the UFT has existed only since 1962, when it had a hard struggle simply to establish collective bargaining. Since then it has made remarkable progress in upgrading the teaching profession in New York City, despite a bad press, internal dissention, and lack of support from stuffed-shirt educators, politicians, and high-class parents' organizations. It is true that so far most of the Union's bargaining points have concerned salaries and working-conditions, with benefits to ghetto children coming only indirectly—insofar as better-paid and less put-upon teachers will tend to teach better. But in the past two years under Shanker, the Union has begun to make proposals for fundamental changes in ghetto schools and in the system that serves them.

Over a year ago, the Union voted down the Board's suggestion for forced rotation of teachers, an ill-conceived effort to send better teachers into the ghettos. The Union's resistance created antagonism in the ghetto and among the more militant teachers, who did not appreciate the professional considerations involved. Shortly thereafter, however, the UFT prevailed upon the Board of Ed to designate certain elementary schools as "More Effective Schools," where extra funds would be spent to carry out a union-developed program for the first four grades, which involved heterogeneous grouping, smaller classes, and volunteer staffs including all kinds of specialists. An M.E.S. inter-school teachers' committee now coordinates such programs in 21 schools, where reading levels have indeed been improved, although the Board is beginning to complain about the high costs.

Deriding most of the "solutions" proposed so far as "empty slogans," Shanker has come up with a series of practical ideas which would enable ghetto teachers to move beyond "survival techniques," such as setting out copy-work, buying off troublemakers, showing movies, and playing in the park. First of all, he wants an "Internship Program" within each school, "so that teachers who know how to teach can provide on-the-job training for teachers who don't." Secondly, he agrees with those educators who have long called for the abolition of the Board of Examiners, with its eccentric licensing procedures. Shanker would like the Board of Ed to rely on the U.S. Exam for Teachers, which is given at every teaching college in the country. At present 37 per cent of the New York teaching staff consists of substitutes, which means that there is no alternative to incompetent teachers. But if thousands of would-be teachers all over the U.S. suddenly became eligible to teach in New York City, the present incumbents would feel the pressure of competition.

(To which one might add, why not throw it open all the way? Why

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not let anyone into your internship program who has a B.A.? Why not let in VISTA workers, unemployed artists, qualified volunteers? What the parents are saying, in effect, is that the traditional teachers college formulas don't count in the teaching of ghetto children. Once an internship program is established, actual teaching success can be made the only criterion of licensing.)

Shanker also has some ideas for reforming supervision. "There is no supervision in the public schools of New York at the present time. The supervisors have all decided that it's easier to write up schedules and order supplies than to provide teaching leadership." He wants the Board of Ed to hire administrators from outside to take care of finances and supplies, and to let each staff of teachers *elect* its principal from its own ranks. The principal would then bear the responsibility of head teacher. Judging by distribution of UFT chapter chairmen, Shanker estimates that this procedure would result in the immediate creation of 30 Negro principals.

A delicate point in Shanker's proposals calls for special facilities for severely disturbed children, two or three of whom can put a ghetto class in a total state of disruption. Shanker contends that the equivalent children in middle-class schools are removed by their own parents, who can afford to send them to private classes. It's a tricky matter, however, to pick out the psychologically disoriented in a ghetto school where so many children are justifiably angry, defiant, and withdrawn. Bad teachers tend to *create* a certain number of "disturbed" children, and I have seen some boys and girls who were judged impossible by guidance teachers suddenly begin to read and write on an extremely high level, simply because they finally found a teacher whom they trusted.

Shanker will soon propose to the UFT that it accept the help of nonprofessional school aides, even to the point of letting them assist with the teaching. Nor has he given up on integration: he notes that at P.S. 307 in Brooklyn, 120 parents, mostly white, are bussing their children into a ghetto area to take advantage of a free all-day kindergarten, and that more parents are clamoring to do the same. Since middle-class children are evidently not too precious to be bussed to something they can't get otherwise, Shanker suggests that the city could create new ghetto facilities for inexpensive summer camps, music schools and pre-school centers.

As this article goes to press, the UFT is about to come out with a new plan for community involvement in ghetto schools. Unlike the Board of Ed's plan, it will begin with the admission that pupils have been retarded in several basic skills. It will suggest that the Board single out one area—District 4, which includes 201—for immediate improvement, to

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be followed by two the following year and three the year after. It calls for the foundation in each area of an "Educational Development Council," which would include people from the Board of Ed as well as elected representatives from the UFT and the community. Each Council would be funded to develop definite plans for improvement, which in turn would be subject to ratification by the Board, the local teachers, and a congress of parents.

Until there is some plan—or planned experiment—it will be impossible to tell which teacher, book, or method makes a difference. Nor can teaching performance be measured and held accountable until parents and teachers are jointly involved in setting goals and methods.

VI. The Future

Since the boycott of 1964 and its disillusioning aftermath, the fight against inferior ghetto education has shifted to a series of local actions directed against specific schools and principals. At the present moment there is trouble brewing at schools on the Lower East Side and in Brownsville, at P.S. 175 and P.S. 125 in Harlem, and at P.S. 36, "the school on the rocks" being built on Morningside Heights, where Columbia's involvement has already been an unhappy one.

In almost every case, the activists are going it alone and not seeking allies outside their communities. Although most of them are not black nationalists, they have assimilated nationalist rhetoric to describe themselves and their predicament. As an example, let me submit an excerpt from the newsletter of the East Harlem Protestant Parish, which is directed by the white Rev. Robert Nichols:

> Harlem has accepted the definition of itself as a colony. . . . If it cannot participate in White American Society, it is no longer going to be exploited by overseers who commute into the neighborhood by day, wreak havoc with the lives of the black people, and withdraw by night with big paychecks. . . . A way must be found to make the public school part of the very fabric of the ghetto community.

No knowledgeable person could deny that there is some truth in the colonial metaphor. But acceptance of the metaphor will only tend to make it more true. Suppose, for example, that "White American Society" also accepts the metaphor and directs Supt. Donovan to cut loose the ghetto schools, so that they can be "part of the fabric of the ghetto community." Would the result be better education?

That many teachers, social workers, and other professionals do not behave with professional adequacy in the ghetto situation is an observable and deplorable fact which must be altered. But must we then con-

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clude, along with the new romanticists of poverty (many of whom are affluent whites), that *there is no such thing* as professional knowledge, ability, or training? Clearly there are areas—for example, medicine—where letting poor people take care of themselves is no solution; it's a form of sabotage. Just as medical care for the poor must be more sensitively coordinated into the public fabric of their lives, so must teaching. If there are "outsiders" already involved in the fabric of the community, the trick is not to chase them away, but to use them, to make the most of them.

The fact is that most of those who employ the colonial metaphor don't mean to be taken literally. At bottom, most of their demands are for a different *kind* of help—a kind that includes participation—rather than an end to help altogether. The danger of such rhetoric is that it is believed both by those who hear it and those who speak it—in which case the waters are muddied, backlash cuts off funds, and children are filled with bitterness instead of knowledge.

The current vogue in super-solutions is decentralization. Each day an academic anarchist proposes a new theory, and budding manipulators scamper for funds to universities, foundations, and government. A move is currently afoot to start a private Junior High in Harlem, financed by the Ford Foundation, blessed by Robert Kennedy, and run by a "community corporation." In the midst of the 201 crisis, Nelson Rockefeller proposed that schoolboards be elected—a proposal that was greeted with joy by reactionary parents in Queens. Still others are proposing that the public school system be abolished, that each child receive a stipend to go to the private school of his choice, that schools be run entirely by neighborhood boards, or that schools be farmed out to private institutions.

All of these notions raise basic questions about the nature and purpose of public school systems. One hardly knows where to start—you'd think there were no good reasons for public education in the first place! Supposedly the members of a democratic society share some values—values neither black nor white—which we would like to impart to all our children. Perhaps most of us wouldn't like it if a private school in Queens collected a government subsidy to teach its kids, say, that suburbs are sacred sanctuaries, or that welfare is unconstitutional. So we would have to supervise our decentralized schools somehow, probably license them, set standards for teacher training, for achievement levels, for sanitation—and perhaps end up with a bureaucracy larger and more corrupt than the one we have now. And can anyone testify that the teachers colleges, or the educational institutes, or private industry, or even poverty groups,

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are intrinsically more efficient and less susceptible to corruption than the New York Board of Ed?

Many of the Harlem parents think they are demanding no more than suburban parents already have, when they ask for the right to choose teachers and set curricula. But the truth is that most suburban school boards choose only the supervisor, who then controls the curriculum and guarantees the job of everyone he hires. The basic decision is the choice of supervisor—and it is true that Harlem parents have no such choice, and that they must be given some sort of participatory equivalent. But the general rule in American education is that the more parents leave schools to professionals, the better they are. The richer the community, the more sophisticated educationally, the more it stays out of curriculum and personnel. For no teacher who has much respect for his teaching ability will be attracted to or remain in a system where his curriculum is dictated to him and the displeasure of a pupil can get him fired.

If the Harlem community got what some of its leaders say they want, they'd get no more than what crummy rural schools have. New York schools are already superior to those schools. I.S. 201 is particularly superior. What we have to get is something more like rich suburban schools have. And to get that we need more money, we need to attract and train better teachers, we need progress in integrating our whole society, and, most immediately, we need formalized cooperation between school and community.

If one assumes that big-city politics are here to stay, what will produce progressive results is an increased adroitness at conciliating and coordinating the various interest groups, a majority of which have a positive stake in educational improvement. Now, as never before, these groups are talking about what will work and what won't. But if the cycle of failure and frustration continues, it will only reinforce the temptation to a sterile superiority and a righteous defeat.

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Paul Goodman

THE MORALITY OF SCIENTIFIC TECHNOLOGY*

It is becoming common among philosophers to treat the progress of science and the proliferating system of technology as the now determining cause of history, autonomous and underlying like the Marxist "relations of production," but narrower than that, less dependent on human choice. Whatever men wish, the independent development of scientific technology will shape the future. In more drastic versions of the theory, technology has already changed man into a product of itself or a technical function in its own system.

To Jacques Ellul, for instance, the American "empty society" can be more simply defined as an inevitable result of our high technology where, in his words, "work implies an absence of man, whereas previously it implied a presence." He means that a few motions of human labor and brains are selected and used mechanically, and the rest must be deleted as an interference. The controlling social organization, to which I would attribute independent influence, is to Ellul nothing but a function of technology itself, which in its essence standardizes, swallows up every case, and controls. And the populist and libertarian counterforces are to him whistling in the dark; he would say they are, like his own complaints, "the work of some miserable intellectual who balks at technical progress. What good is it to pose questions of motive? Technique exists because it is technique."

Marshall MacLuhan pursues the same theme less pessimistically. He holds that the technical style of communications alters the nature of human perception and thought. It makes little difference, he says, what message or entertainment is broadcast on television, or whether the airways are a free forum or are regimented monopolies, for the effect on human nature has already occurred because of the electronics medium itself. There is no point in making value judgments, and Professor MacLuhan claims, at least in his delightful lectures, that he is morally neutral. (I think he is privately more disturbed.)

* This essay was one of the Massey Lectures prepared for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and will be published by Random House, Inc., in *Like a Conquered Province*, in spring, 1967. Copyright © 1967 by Paul Goodman.

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For Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, however, the new knowledge and technique constitute no less than a leap forward in organic evolution, transcending humanity as we have known it. Essentially, we now inhabit the Noösphere, the world-wide network of exchange of scientific information. Behavior no longer springs from animal humors, the personal conflict of passion and reason, or the politics of groups, but from the decision of the giant intellectual spirit. As a pious Christian, Teilhard de Chardin is enthusiastic about our new state of being, which is imbued with divine love. I am bemused at the nature of the love given or received, as either eros or agape, by what seem to be information-retrieval computers, but no doubt I fail to understand.

Here, then, are three strong minds who see essentially the same phenomenon, the system of scientific technology brooding freely and determining the future, though they evaluate it differently as horrible, neutral, or blessed.

Yet the gross history of the past hundred years does not reveal this phenomenon. Scientific technology has certainly effected with its products, processes, and method most human beings and nearly every human function; in large areas it has created an artificial landscape and altered the balance of species; it has gotten off the planet and may destroy a good part of life on the planet. But invariably, in its proliferation, its direction of development, and its intensification of effect, it has been in the employ of old familiar motives: profits, power, and the aggrandizement of persons or groups; or convenience, health, excitement, and curiosity. I do not see the autonomy. On the contrary, it can be shown that the organization of recent scientific technology has, by and large, moved *away* from the traditional research autonomy of science and the principle of efficiency of technology, and under political, military, and economic control. If they were organized in their own terms, science and technology would be very differently organized. At present there is a waste of scientists' time and brains, and engineers are not allowed to decide like real professionals. Finally, the moral and ritual drives to standardization, rationalization, control, and self-control—what Max Weber called the Protestant Ethic—have, in my opinion, been more intensified by new psychological obsessions to ward off insecurity, and compulsions to identify with power, than by technical routine. People submit to inhuman routine out of fear and helplessness. And such routine is *not* of the essence of scientific technology. In the past both science and technology progressed better without such rituals, and they would do so now.

Yet I would not bother to make these academic remarks—which are partly matters of definition and largely depend on what one pays atten-

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tion to—except that the present submissive state of scientific technology is a sad betrayal of the promise of independent scientific technology dreamed of by Thomas Huxley, Kropotkin, Veblen, John Dewey, Buckminster Fuller. They thought of science as humble, brave, and austere, and of technology as circumspect, neat, and serviceable. Working by its own morale, scientific technology should by now have simplified life rather than complicated it, emptied the environment rather than cluttered it, and educated an inventive and skillful generation rather than a conformist and inept one. It is the same with the development of communications. Norbert Wiener used to point out that repetition of communication just increases the noise; in general, he said, there is more new information in a good poem than in a scientific report, because there is more improvization on the basic code. Then, if our electronics media, and printing media, were doing their job, there would be less brainwashing and less gabble altogether; and Americans would not be spending six hours a day watching television and learning new habits of perception.

Jacques Ellul is mistaken about us miserable intellectuals. We complain not because we balk at technical progress but because we are disappointed in it.

2. *The Morality of Science*

Since I intend to complain about the present morale of scientific technology, let me first make clear what I do not complain of. Science *is* autonomous, because knowledge must be pursued for its own sake as part of the human adventure. Despite the risks involved, for instance in nuclear physics, most people honor this claim. I do. Also, technology is grounded in the human principle that you must give a workman the best tool, otherwise he is degraded. Despite the disruption sometimes involved, for instance in automation, most people are not Luddite and do not oppose technological advance. I do not.

Apart from these basic principles, however, the meaning of both science and technology has changed radically in the past fifty years. The often repeated statement that there are more scientists now alive than existed in all previous time ought to put us on the alert. How do these new multitudes of scientists take themselves? how are they in the world?

The present orthodox philosophy of scientific technology is that there is something called pure science or basic research which is morally neutral (except for the drive toward knowledge). Its inquiries may not lead to anything useful. Useful findings are "applied" and become part of the system of technology.

This is a peculiar position, and quite untraditional. What is "ap-

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plied" science? It is reasonable to make the Aristotelian distinction between science as an act of wonder, disinterested curiosity, and esthetic construction, and technique as empirical rules of thumb for efficient practice; but especially since the Renaissance, natural philosophers would not have made a big deal of such a distinction. Every theory involves operations and apparatus; and a *reasoned* machine, like a steam engine or a generator, is a model of its theory, it is not an "application." The machine is applied, not the theory. In fact, of course, science and technology have rarely gone separate ways; it would be odd if they had. Agriculture, domestication of animals, measurement, building, machinery, navigation, transportation, communication, politics, war, pedagogy, medicine, all abound in controlled experiments that invite observation and testing; their difficulties and errors lead to new questions; new apparatus make new theory. Contrariwise, any natural discovery is bound to be tried out; a model is built if only as a toy; and natural philosophers have always put their wits to work for industry, war, and medicine.

What is striking is that the doctrine of pure science and its moral neutrality always comes to the fore when scientists are assigned an official status and become salaried or subsidized, as in the German universities in the nineteenth century or in America today. It looks like an attempt, on the part of the scientists, to affirm their identity and protect themselves against officious interference by managers; but it is also, I am afraid, a self-deception and a hoax on the public. In America at present the great bulk of the billions of dollars for science is for research on extrinsically chosen problems, or even on particular products. A large part of the training of scientists in the universities is toward rather narrow technological expertness. Of nearly $20 billion marked for Research and Development, more than 90 per cent is actually devoted to last-stage designing of hardware for production. Corporations mark up prices 1000 per cent in order, they say, to pay for basic research, but most of the research is to bypass other firms' patents. It is hard to credit that this kind of science is disinterested, and that promoters are not using the prestige of science as a talking-point.

It is taken for granted that amazing new developments will, if possible, at once be sequestered for military use and sometimes be made secret. Lasers will be death rays. The adventure of space will end in orbiting missile sites. The chief use of drugs that influence behavior will be to paralyze an enemy's will to resist. Anthropology is for counter-insurgency in primitive countries. And even the benevolent dolphins are to be trained as kamikaze submarines. Unfortunately this is not a caricature. Then it is dismaying to hear dedicated scientists explain that they

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are allowed perfect freedom to do restricted-publication research, and that any theoretical problem is indifferently good for the progress of science. And I have heard the pathetic contrary position, a fine physicist at Caltech saying he feels guilty about taking the federal money, because they are not going to get what they expect. The simplest explanation of the proposition that "there are more scientists alive today than existed up to now" is that business-as-usual has coopted science. It is not that our society has become scientific, but that to be a "scientist" has become one of the exploitable roles.

Make a historical contrast. During the heroic age of modern science, say from the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries, natural philosophers believed, uncritically and perhaps naively, that they directly confronted the nature of things in a kind of dialogue with Nature with a capital N. Each man was solitarily engaged in this open dialogue which might lead in any direction and hopefully be surprising. But since all were engaged in a common enterprise on the frontier of knowledge, they eagerly communicated with one another, in academies, by publication, depositing theses in university libraries, and by enormous correspondence by letter. (Theorists of anarchism point to the sublime progress of modern science as a triumph of almost perfect coordination without top-down management.) The duty of publication to allow replication became part of the definition of science; by it one became honored as the first. One is puzzled as to what restricted "scientific" information can mean. Does "replicable" mean "replicable by those cleared by the FBI"?

During the heroic period, science was not the social orthodoxy. Indeed, a disproportionate number of the natural philosophers were exploring forbidden territory and publishing defiantly. They were not getting any grants. Their image was rough and morose or moonstruck and bumbling. Their claim to freedom of inquiry was grounded not in a formal distinction about role but in a civil conflict about content; this confirmed their solidarity as a rebellious band. They were not morally neutral, nor was Nature morally neutral. Nature was wonderful or horrible or fascinating; she was surely beyond ordinary human uses, but abounding in moral as well as practical lessons for human betterment.

In their hearts, I am sure, many scientists still belong to the ancient band—just as many academics still vote with Abelard. Sometimes a great scientist talks the old language. Old-fashioned moralists hanker after a "natural ethics" or a "scientific way of life." But the official position is quite otherwise. Science is no longer a dialogue with Nature but a system of expanding knowledge that is self-generating and self-correcting, something like Hegel's progressive Absolute Idea. It is to this system that scientists are dedicated and which they serve with a special method prac-

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ticed with considerable formal scrupulosity, so that it sometimes seems to be the correct method rather than the content that constitutes scientific truth. Rather than banded individuals, scientists have become an organized priesthood, and their system has become the major orthodoxy of modern society; it is the system of ideas that everybody—including myself—believes, whether or not one knows anything about it. The popular feeling about it contains both superstitious reverence and superstitious fear, and the current mass-education in science, we shall see, does not allay these. By and large, however, laymen are convinced that the progress of science will increase human happiness.

The shift of emphasis from an open dialogue of morose or bumbling men with surprising Nature to an elite service to a progressive self-correcting system of knowledge has been accompanied by immense changes in the social organization of science, the role of the scientist, and the personal engagement of the man in the role. There is now less use for individual genius and hunch, nor for a personal ethical choice of a field of search as peculiarly fascinating, congenial, or "good." The issue is not, let me make clear, whether the field is benevolent or useful, for it has often been the hallmark of scientific genius to research the senseless, the apparently trivial, the pathological. But I doubt that an older-style scientist paid attention to what *he* considered indifferent. His work was suffused with himself—and it is my Wordsworthian bias that scientists and artists, formed by their disinterested conversation with meaning, are usually good people. When a study is pursued as indifferently scientific, however, it is likely that extrinsic purposes will dictate the direction that is taken. Inevitably there is pressure for pay-off rather than the wandering dialogue with surprise. A scientist becomes personnel, pursuing the goals of the organization.

More fatefully, as a great successful institution, the system of knowledge has become interlocked with the other great institutions of society, and the dominant style takes over. But this style was not devised for open dialogue with surprise; it was devised for cash-accounting, tax collection, military discipline, logistics, and mass-manufacture. Yet it must somehow be appropriate to science too. Committees *must* be able to evaluate "projects." There *must* be profiles of gifted persons to support, and there *must* be university courses relevant to training others. Scientific thinking must be able to be parcelled out for efficient division of labor, and discoveries must occur on schedule: basic research, application, development, shaping up for production. With enough capital, one can mount a crash program and break through. To be serviceable, excellent scientists become administrators. Grant-getters, who are clever about the forms, become scientists. Corporations become impresarios for scien-

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tists. Scientific brains from other countries are bought up to work in the American style on American problems, seriously depoverishing their own peoples and precluding the development of various schools of thought. In the end, unless a hypothesis involves big cash, its author cannot afford to pursue it, though he used to love it.

The rationalization is ready to hand. Modern science *requires* big capital and big organization: take cyclotrons, moon shots, statistical surveys, universal information-retrieval. These are now science *par excellence*. There has been a re-definition. By-passing the method of hypothesis, analysis, deduction, and crucial experiment, the scientific style of nearly 400 years, we have amazingly come back full circle to the bureaucratic system of Bacon's *Novum Organum*. The Manhattan Project was the watershed.

It is hard to know whether the corporate style of research is really the best one, for it tends to be self-proving. If brainy people agree to operate in this manner, they are not operating in some other manner and we do not know what they would be producing. Yet there is a curious body of evidence compiled by the Anti-Trust Committee of the United States Senate that shows rather overwhelmingly that in recent decades, even in practical Research and Development, the majority of significant advances have *not* come from big corporations and big universities and have not been sponsored by foundations and government; they have still come from lonely (and often rejected) individuals, random amateur inventors, partnerships, tiny firms where the scientists, technicians, and craftsmen have a chance to talk to one another. To give a random sample in major areas: big organizations were not involved in either the basic inventions or the innovating models of xerography, automatic transmission and power steering, guided missiles, continuous mix baking, shrink-proofing of knit goods, oxygen conversion and continuous casting in steel, tranquilizers and antibiotics. The rigidity, timidity, short-sighted greed, propensity to take the image for the reality that beset big business organizations in communications, education, and government, beset them also in technical innovation. One would expect this to be still more so in pure science.

Let me make myself clear once again. I am not opposed to heavy subsidies for science. It is one of the few things that make it worthwhile to be human; no price can be set on it. But, like art, perhaps science is hard to buy directly. Perhaps the best we can do is to provide a decent society in which people can be themselves and children can grow up with their lively curiosity not too stultified. By definition, anything radically new must seem far-fetched except to its innovator. At present as public policy—if only to increase the general cultivation—I would

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decentralize subsidies for science as widely as possible rather than, as we do, letting the money go to a few managers. And with this, as Horace Gray of the University of Illinois points out, freedom of access to knowledge must be extended by limiting monopoly patents.

3. *The Morality of Technology*

The morality of technology has also suffered a sea-change. Historically, the main origin of technology, in the work of craftsmen, miners, navigators, etc., provided a ready check on utility, efficiency, costs, and unforeseen effect. A secondary but important origin, in the natural experiments of Medieval and Renaissance alchemists and magicians, and perhaps physicians, provided no such check; the archetypal story is *The Sorcerer's Apprentice.* But therefore these groups had a strong ethical code, to permit only white magic, and prescribing Christian virtue as the priceless ingredient of the Philosopher's Stone. The Black Magician, like our Mad Scientist, was a villain for popular tragedy.

But even with the Industrial Revolution and the capitalization of machinery finally for cash profits rather than any other purpose, the market itself provided a check on the cheapness of the process and the utility of the products, although of course the whole system was notoriously careless of social costs and remote effects like enclosure, slums, air pollution, slag heaps, and the exhaustion of resources.

In principle, the discipline of Political Economy was, and is, supposed to regulate costs and benefits so as to guarantee the general good. In this discipline, the use and extent of technology are subject to prudence, including safety, caution because of the possibility of unforeseen disadvantages, forethought to prevent over-commitment, and concern for the shape and function of the whole.

The history has been different. Political Economy did not devote itself to these matters but to the Gross National Product measured in cash; its advice was, and is, how to maximize technological growth to increase the abstract number of goods and services, whatever their quality or mutual contradictions. The check of the market has been weakened by subsidies, cost-plus contracts, monopolies, price-fixing, advertising, and the ignorance of consumers. And the various technologies increasingly interlock and depend on one another in a vast and recondite system, so that it has become fantastically difficult even for experts to decide what is by and large useful, cheap, or even safe. No one at all can trace the remote effects. And the control of the systems of technology, and of the systems of systems, is lodged in managers who finally are not interested in efficiency, not to speak of prudence. They are not in business for technical or citizenly reasons.

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There ceases to be a morality of technique at all. A technician is hired to execute a detail of a program handed down to him. Apart from honestly trying to make his detail work, he is not entitled to criticize the program itself, in terms of its efficiency, common sense, beauty, effect on the community, or human scale. If management is not concerned with these either, a technician must often lend his wits to ludicrous contradictions. Cars are designed to go faster than it is safe to drive; food is processed to take out the nourishment; housing is expertly engineered to destroy neighborhoods; weapons are stockpiled that only a maniac would use. The ultimate of irresponsibility is that the engineer is not allowed to know what he is making, and we have had this too.

The interlocking of systems of technology without the direct check of personal acquaintance and use and political prudence creates a series of booby traps. Human scale may be quite disregarded, the time and energy that people actually have, the space they need to move in, and the rhythm or randomness with which they best operate. As the engineers design, we move, or sometimes can't move. Facilities are improved, but during the transition everybody is inconvenienced, and by the time the facility is completed it may be obsolescent. Fast trips are made possible by jet, but they prove to chop up our lives, to involve longer trips to airports and more waiting in terminals, so we have less free time. Business machines are installed and there is no longer any person from whom to get information or service for one's particular case. Cities spread so far that one can't get out of them; the country is deserted, so it is inefficient to provide means to get to it. Immense printing presses and other means of communication are devised, but to warrant such an investment of capital requires a mass audience, and it becomes hard to publish a serious book or transmit a serious message.

This sounds like chaos and modern life pretty nearly is. Apart from the cure of infectious diseases, some public services, and some household and farm equipment, there have been few recent advances in technique that have not proved to be a mixed bag in actual convenience. The great advantages, on balance, that came from universalizing basic conveniences or necessities, like electricity or water supply, do not necessarily occur when massifying comforts and luxuries. The moral advantages, of enriched opportunity, are largely delusory. New opportunities do not make time available to enjoy them, and the chance for choice works out as superficial acquaintance and confusion. The marvels of fable, like flying through the air and seeing at a distance, have not proved so beautiful in reality. It is not hard to fantasize a use of our high technology that would be neat, uncomplicated, rich, and educative; but it is significant that utopian writers have stopped fantasizing in this direction.

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The fact remains that countries with a fifth or a tenth of our available technology have a way of life that is as good or better. I do not mean by this argument that we ought to cut back our technology, for human beings are bound to try out everything; but there *is* a problem here that we have no right to disregard as we do.

There is a new technological instrument of Political Economy that, ideally, could follow up some of the bewildering remote effects of innovation and detect the contradictions before they occur. This is computing costs and benefits. But it would have to be used authentically, focusing on what happens to people rather than on the convenience of the programmer or the aggrandizement of his system. Actual experiments, in city planning, welfare, education, and foreign policy, have not been promising. They tend to omit from the equations factors that are unknown or stubbornly existing but excessively complicated, like individual differences, history, anomie, esthetics, the changeableness of policy. Then, though wise and impartial, the computer cannot give its best advice, which might often be: Not safe! do not over-commit! take it easy! make it human! Instead, on the basis of puerile theories the programmers compute hard-nosed facts—"hard" facts are those with numbers attached—and bull through solutions to which human beings with the flexibility and fortitude that, God bless them, they have, adjust as best they can. The theories are thus confirmed.

4. Prudential Criteria

Let me suggest two kinds of remedies to restore morale to scientific technology.

The first is to judge technology directly in terms of the moral criteria appropriate to it as a branch of practical philosophy. (How odd it is that today this obvious proposal has an odd ring!) In an essay on "Applied Science" in *Utopian Essays*, I listed the following criteria: Utility, Efficiency, Comprehensibility, Repairability, Flexibility, Amenity, Relevance, Modesty. By utility I mean, for instance, not pushing brand-name variety that makes no practical difference, whether in cars or drugs; not building obsolesence into expensive machines as if they were children's toys. By efficiency, I mean especially not over-riding the competence of technicians for the demands of the system; not disregarding thrift merely for convenience of administration—for instance, radical decentralization would often save on costs, as well as giving more control to those who do the work. By comprehensibility of design and concern for repairability we might alleviate the growing ineptitude of users and their bondage to repair-men and corporation service-stations. By flexibility we might stave off the increasingly frequent disasters that occur when interlocking sys-

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tems of technology break down as a whole because of stoppage in a part; we might ease the entry of small enterprises and new regions into the economy. By amenity I mean concern for the whole range of feelings, not trivia like getting rid of billboards but the frayed nerves of traffic congestion, the destruction of cities by freeways, the chewing up of landscape for quick profits and transient convenience; not breeding out the taste and maturity of food for the convenience of processors and packagers. By relevance I mean concern for human scale, the time, size, energy, need for space of actual people, rather than calculating efficiency in abstract units of time, space, and energy. By modesty I mean not looming larger than a function warrants; caution about hasty commitment and over-commitment which by now have given us several generations of slums of engineering and piles of junk.

Another valuable consideration is to check competition in technology when an enterprise reaches a size and expense that makes it a natural monopoly that should be regulated in the public interest or nationalized. At present, I think, this applies especially to automating, where it is absurd to duplicate immense concentrations of tools—though it might be wise radically to decentralize the programming. It certainly applies to the crazy competition in exploring space.

Such a moral program is, I say, obvious; yet it is revolutionary and beyond our present political means. We can legislate, and exact penalties for hazard, dishonest claims, and malpractice, but not for slovenliness, childish gluttony, callousness about the community, and indecency. Then the public becomes resigned. Nevertheless, in my opinion, a lot would be accomplished if technicians would take the lead and insist on acting like professionals. Ralph Nader is going across the country preaching this to the engineers. Common people would follow their lead and find political means. It is endlessly amazing how people spring back to life and good instincts if they see a glimmer of hope; there is a dramatic reversal in the opinion polls.

5. *Mass Education in Science*

Much could be accomplished also by a different kind of mass education in science. I agree with the current wisdom that in a world pervaded with scientific technology, a great part of the curriculum must be scientific. The question is for what purpose and how. At present, there is some effort to teach the excitement and beauty of science and natural truth, and to get great men to give the TV lessons; this is laudable. But the chief purpose of most recent curriculum reform seems to me to be wrongheaded: it is to process Ph.D.'s or even to educate creative scientists; and the method is to teach the latest findings. The time of the vast

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majority who are not going on to scientific careers is wasted. Yet it is likely that most of those who are scientifically gifted will follow their bent anyway, quicker than they can in standard courses. We really do not know how to educate for creative genius. And it is not the case, as is claimed, that in a high technology average workmen need extensive scientific schooling; on the contrary, a few weeks to a year on the job, rather than years of lessons, is still the best way to train adequate low-level technicians. (The problem here is not the training but the availability of the jobs.)

Entirely neglected in the present curriculum, however, is what science *is*, as a way of being in the world. For instance, its austerity and honesty. For this, it is worse than useless for the average student to learn answers for the College Board examinations. This turns the whole thing into an abstraction or a hoax. The student ought instead to be scrupulously reporting what happened in his laboratory, why his experiment did *not* "work out"—of course, it has worked out some way or other.

There should be heavy emphasis on becoming at home in the actual technology, making model machines and learning to repair intelligently the usual standard machines. This was the scientific program of classical progressive education fifty years ago, to make critical and self-reliant users in an industrial society, to restore the sense of causal control of things rather than feeling powerless among things.

As part of social studies, a major subject should be the economics, politics, and organization of science and technology. I do not see any way for the average citizen to be able to judge the substantive issues relevant to the vast sums for research and development, medicine, space exploration, and technical training; but it would be helpful if he understood the interests and politics involved.

With regard to one area of science, however, it is essential that citizens do learn to judge the substantive issues. This is human ecology, combining physical science, physical and mental hygiene, sociology, and political economy, to analyze problems of urbanism, transportation, pollution, degenerative disease, mental disease, pesticides, indiscriminate use of antibiotics and other powerful drugs, and so forth. These matters are too important to be delegated to experts.

A few years ago, C. P. Snow created a stir by speaking of the chasm between "two cultures," that of the scientists and that of the humanists. Since we live in times dominated by scientific technology, he castigated the humanists especially for not knowing the other language. The point of this lecture has been that Sir Charles posed the issue wrongly. There is only one culture; and probably the scientific technologists have be-

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trayed it most. Science, the dialogue with the unknown, is itself one of the humanities; and technology, practical efficiency, is a part of moral philosophy. Scientific technology has become isolated by becoming subject to the empty system of power: excluding, expanding, controlling. The remedy is for scientists and technicians to reassert their own proper principles, and for ordinary people to stop being superstitious and to reassert their own control over their environment. Then there will be communication again.

With this collection of provocative essays, Irving Howe, teacher, editor, author and critic scrutinizes some of the dilemmas of our time. The experiences examined range from the McCarthy years through the crisis in Vietnam and include portraits of Trotsky, Pasternak, Stevenson, Kennedy and Johnson—the result is a brilliant and challenging book which clarifies the radical position.

Irving Howe

STEADY WORK

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Stanley Plastrik

IN THE LAND WITHOUT SOVIETS

"In our country, one trusts no one—not even one's friends."
"Then why are you telling me *this?"*
" (Laughter)—I can talk to you for three reasons. First, you will never see me again. Second, no one would believe anything you might say. Third, once in a while everyone has to talk."
—Conversation at a Leningrad streetcorner

This past summer I spent a few weeks in the Soviet Union. I visited Moscow, Leningrad, and Sochi, the Black Sea resort. It was an illuminating experience. I shall set down here my first impressions, with all their limitations and advantages.

Russia mourns 20 million dead, soldiers and civilians, lost in the war with Nazi Germany; and over one million Russians died in the early years of the civil war. Add to this the 20 million Russians who died during the Stalinist period (1927–1953)—victims of forced collectivization, starvation, prison camps, purges, and trials. (This last figure was given to me by a well-informed Russian as the one now officially accepted by Soviet authorities.)

A total of 41 million Russians have died violent deaths in the first half century since the October Revolution. Few other nations have experienced so appalling a fate. No wonder that it creates the atmosphere of grimness one encounters in the Soviet Union. How does a people overcome such memories?

State of the Russian Economy

As soon as one reaches Russian soil, one sees dilapidated streets and dull store fronts, shabbily dressed people, and unappetizing ready-to-eat food sold in little shops. More careful study confirms these first impressions. And yet, one also grasps the truth of the constantly-heard remark: "It is much, much better now than it was a few years back!" The terror of the Stalin regime and the last paranoiac years of the *Vozd*—the Russians can scarcely believe they went through that nightmarish period. As one stands inside the walls of the Kremlin, thrown open now

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to the public, it is hard to grasp that there, in *that* small, gray building, Stalin signed his endless death lists.

Clearly, Russians today are most concerned with the lagging state of the country's industry and agriculture which is evident, first of all, in the poor quality of the food (four items, however, should be excepted as superb: caviar, champagne, ice cream, and bread). One finds a general shoddiness of goods, the disrepair of all types of transportation—and a fantastic number of repair shops of all kinds. Any comparison with the state of the American economy or that of Western Europe can only be to Russia's disadvantage, and no serious Russian economist indulges in such comparisons except in a very few and limited areas.

The pricing system and price structure are in a disastrous state. In terms of earnings (100 rubles a month constituting a good salary), the prices listed in GUM and other popular stores are fantastically out of line. A half month's pay, for example, will buy one of the shabby suits on display. The centralized, bureaucratic fixing of tens of thousands of prices—a system now under severe attack—is largely responsible. So far, merchandising, marketing, distribution of goods and food, cost-accounting, etc. are still relatively primitive in the Soviet Union.

But the pressures of a starved, peacetime consumers' economy continue to mount—let us be thankful for this—and they will not subside. Consequently, so-called economic reforms are underway everywhere: in cost-accounting and factoring; in decentralization and "regionalization" of the great economic empires which hitherto have been competing with one another for scarce and costly materials; in profit making and profit taking (ultimately, to be distributed as higher wages and bonuses); in the introduction of computer planning, input-output programming, etc.

All this leads to interesting questions about the future of the Soviet economy. I had the opportunity to ask Professor X, an eminent Soviet economist, some of these questions in a private conversation. In view of the structural changes and shifts—structural, because the Stalin-built economy proved too rigid to adapt to modern economic needs—what will happen to Soviet ideological premises concerning the economy? Will not the Russian economy come to resemble that of West European countries, especially those with a nationalized sector—and perhaps even, in its basic motivation, the giant corporations in the United States? The last question is valid, since workers in the Soviet Union do not enter into or control the productive process any more than workers in the capitalist world—except through the kind of "production councils" which exist in Western Europe too.

Apart from a ritualistic doffing of his cap to Marxism-Leninism, Professor X's answer was most revealing: he attacked the "outdated"

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notion of workers' control in the factory and even the limited application of this concept in Yugoslavia! A highly intelligent man—in fact, the most intellectually sophisticated people I met in Russia were the professional economists—Professor X revealed the elitist bias which unites bureaucrats of all countries. One might conclude that even the most moderately liberal notions of "industrial relations" have yet to be accepted in the Soviet factory system.

Russians on Foreign Policy

The most frank discussions I heard in the Soviet Union were those dealing with foreign policy. A minimum of "ideology" and a maximum of Russian national interest lifted these talks out of the realm of the usual propaganda. They illuminated certain clear-cut Russian views: a great eagerness to settle the Vietnam dispute and to avoid enlarging that conflict. Many Russians are sympathetic to Americans who want to become disengaged, with American prestige kept intact. I was especially interested to see the apparent gap between official and unofficial views on Vietnam. For example, both radio and television blasted away on the subject of Vietnam and "Amerikanski imperialisti" without let-up.* Or, to quote from Alexander Werth's report in the *Nation*, September 5, 1966:

> Despite the moderation of Kosygin's official speeches, anger against the United States is mounting rapidly. (Armored doors and iron window bars have recently been installed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow where the staff expects any day an outburst of mass violence.) The entirely genuine popular sympathy for the people of Vietnam was reflected in the declaration in favor of increased aid to Vietnam published by the Supreme Soviet.

This reflects the official view; I doubt that it reveals actual feelings. I encountered no anger and not much concern over Vietnam—although people did express to me their sympathy toward the Vietnamese people, and a desire to stay out of the war. I was astounded by the number of simple Russians who expressed the opinion that the whole world benefits whenever American action in Vietnam weakens China. Many Russians I spoke to seemed to believe that Russia and the United States will ultimately "line-up" against the Chinese whom they consider far more of a threat than even those Americans obsessed with the Cold

* In Russian hotels, radios cannot be turned off. They can be lowered to a whisper, but no further. This, however, also has its advantages. A Russian visiting a foreigner in his hotel room immediately turns up the radio full-blast. Then a mouth-to-ear conversation can begin.

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War. One frequently hears chauvinistic attacks on the Chinese, with nationalistic and racist overtones, even to the point of the "yellow peril."*

Scratch the surface veneer of Marxism-Leninism, and both populace and Party regard Vietnam as a nuisance that ought to be carefully removed in order to speed toward the end of the Cold War.

The Authority of a State?

Upright and glooming,
Above the stony barrier looming,
The Image, with an arm flung wide,
Sat on his brazen horse astride.

What thoughts engrave his brow! What hidden
Power and authority He claims!
—*The Bronze Horseman,* by Alexander Pushkin.

The two ugliest sights in Russia:

(1) Volunteer citzien-police with red armbands—They patrol neighborhood side streets in groups of four after sundown; their task is to keep a watchful eye on young people and drunkards and to call the "militia" if necessary. The young have appropriate names for them.

(2) Lenin, in rosy illumination, in his tomb in Red Square—A Soviet professor admitted to me it is time to end this garish spectacle and to bury Lenin. (We know how violently Lenin himself felt about such matters.) Nothing remains but parchment-like skin; a repulsive sight deep in Russia's only air-conditioned public spot. Yet visitors still line up, for hours on end.

The political modesty characterizing the post-Khrushchev regime of faceless technicians and bureaucrats must appeal to the Russian people. I did not see a single photograph of either Kosygin or Brezhnev except in the daily press. A superficial matter in itself; could it imply that, with the cult of the individual on the wane, a greater degree of personal and political freedoms exists now in the Soviet Union? But a basic political reality remains: *the complete disenfranchisement of the Russian people.* Beyond the meaningless "elections," Russians have no public institutions through which they can *participate,* take part on any level in decision-making. The old joke that the Soviet Union has neither "soviets" nor "unions" retains its grim point. There is a "politics"

* Racial prejudice among Russians might be surprising, but it exists. African students, for example, whose plight has been reported in the press, tell harrowing tales of being stopped in the streets by Russians—strangers—who curse and revile them as "monkeys" and savages, in choice Russian invective!

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of sorts. A top stratum participates in the making of decisions and in a sounding of views—but this constitutes an insignificant fraction of the population. (2 per cent? 3 per cent at the outside?)

A visitor traveling rapidly through the country can neither observe nor measure the degree of accepted authoritarianism that exists in the Soviet Union. He can only sense it and test it, to an extent. An American psychologist who had attended the International World Congress of Psychologists in Moscow remarked to me:

> In France, when the immigration authorities at the airport took away our passports for a while, we were annoyed and angry because of their bureaucratic bungling. When the same thing happened in Russia, we were apprehensive and fearful. Were they going to keep us there? We felt immensely relieved when our passports were returned to us.

The Soviet authorities clearly have a tight grip on the people. The wife of a prominent, accepted Russian artist explained a common rule of thumb for foreigners before visiting Russians to whom they have been introduced, either in person or by letter. "If your host is visited by *them* the day after your visit, will he be able to give a satisfactory explanation for your visit? A satisfactory explanation? Why, one *they* will accept." The state authority manifests itself most clearly in the game of knowing and wanting to know at all times whom its citizens see, correspond with, contact in any way.

> *On October 6, 1966—the government of the Russian Republic announced a new series of laws directed against "protest demonstrations, strikes, subversive writings, and slanders against the Soviet state." The other Soviet republics will no doubt follow suit. These new laws codify previous laws directed against strikes, subversion, etc. In my view, they reflect the struggle with the youth, the generational split; they are aimed at youth groups and young intellectuals, especially those active in Leningrad and Moscow.*

Ideals New and Old—Youth

> . . . the search for new ideals is probably more widespread in the Soviet Union now than at any time since the years before the Revolution.—*Peter Reddaway, London School of Economics Research scholar at Moscow University.*

On the top floor of the great Hermitage Museum, in a remote part of the building overlooking the great square, there are a dozen galleries containing some fabulous impressionist and post-impressionist paintings. (To get there, one must carefully ask for directions—"impressio-

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nisti?") One can spend hours there, virtually alone in an otherwise crowded museum. The few Russians passing through walk rapidly, often expressing puzzlement and displeasure. There are Cézannes, Picassos, Matisses, and other great paintings. (We know that the Museum has hundreds of other such canvasses hidden away.)

Yet there are usually a few people among the "impressionisti," studying a painting closely, spending long hours in these unfavored galleries. Are these young men and women, one wonders, members of Russia's "cultural underground," about whom so much has been written in recent years? And how sad it is, upon reflection, that post-impressionist art should still be looked at with displeasure by the political and cultural authorities, when in other countries—as well as in pre-revolutionary Russia itself—painting has gone so much farther along the path of creative experiment!

Among the ordinary people in Russia, but particularly among the creative and technological intelligentsia, an attempt is being made to re-awaken certain principles of common decency, such as loyalty to one's friends and one's conscience. There is also a growth in religious observance. It is not true that only the old people attend the few Orthodox churches permitted to perform services; I saw many young Russian boys and girls at such church services. Of course, one must exercise caution and a sense of perspective; there is no feverish religious revival, no large-scale movement rallying to discover new ideals and old moral principles. But forces are at work in quest of personal and cultural renewal, particularly among the young. Given the nature of the regime and its unhesitating willingness to intimidate, threaten, clap into jail, and harrass its citizens—and the specter of the work correction camps which have replaced the Siberian slave labor camps—it takes extraordinary courage to defy the authorities. Yet it is done constantly; let me illustrate.

Two young Russians, both under 25, found themselves under arrest and charged with "consorting with foreigners" and "hooliganism."* The reason for the arrests was intimidation only; both prisoners were released after 24 hours. Both cases involved the unwarranted charge of "black marketeering"—evidently part of the pattern. In both cases, I was the "foreigner" in question.

Had this occurred some years earlier, I would not have heard what had happened to my two young Russian friends or why they suddenly vanished without explanation. They would have lapsed into silence and

* A term used to cover any behavior or conduct out of the ordinary.

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avoided all contact with foreigners. But within a day I did know. Both called me by telephone to explain. Both knew the risks of phoning a foreigner at an international hotel where the authorities can "bug" any room. Yet both, with anger and defiance in their voices, informed me of what had taken place. And one of them was willing to risk meeting me again! But I decided not to. I had already been followed quite unabashedly in the streets by the police, and I did not want to create any further difficulties for this young Russian intellectual.

I also met a young African scholarship student in ....., who openly defied the authorities when they demanded to see his papers, simply because he had spent a few hours with me at a Russian circus. By the time I left Russia, I was convinced that such examples of defiance could be multiplied many times.

What does it mean? Surely, it reflects the deeply rooted conflict between Russia's post-war youth and their parents. The partly suppressed film "At the Ilyitch Gate" (it has apparently not been shown abroad) deals with this problem and strikingly illustrates that the "older generation" has nothing to offer or say to the new generation. The film demonstrates that despite all efforts the values and style of the "youth international"—the cool age, jazz, etc.—have reached Russia and found a welcome reception. Partly, this is the universal phenomenon of young people fed up with parental moralizing. ("What do you know, you young whipper-snapper, about the Revolution—or Stalingrad—or the siege of Leningrad?") But most significant and constructive is the eagerness for a richer and more rewarding life: young Russians want to travel abroad. They welcome contact with foreigners and Western culture, want a chance to feast upon modern art, films, magazines, books, and music.

If we were subjected throughout our lives to a constant barrage of lecturing, moralizing, and didactic reading-material, we too might yearn to escape with the same fierce passion that, I believe, can be found in Russia's youth.* An African student familiar with some details of the Negro revolution and the American civil rights movement told me he felt that nowhere was the slogan, "Freedom Now," more appropriate than in the Soviet Union. At the universities, at the numerous compul-

* In the resort town of Sochi I attended a concert of the Leningrad Symphony summer orchestra. In introducing a Tchaikovsky symphony, which constituted the second part of the program, (she had already gone on at great length about the first part), a young Russian lady lectured for 13½ minutes (by my watch)! I could only get such phrases as "bourgeois revolution" out of it, and wondered whether she mentioned his well-known homosexuality. ("Three years in a work-correction camp," a Russian had proudly told me when I inquired about *that* problem). The musicians waited patiently along with the audience until she had finished.

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sory courses on "Marxism-Leninism" and "Diamat," the students in the crowded amphitheaters (where attendance is taken) carry on their conversations, sit openly reading newspapers, do homework, and walk about. The professor reads monotonously from his notes, carefully ignoring what is happening around him. Teacher and student understand one another.

Notes on an "Underground"

No political "underground" or opposition movement seems to exist in the Soviet Union; if there were the desire to create one—along Trotskyist or other lines—it would be destroyed at once. Whatever structural opposition exists is limited to Party circles and probably confined to the upper Party hierarchy.

But one can sense everywhere an intellectual "underground." There is its intelligentsia, there are its writers, artists, poets, musicians—and some of them have become known to the West. Since the Daniel-Sinyavsky trial, this "underground" is, for a foreign visitor, impossible to reach. Yet these circles exist, help and protect one another, live on a high level of intense intellectual and creative consciousness. Their reaching-out toward modern art and culture, the literature of the West, has had an effect on the Soviet youth. And it is through contact with Soviet youth and students that one gains a glimpse of Russia's intellectual "underground," more as a hidden force than a visible presence.

The State of Personal Freedom

The foreign visitor who participates in a probing or critical way in the routine discussions common to groups visiting the country is called to the attention of the authorities. He must then expect to be watched and followed openly, as I was. No doubt the authorities intend such shadowing as a "friendly" warning. It is their way of saying, "We are watching you, so be a good guy and keep out of trouble. Visit the stores (especially the *beryoshka* shops where nice things can be purchased against *valuta*), see our museums, etc.—but behave!" And yet, it can be amusing and reassuring to be followed in the streets.

But when young Russians whom one has met—in the Moscow Metro in a shop or a youth cafe*—are arrested under one's very nose, held for 24 hours by the police, accused of being "hooligani" and of consorting with foreigners, the experience is disconcerting, frightening, and out-

* The Western press has commented at length on these youth cafes. They are established with permission of the authorities, managed by *Komsomol* representatives (sharply-dressed smoothies!), and surveyed by the police. They close at 11 pm!

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rageous. After this had happened twice, to my knowledge, I abandoned the attempt to speak to young Russians, for the sake of all concerned.

What of Soviet Jewry? Every word I heard in the Soviet Union on this subject verified the disheartening report by David Weiss published in DISSENT, July–August 1966. At the Moscow synagogue where I attended services seemed to be more American tourists present than Russians. Foreigners who had come with prayer books they intended to leave as gifts were continually approached by worshippers who would whisper, "Don't give it to him (the cantor, or some other member of the congregation)—he'll sell it on the black market." It was a pathetic scene of disarray and defeat.

Yet many young Jews, including Komsomol members, say openly, "I do not go to synagogue; I do not believe in Judaism as a religion. But I am a Jew and want to be known as a Jew." What more proof could one ask for than the fantastic story of 10,000 young Moscow Jews celebrating *Simhat Thorah* (Joy of the Torah—the last of the autumn holidays) by dancing in the streets that border the synagogue?

Song of the Black Market

Dialogue at midnight, in Leningrad's great Palace Square that overlooks the Hermitage. I have come from a stroll on the Neva embankment and approach the center of the square, looking about, reflecting on the past of the city—Lenin, Trotsky, the Smolny Institute. The Peter and Paul fortress is lit up in the distance. All seems mummified now, all dead, frozen into ritual, without any living content. A young Russian, dressed better than most, approaches.

> *"Good evening. I am the representative of the Black Market; what do you have to sell? I will give you 20 rubles for your jacket; 7 for your shirt; 5 for your underwear."* [*I had hasty visions of returning to the hotel, stripped and naked, but hands stuffed with rubles.*]
>
> *"Sorry; I have nothing to sell."*
>
> *"Which hotel are you staying at?"*
>
> *"Oktyabryskaya."* [*The Hotel of the October Revolution.*]
>
> *"What is your room number? I will come tomorrow and buy anything you want to sell."*
>
> *"I will not give you my room number; I have nothing to sell."*
>
> *"Then I bid you a friendly farewell in the name of the Black Market."*

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An Act of Subversion

Before leaving for the Soviet Union, aware that most likely I would not find the atmosphere to my taste, I had meditated on what single, harmless act would most annoy the Soviet authorities. I hit upon the idea of bringing into the country the latest copy of *Playboy* magazine. I would leave it behind, in this land of an outwardly rigid code of sexual behavior (often mistaken for puritanism), and its undernourished public sense of humor. Little did I then realize how genial a notion this was. In the city of . . . , I unveiled my copy of *Playboy* to a small group of young Soviet workers and students. Utter astonishment! A long wrangle over who should take charge of the magazine after I left; guarantees that it would have a wide and ardent circulation, numbering perhaps in the tens of thousands.

Somewhere today, inside the Soviet Union, Miss August, 1966, passes from hand to hand in all her glorious, folded-page nudity.

A Few Simple Conclusions

It is hard not to come away from the Soviet Union, even after a brief visit, without a sense of depression and pessimism. By and large, it is a dull country, profoundly conservative. Except for the underground vanguard, Soviet Russia's culture is provincial and conformist. It is a severely controlled country, retaining its totalitarian framework despite the relaxations of the post-Stalin era. The apparatus and "repressive organs" of the state are actively present everywhere; and the Party keeps its full monopoly of power in all spheres of life. Do young people seek a career? There is no career outside the state, no road without the Party's approval. The only alternative for the young intellectual is to choose an "underground existence" which means a most difficult life.

I found less interest in "politics" in Russia than in any country I have ever visited. Political life is still rigidly circumscribed by Party ritual. True, there is a running struggle within the Party—the "hards" vs. the "softs," the de-Stalinizers vs. the neo-Stalinists—which in the next decade may become even sharper. But outside the Party there is no "politics." There is only the vaguely discernible struggle between the generations over the issue of how one should live one's life. I would assume this will go on indefinitely, with an aging Party leadership constantly working to turn over the reigns to a properly bureaucratized and conformist layer of middle-aged and fairly successful technicians, Party personnel, and executives.

Some years back Max Shachtman coined the phrase "bureaucratic collectivism" to describe Soviet society. Others have filled in the details,

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but the term remains accurate. The Soviet Union is a totalitarrian society, based upon bureaucratic collectivism, with a ruling class-Party that has its roots in the state-owned economy.

The Soviet economy may continue its present limited "liberalization" or, rather, non-practice of terror. Structural economic reforms may be reinforced and will probably prove successful, and any "loosening up" of the system is bound to have favorable results (that is, living standards may pick up substantially); many Western concepts in the sciences and even social sciences may slowly be absorbed with lessening resistance; the intellectual "underground" may continue to grow. Yet the overall atmosphere will remain dull and restrained—unless there will be more fundamental changes.

The future of personal and political freedom looks gloomy in the Soviet Union. Is it because the Russians, following that ancient cliché of liberalism, have no history of or acquaintance with freedom? One has only to see a Russian inspecting with envy the foreign visas in a visitor's passport, or to hear his endless questions as to what one "can do" or "can't do" back home, to know this is false. But, basically, most Russians are resigned to their fate. There is little sense of a will to struggle even for a change of personal conditions. Yet eagerness for news of the West, of fresh ideas and concepts, also exists and cannot be stopped. The Russian people—warm-hearted, friendly, spontaneous, and intelligent—still value that "sincerity" in personal relations Tolstoy has written about. They certainly deserve a better fate than their present life.

CONTRACTING OUTLANDISH HABITS

"He [Lykurgus] would not allow citizens to leave the country at pleasure, and to wander in foreign lands where they would contract outlandish habits, and learn to imitate the untrained lives and ill-regulated institutions to be found abroad. Also, he banished from Lacedaemon [Sparta] all strangers who were there for no useful purpose . . . Strangers introduce strange ideas; and these lead to discussions of unsuitable character, and political views which would jar with the established constitution, like a discord in music."

—from *Plutarch's Lives*

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NOTEBOOK

Harvey Swados

The Peoples' Symphony: A Tribute

For the better part of twenty years my wife and I have attended, often with our friends, occasionally with our children, a chamber music series in Manhattan's Washington Irving High School, off Union Square. The series, incorporated in 1900 by the Peoples' Symphony Concerts under the inspiration of Franz X. Arens "To Bring the Best Music to Students and Workers at Minimum Prices," has given me great personal pleasure. It has also given me ample opportunity to ponder, during all those intermissions gazing at all those vaguely familiar faces, the ingredients that create a sense of continuity, in short a cultural tradition, to make more tolerable the jagged, abrasive quality of contemporary urban life.

It is not a minor question. "Culture" and "beauty" have suddenly become political matters, and, in a perhaps typically American confusion, have become associated in the public mind with the spending of vast sums, usually on demolition and construction projects. Culture means concrete. But after the buildings have gone up, when in that sense it is already too late, and audiences have discovered that they cannot hear as well as they used to in the older buildings, or do not care for what they see in the newer ones, people may turn to an examination of somewhat more modest undertakings with an eye to isolating their particular contribution to the cultural fabric.

Franz Arens was twenty-seven years old before he heard his first symphony —Beethoven's Fifth, in Munich—with bafflement and bewilderment. He returned to America, convinced, as he put it in his first circular, sent out in 1900, that "A great deal of bad, cheap and trashy music is offered to the people," and determined to prove that "If good music were provided at rates within their reach, they would eventually prefer the latter."

Arens's vision coincided with the great swell of European migration, much of it composed of Jews, Slavs, and Italians, people who were, as he insisted, "literally music hungry." The first year's concerts, given at Cooper Union as the new century began, ranged in price from ten to fifty cents, and the expenses were defrayed by Arens from his own funds. Thereafter voluntary subscriptions carried on the work. It was apparently not too difficult for this visionary to interest philanthropic families in his conception, when they saw music lovers storming the ten-cent section, and police reserves called out to keep the customers in line in front of Cooper Union.

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Now, sixty-five years and over a thousand concerts later, the original capital funds (augmented by stock left to the organization) remain intact, and in consequence the recitals are assured of continuation into the indefinite future. It would seem perfectly clear that one reason for this is the modesty and simplicity of the entire operation: no building campaigns, no flacks or drumbeaters with mimeos, press releases, and luncheon meetings, no surveys or study commissions—not even any advertisements, unless someone contributes fifty or a hundred dollars for that specific purpose. Just music, eighteen Saturday evenings a year, in three series of half a dozen concerts each.

During all those years, Peoples' Symphony Concerts has changed format and locale as little as possible. Franz Arens was succeeded as manager by his son Egmont. In 1914 the latter took on young Joseph Mann as assistant manager, and in 1925 Mann (who had been a U.S. Army drillmaster, of all things, during World War I) became manager. He is still at it in 1966, working out of a pokey one-room office high in a Union Square loft building. In the early days, Franz Arens used to open the hall at 6 P.M. with a brief lecture, illustrated with musical examples at the piano, and followed with a pause for supper, before the musical evening. Mr. Mann, a portly gentleman with a cigar and severely brushed black hair, is no musician, and he is dealing with a vastly more sophisticated audience, but he too is very much in evidence at every recital, soothing nervous musicians (some of whom arrive the morning of the recital and practice all day long), placating disgruntled patrons, and prowling the aisles, reminding the faithful that there is no smoking and no saving of seats for friends or family (in the orchestra your season ticket does not entitle you to a specific seat).

After the early years in Carnegie Hall and Cooper Union—which used to feature symphonic concerts—the move was made to brand-new Washington Irving High School. It opened its doors to its first class of excited Lower Manhattan kids on a Monday morning in the fall of 1914, but on the previous Saturday evening its elegant auditorium (the chandeliers and imported parquet flooring have long since disappeared) was christened by a Peoples' Symphony Concert. The two have been synonymous ever since that World War I era when the Workmen's Circle and the Peoples' Institute (which founded the Lewisohn Stadium Concerts) used to send their members en bloc to hear the music. And even though upon occasion a Simon Barère may enter a cab at Columbus Circle, confused, and wind up in Washington Heights, at the other end of Manhattan, while fifteen hundred music lovers anxiously await him downtown in Washington Irving, by and large the concerts are identified in the mind of the musical public as the Washington Irving concerts.

This kind of continuity, it is important to understand, has far more than sentimental significance. To be sure it is moving for someone like myself to recall that my mother was a graduate of the old Washington Irving, and indeed I still have her class photo, a clutch of wide-eyed marvelously innocent girls in shirtwaists

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and huge hair ribbons. Or that an aunt's more recent class photo used to hang on the second floor outside the balcony. But what is publicly meaningful (even if not statistically demonstrable) is that the diffusion of culture is in its way as dependent on the maintenance of such traditions as it is on innovation, money, or the mixture thereof.

It is not merely that interest in music among Washington Irving students, now composed of Jews, Chinese, Negroes, Puerto Ricans, among others, has grown, influenced by the Saturday evening recitals, to the point where the high school orchestra is large, first-rate, and so flourishing that it also includes smaller chamber groups. But the recitals have attracted outside listeners whose lives have been not only enriched but changed by exposure to the best chamber groups in the world, ranging from the fabled Flonzaley and Kneisel Quartets (both introduced to this country by Franz Arens) down through the Budapest and the Quartetto Italiano to the Juilliard and Guilet Quartets, and such virtuosi as Arrau, Novaes, Serkin, Francescatti, Stern, and Szigeti.

About thirty years ago—many subscribers have been coming for longer than that, incidentally—one woman brought her fifteen-year-old son along to his first Washington Irving recital. The boy was so moved that he swore to her that one day he would perform there himself. It took a long time, but when Noah Greenberg finally did bring his Pro Musica group to the Peoples' Symphony series, he quickly established them as favorites with an audience which is resistant to innovations (even of old music), and simply will not turn out to hear song recitals. At his last concert there, only a few weeks before his sudden death, this good musician, good socialist, and decent human being led a performance that was both charming and energetic and had the members of still another generation, curious youngsters, clustering before the stage at intermission for a closer look at the hand-crafted rauschpfeifen, krummhorns, portative organ, and regal. Maybe this was why Greenberg more than once urged Joseph Mann not to worry if the organization couldn't afford the Pro Musica's full fee—he'd find someone or some foundation to make up the difference and so ensure their appearance before the Washington Irving audience. "I loved that man," says Mann, who has similar stories about the generous loyalty of artists like Szigeti and Gina Bachauer.

Greenberg knew, like other performers, that this was a special audience. "Of all the audiences in New York for which music is regularly performed, the one I would choose to perform for is this one," Irving Kolodin wrote in the *Saturday Review* of February 23, 1963, "It is alert attentive, responsive to the most refined values in execution and not deluded either by reputation or the lack of it."

With such an audience musical bonds are taken for granted. Even the eccentrics can be endearing—the grim lady who will not move one chair to the left to accommodate your group because she arrived an hour early to claim this particular seat, the stooped old man who pulls his Beethoven score from a brown paper bag and follows it with a pen flashlight. But

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there are others, like the piano fan who, eagerly eavesdropping on your conversation about an Arrau performance at Philharmonic Hall, will join in with his opinion as unselfconsciously as if he had been with you in the first place. Or the two elderly ladies, one explaining to the other that the two women seated nearby in choice seats by Mr. Mann himself in apparent violation of the first-come-first-served rule were the wife and mother of the performing artist, a distinguished pianist of my acquaintance: "Some mother," sighed the second lady, loud enough for the pianist's relatives to hear, "to have a son like that."

It was to such an audience that Alexander Schneider could say jovially, after one of the Budapest's scores had been stolen (unlike other quartets, each member of the Budapest looks out for his own music), "I'm sorry, folks, but we can't finish without the music. I promise you, next year we'll make it up to you."

This audience, composed about 65 per cent of teachers and students, is for inscrutable reasons mostly from Brooklyn. "When the young people that come to our concerts start to earn more money," Mr. Mann says, "they 'graduate' and go uptown to the recitals."

Obviously, though, a lot of them stick. As an audience they are conservative and do not respond to modern music. Nevertheless the concertgoer will recognize among them, particularly among the young couples in sweaters and desert boots who sit holding hands, some of the same intent listeners who turn up at the McMillin Theater concerts of Columbia University's Group for Contemporary Music, which presents, under the leadership of Charles Wuorinen and Harvey Sollberger, the most ambitious and brilliantly performed avant-garde music to be heard in the United States today. There is no accident in this. In both series the emphasis is on excellence rather than on flashiness. The showoff sensation-mongering of Cage and his crowd is not to be found in the Wuorinen-Sollberger concerts, which are also run quite humbly, without fanfare, monstrous budgets, capital fund drives, or elaborate protestations of cultural utility. But the connection is made—between musicians, between performers and publics, between generations. Isn't there a lesson in this for those whose devotion to the diffusion of culture today manifests itself across the country in complex plans for the erection of palaces which may in the end serve—like the grandiose edifices of dead tyrants—as tombs rather than towers of culture?

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Paul Feldman

THE PATHOS OF "BLACK POWER"

Clearly, the slogan reflects strong emotions. In its very vagueness, it is like a cry of deliverance. Whether it can lead to a strategy for action is another question.

Because I favor the substance of black power, I am dubious about the slogan "Black Power." By power for Negroes, I mean grass-roots organization to strengthen "the Movement" and spur allied progressive forces—unions, churches, students, liberals—into renewed common action in behalf of a major economic program. By opposing the slogan of "Black Power," I mean that any course leading to a prideful but damaging withdrawal into—and thereby, in effect, acceptance of—the ghetto can only result in powerlessness.

"Black control of the ghetto" has replaced "Integrate" and "Jobs and Freedom Now" as the rallying cry for a narrow section of the Negro movement. But SNCC and CORE, which express this outlook, have not yet offered any program—good, bad, or indifferent—for resolving the contradictions that doom more than 40 million Americans, a large share of them Negroes, to poverty. A slogan is not a strategy, and certainly not a program; it can yield a moment of satisfaction, but it does not yet give people a clue as to what to do next. For all its rhetorical urgency, "Black Power" has a strangely quietistic effect, and that may be the reason it wins favor with both conservative politicians and the kind of radicals who talk grandly about "peasant revolutions" in the Third World but are indifferent to raising the minimum wage in the United States.

What alternative does Stokely Carmichael offer to the A. Philip Randolph program for a $185 billion Freedom Budget and its implementation through a strategy of coalition politics to gain a majority in Congress? The question is worth looking into.

I

In a recent and vivid article, Carmichael writes:

> We have no infallible master plan and we make no claim to exclusive knowledge of how to end racism; different groups will work in their own

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> different ways. SNCC cannot spell out the full logistics of self-determination but can only address itself to the problem of helping black communities define their needs, realize their strength, and go into action along a variety of lines which they must choose for themselves. (*New York Review of Books*, Sept. 22, 1966.)

This may seem a bit modest—and less than frank—after he also discloses that "in some places, such as Alabama, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, and New Jersey, independent organizing under the black panther symbol is in progress. The creation of a national 'Black Panther Party' must come about...." What we are not told is how a national political party can be built by organizing Negroes around the woolly concept of "self-determination," which could, at best, apply only to a colonial people; whereas Negroes exist as an exploited minority in a complex industrial society.

The closest we get to an answer is that SNCC will organize the ghetto on the basis of a "black consciousness." It wants to replace Negro feelings of inferiority with race pride. Proposals toward this end range from classes on Negro history, to self-help programs, to black control of the ghettos. If Carmichael here is assertive, his ideas bear a disconcerting resemblance to those of white moderates like Charles Silberman and Irving Kristol who say that what is needed now is not major social change but an improvement in Negro attitudes and psychology, that is, a sophisticated version of "self-help." The only difference, it seems, is that we are to have the rhetoric of black nationalism instead of middle-class values. And even there it is not a great difference, since the two—black nationalism and middle-class values—are similar in many ways. Elijah Muhammed's favorite phrase is an invocation of the bourgeois ethic: "Wake up, clean up, and stand up." Not a white suburbanite in the country, looking on from a reassuring distance, would care to disagree. *Make something of yourself . . . boy.*

Now the problem of Negro deference is real enough, but it cannot be eradicated through threatening speeches or new "images." Had that been possible, the nationalist predecessors of "Black Power" all through the twenties and thirties would have succeeded. Confidence can be achieved in the Negro community in one way alone: through struggle, through concrete victories.

And interestingly enough, inherent in the views of white moderates and "Black Power" enthusiasts alike is the assumption that the masses of Negroes are apathetic and have to be "electrified" into action. One would have supposed that this myth had died after all that has happened these past several years: after the March on Washington, after Birming-

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ham, after Selma. But myths die slowly. By contrast, I want to advance the proposition: *the major problems lie not in Negro "attitudes" or "values," they lie in socio-economic institutions that need to be changed.*

In a number of its implications, "Black Power" is a conservative position. I say this not merely, or even primarily, because William Buckley expressed agreement with Floyd McKissick's defense of "Black Power" on TV. Nor merely because the right-wing Free Society Association, headed by Barry Goldwater, announced that "Black Power could become a constructive political force under responsible leadership," since "it has at least the virtue of calling upon the Negro to think and do for himself." No; "Black Power" is conservative because it signifies a turning inward of the Negro revolution, a form of economic separatism which, under the best of circumstances, would leave the ghetto intact and still at the mercy of overwhelming social forces.

At no point do the "Black Power" advocates raise fundamental demands that would challenge, or seriously modify, the economic status quo. To be sure, Carmichael writes: "Ultimately, the economic foundations of this country must be shaken if black people are to control their own lives." Ultimately. But first, writes Carmichael, ". . . we are determined to win political power, with the idea of moving on from there into activity that would have economic effects." Meanwhile, however, what are the Negro masses to do? Their economic needs are immediate and urgent; those needs can be satisfied, or at least importantly eased, by federal and local action right now; such action can be had if enough pressure is brought to bear; and the pressure can be brought to bear if a coalition of forces like that which initiated the March on Washington is reactivated. Carmichael, however, is contemptuous of such ideas, since he has painted himself into a corner with the notion that the whole of American society is racist, there are no reliable allies, and nothing remains but to "go it alone." Can, however, the Negro worker in need of a better job, or an increase in minimum wages, or a decent apartment, wait until Carmichael and his friends find out what they mean by "Black Power"?

What is most striking about Carmichael's statements is their paucity of economic thinking. I don't mean to imply that he is indifferent to the Negro's economic plight; no, he is poignantly aware of it. He writes: "We should begin with the basic fact that Black Americans have two problems: they are poor and they are black. All other problems arise from this two-sided reality. . . . Any program to end racism must address itself to that double reality." But this is precisely what he does not do. Instead he writes:

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> When we urge that Black money go into Black pockets, we mean the communal pocket. We want to see the money go back into the community and used to benefit it. We want to see the cooperative concept applied in business and banking. We want to see that the black ghetto residents demand that an exploitative storekeeper sell them, at minimal cost, a building or a shop that they will own or improve cooperatively; they can back their demand with a rent strike, or a boycott and a community so unified that no one else will move into the building or buy at the store. The society we seek to build among black people, then, is not a capitalistic one; it is a society in which the spirit of community and humanistic love prevail.

Carmichael's moral vision is admirable, but his social understanding fuzzy. Consumer boycotts, rent strikes and such devices have been unable —they are inherently unable—to solve the fundamental problems of poverty and slum housing. They cannot solve these problems because they remain within the limits of the ghetto, at best making more humane an intolerable situation. And for a movement that has by now begun to consider the basic changes necessary in the national economy in order to deal with the Negro plight, Carmichael's conservative proposals are a step backward. With tactics inadequate even for serious reform, he proposes then to construct what might be called "socialism in one ghetto." But a separatist black economy—unless it were to be no more than a carbon copy of the poverty that already prevails—would need black steel, black automobiles, black refrigerators. And for that, Negroes would have to take control of General Motors and U.S. Steel: hardly an immediate prospect, and utter fantasy as long as Carmichael proposes to "go it alone." In the end, the militant-sounding proposals for a build-it-yourself black economy (a black economy, alas, without capital) reminds one of . . . precisely those white moderates who preach self-help to the Negroes. Both envisage changes in style, rhetoric, language, morals —in everything but economic condition.

I don't mean to imply that Carmichael doesn't have a better grasp of the economic realities than his article suggests. But he is trapped. His refusal to work for coalitions that would cross racial lines is in practice a way of foregoing fundamental economic change. As a result, he must make an enormous leap from revolutionary rhetoric to extremely mild and conservative tactics of ameliorism. In short, Carmichael's economic program is merely an adjunct to his "Black Power" ideology, and the necessary tensions between that double reality—blackness and poverty —get lost in the shuffle.

Carmichael's utopian vision—for that is what it comes down to: Brook Farm in Harlem—is likely to be discarded by those who will try

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to carry out "Black Power" in a more realistic way. "Black Power" may well become, as in part it has already, the slogan for Negro businessmen. To Negro workers, who must go to the factories "downtown" in order to earn their living, it can mean very little. But Negro storekeepers may find it helpful in driving out white competitors and taking over tertiary aspects of the ghetto economy. They, rather than the whites, would then exploit the misery of the economy. More of the money would stay in the ghetto and a bit might even trickle down—who can be "against" Negroes having an equal right with whites to exploit Negroes? But how does this sort of thing change or even affect the basic troubles of the Negro masses? A black economy, more or less hermetic, is not merely a highly improbable vision; it could not, even if realized, significantly improve the life of the Negro masses. Their fate, for better or worse, is linked to the economy as a whole.

II

The irrelevance of the economic program put forward by what has been called the "Left Wing" of the Negro movement invites a look at the social composition of CORE and SNCC. The clichés of the mass media—that these organizations represent the aspirations of economically deprived masses while the NAACP and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference reflect the demands of the Negro bourgeoisie—has been too readily accepted. With the burgeoning of the civil rights movement, and especially during the Freedom Rides, CORE expanded and its membership cut across racial and class lines.

Now as it moves toward black nationalism, its composition changed again and now, except for a thin layer of unemployed Negro youth, it is composed mainly of lower middle-class Negroes striving for self-expression in a context that enforces scarcity of social and economic opportunities. Extreme status deprivation and frustration thus create fertile soil for black nationalism. Floyd McKissick, the new chairman of CORE, reflected the sentiments of this group in a recent remark that one example of "Black Power" would be for a Negro to sit on the Stock Exchange.

SNCC started as the organization of Southern Negro college students who led the early sit-ins. But over the years, its composition has changed. With the departure of one of the original leaders of the Nashville sit-ins, its chairman, John Lewis, and Julian Bond, another indigenous Southerner, the new leadership, including Carmichael, is mainly from the North. Key policy-makers come from Howard University, the leading Negro college, whose graduates are part of what W. E. B. DuBois used to describe as the "talented tenth." They have already experienced considerable social and cultural integration and express, in a way, some of

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the same alienation common among American intellectuals. They share with middle-class white youth in SDS their feelings of discontent and rebellion against American culture—"Who wants to integrate into a burning building?" Who wants to become a part of a phony society?" But there is an important quality that makes them different; they have had a first-hand experience of Southern brutality, and they know that their black skin ties them to all other Negroes. Yet the experience of these Negro radical intellectuals is also very different from that of the slum dwellers: they are black, but they can at least partially find their way into middle-class white culture.

The difference between the social strata leading SNCC and CORE is reflected subtly in their ideologies, styles, and economic programs. For "Black Power" can mean different things to different people. While CORE's economics is the kind of "storekeeper capitalism" preached by Elijah Muhammed, with a harsh Calvinist ethic that may help capital accumulation among the economically deprived, SNCC advocates a kind of black utopian socialism. Where Malcolm X's speeches are guides for black nationalists in CORE, the SNCC ideologues have to apply to the American context the more sophisticated thinking of Frantz Fanon.

In describing America's ghettos as colonial territories, they are attempting to internationalize the Negro struggle and to tie it to the anti-colonialist revolutions in the Third World. Besides the pride that comes from identification with Afro-Asian leaders, it provides stimulus for flagging morale. It is also used as an attempt at an answer to those who ask how a black minority in the U.S. can alone make the kind of revolution that SNCC is talking about. Their reply is, "People of color are a majority in the world." Some Negro intellectuals identify even with those African leaders, like Nkrumah, who come into conflict with the masses. Malcolm X was an admirer of feudal leaders like Prince Faisal. But what does a Harlem worker or a Mississippi sharecropper have in common with a feudal prince?

III

By comparison, the NAACP and Dr. King's SCLC speak for the mainstream of Negro thinking in regard to integration, black power, non-violence, and white allies. A recent *Newsweek* poll of Negro attitudes, North and South and among all income groups, showed that almost 90 per cent still looked to Dr. King as the foremost leader of the Negro revolution; more than three-fourths still favored the NAACP as the major organization in the civil rights field; over 80 per cent disagreed with the idea of dropping white allies; and almost the same percentage

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were opposed to leaving the Democratic party and going it alone in an all-black party.

This poll was borne out in the 1966 election. In California "New Leftists" and Negro nationalists urged a boycott of Pat Brown, while mainstream civil rights groups like the NAACP supported him. No boycott developed in the Negro community, where 94 per cent of the vote went to Brown.

The NAACP and the SCLC continue to command the support of the Negro masses, and their programs are more responsive to the thinking of the Negro community. One reason for this is that they are broadly based organizations. While the NAACP (whose membership is over 90 per cent Negro), is led mainly by Negro middle-class elements, *the majority of its approximately 475,000 members are stable working-class Negroes.* Through the Negro church, the SCLC has its base mainly among Southern Negro farmers and sharecroppers, and some middle-class elements.

SNCC and CORE, operating as cadre organizations, can often be out of touch with community sentiment, or at least respond only to a narrow segment of it. When Stokely Carmichael, Floyd McKissick, and New York CORE leader Roy Innis declared I.S. 201 "a national battleground of 'Black Power' " and called for "Black teachers for Black children," over two-thirds of the students passed the picket line, which, in the heart of Harlem, could muster little more than 50 people.

The new leadership of SNCC has also campaigned to convince Negroes to refuse army service during the Vietnam War. SNCC workers, blocking the entrances of a few recruiting stations, tried physically to prevent Negroes from enlisting. But again the results were nil, and almost no community support developed for this action. As Bayard Rustin has written:

> Floyd McKissick and Stokely Carmichael may accuse Roy Wilkins of being out of touch with the Negro ghetto, but nothing more clearly demonstrates their own alienation from ghetto youth than their repeated exhortations to these young men to oppose the Vietnam War when so many of them tragically see it as their only way out.

In these two instances SNCC and CORE were substituting themselves for the Negro masses they claim to be responding to. They declare in favor of "letting the people decide," but their impatience and ideology drive them to try to decide for the people.

This kind of elitism is common among "vanguard" organizations. But it has a particular development in SNCC and CORE. At the beginning of the civil rights revolution these young militants put their bodies on the line, and, by heroic example, touched the conscience of America.

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They moved tens of thousands of Negroes and whites into action. Their tactics were vital in the first stages of the revolution. But as layer upon layer of the Negro community entered the struggle—*today there are more Negroes active in politics, community improvement, and antipoverty projects than ever before*—"the cutting edge of the movement" was called upon to play a different role. Because of the deprivation in the Negro community, these educated youths were a vital resource. Their intellectual and organizing skills were needed to consolidate the gains of the Negro revolution, to broaden it and help it deal with the intricate problems related to economic issues and social change. But the group that provided the leadership for SNCC and CORE got hung up in their own social, ideological and identity crises. They became fixated in the first stage of the movement. The result has been a tremendous loss to the Negro revolution.

Cynics say that radical intellectuals, be they black or white, always march to a different drummer than the masses. But this was not true, or wholly true, when the CIO was built in the thirties. Then radicals played a prominent role, not only in sparking the early organizing drives, but also in consolidating the strength of the unions. In the labor movement, radicals could establish an institutionalized relationship with masses of working-class people. There was an interpenetration of ideas and influences. Left-wing intellectuals were forced to recognize the day-to-day needs of a mass movement, while workers were influenced by the social vision of the intellectuals. In the early stages of the Negro revolution, when the masses were in the streets, a similar situation developed, but then the bonds were weakened as the Negro struggle had to confront economic and political issues.

Thus a dynamic relationship does not today exist between the alienated black intellectual and the Negro masses. Elitism and failure to put forward a concrete economic program are symptomatic of this divergence. This is one reason why SNCC lost the base it had built up in Mississippi, and CORE lost the following in the Northern ghetto it had developed with its rent strike program. Another, perhaps more important reason is that they could not win the concrete victories necessary to maintain organization among the poor. And this leads to the question of alliances and coalition politics.

IV

If Carmichael limits his definition of allies to those outside the Negro community who agree with his ideology of "Black Power," then he is right: except for a handful of intellectuals, he has no allies. But if the definition is broadened to include those who have a common inter-

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est with the Negro community in progressive economic and social change, then he is tragically wrong. Foremost among these political allies is the labor movement. A quarter of a million Negro unemployed have an interest in labor's advocacy of a full-employment economy and its endorsement of A. Philip Randolph's $185 Billion Freedom Budget with its job-generating and ghetto-rebuilding public works program. Over 2 million Negroes have directly benefited from labor's fight for an increased minimum wage. Medicare is not for whites only, and neither is increased unemployment insurance, workmen's compensation, or a larger antipoverty budget. The list could be continued, but apparently these "bread-and-butter" issues are more impressive to Negro workers than to some radicals. There is no reason why Negro groups should not join labor in these struggles, even while continuing to criticize labor's failings.

Carmichael writes: ". . . there is in fact no group at present with whom to form a coalition in which blacks will not be absorbed or betrayed." A strange comment for an advocate of "Black Power" to make about a Negro community whose revolution has already shaken up every institution in the country! Coming from a white, this lack of confidence in the ability of the Negro movement to cope with other social forces might sound condescending.

More important is the question: what would be the effect on the Negro community if it were to accept the idea that it has no white allies? Would this belief stir it into action? Would it stimulate hope? I doubt it. If Carmichael's views were widely accepted, it would probably lead to retreat in the Negro community. After World War I, when Negroes really were without allies and a reaction set in against their previous minimal gains, their response was not militancy but Marcus Garvey's "back-to-Africa" movement.

In practice, SNCC and CORE cannot act according to their rhetoric; they must assume the presence of allies, or at least that not all the social forces outside the Negro community are one big reactionary and racist mass. What stands between SNCC's enclave in Lowndes County, Alabama, and Governor Wallace's state troopers and militia? We are not told, but we must assume it is Washington, or at least liberal pressures on the Johnson Administration. When the SNCC leader talks about the need for local black people to control and make decisions about spending poverty money, he does not tell us (but we have to assume) that *somebody* outside of Lowndes County is fighting to expand, or at least maintain, the poverty program.

Since Negroes in the deep South are struggling to get their share of political power, how does it inhibit them if they are told that the

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leader of the Mississippi AFL-CIO, Claude Ramsey, is openly advocating and working to forge a Negro-labor coalition against the state's racists and reactionaries? And why should this kind of alliance not become a constructive pattern for the rest of the South? Is Charles Weltner of Atlanta, who resigned from Congress rather than support Lester Maddox, an enemy of civil rights? I think not.

Carmichael proposes that the black and white poor be organized separately, so that at some future point they can coalesce. As a tactic, separate organization may be temporarily necessary in parts of the deep South. But the historical lesson is that in the long run this can't succeed. The Southern Populist movement, in which poor whites and Negroes were organized into separate groups, floundered on the rock of race prejudice—and also because this agrarian movement could not deal with the problems related to the industrialization of the nation. And even where separate organization may be necessary, SNCC's style and ideology hinders the future unity of the black and white poor. SNCC's use of what is primarily a racial rather than an economic approach contributes to undermining the possibilities for a future alliance. So far, the effects of the "Black Power" slogan on the white poor has been a disastrous relapse into racist violence. Separate organization presents the same problem for the poor as dual unionism for the labor movement. Employers can exploit and use one group against the other.

At this point, a few words should be said about those white intellectual patrons of "Black Power" who are encouraging Negro militants like Carmichael. One of these, Professor Howard Zinn, writing in the *Nation* (September 5, 1966), layed out a strategy of "a kind of political guerrilla warfare" as an alternative to coalition politics:

> Setting up *Parallels* to unsatisfactory official bodies and new ones where they are needed (right up to Congress, the Supreme Court and an international war crimes tribunal) has infinite possibilities. If Negroes set up their own "police force" in Philadelphia, Mississippi, the Attorney General might begin to rethink his narrow view of "federalism." If Harlem and Roxbury "seceded" . . . and set up their own "government," it might bring worry—and action—in high places.

This kind of deracinated talk leads not to concrete action involving large numbers of Negroes, but to quietism and copping-out.

Much more serious are the comments of I. F. Stone. He writes in the August 18, 1966, issue of the *New York Review of Books:*

> His [the Negro's] racism answering ours, is a necessary step toward our ultimate reconciliation. The riots—and they will become worse—have a logic of their own: can we deny that only the fear of race war can force

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> us finally to gird for Negro rehabilitation and reconstruction as we gird for war abroad, on a giant scale and with a generous hand.

"Black Power" and New Left spokesmen have argued—and evidently, convinced some liberals—that the only way in which Negroes could wrest anything from the power structure was by violence and rioting. They say that only after the riots in Watts did the federal government pay any attention to Negroes in that area. Now it is true that some special programs were initiated in Watts, though actually there was a minimum of money expended and a maximum of rhetoric. (The programs, by the way, were not funded with new appropriations but came out of the money that had already been earmarked for antipoverty programs in other Negro ghettos. In that sense, the Watts riot merely led to a redistribution of inadequate funds.) To be sure, Chicago Negro communities got sprinklers on their fire hydrants after the riots—but not much else.

The definitive answer to those who see riots as a "creative" strategy came, however, in the 1966 elections, with the election of men to Congress pledged to cut back the entire poverty program. In Bakersfield, California, the scene of several days of racial violence last May, the voters decided overwhelmingly on November 8 not to participate in the federal antipoverty program. According to the *New York Times*, "Most of the benefits of the poverty programs now in effect . . . go to Negroes." Those who still argue that violence and riots help the Negro cause had better think again.

The white middle class can afford the luxury of being titillated by the derring-do of its children in the New Left. But it is the Negro masses that must pay the price for the damage done by the ideologues of "Black Power."

It would be absurd to blame Stokely Carmichael and other "Black Power" advocates for the "white backlash," which has its roots in American institutions and their failure. The racism and hatred of the oppressed cannot be equated with that of his oppressor. As Martin Luther King said, "the cry of 'black power' is at bottom a reaction to the reluctance of white power to make the kind of changes necessary to make justice a reality for the Negro."

"The nation is moving in a vicious cycle," a *New York Times* reporter observed, "in which Negroes riot because whites do not do enough and whites do not do enough because Negroes riot." Exactly. And at this difficult movement, we would not be candid if we did not add that today "Black Power" advocates are becoming part of the problem, even as yesterday, under different banners, many of them were superbly part of the solution.

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Eléna de la Souchère

VENEZUELA: PROGRESS AND TROUBLE

This article, which first appeared in the French magazine Preuves, *was written before the recent announcement by the Venezuelan government that, in order to cope with terrorists of both the Right and Left, it was "temporarily suspending" certain civil liberties. While understanding the need of a democratically elected government like that of Venezuela to protect itself against the various authoritarian groups which seek by force to overthrow it, one is still disturbed by the measures it has announced. It may be reassuring to know, however, that once before, under the Betancourt administration, similar emergency steps were taken to cope with terrorists and democratic rights were then restored.*—ED.

Venezuela has twice suffered an abrupt intrusion of the technology and culture of more highly developed societies. The Spanish invasion suddenly introduced a European way of life into a country in the same latitude as Guinea—that is, into an environment that by nature is not hospitable to it. Venezuelan life, like that of all the Latin-American world, is mountain life. In the southern half of the country, the savannahs on the Orinoco and its swampy delta are, for all practical purposes, deserts, exactly as in Guiana. On the other bank of the Orinoco, the *llanos*—vast prairies on which graze herds of cattle, chased now by the rising of the river, now by the November-to-April drought—are scarcely more populated. Thus, Guiana and the *llanos,* which represent 80% of Venezuela's land area, were in 1960 inhabited by only 20% of the population. The other 80% were concentrated in the Andes of Mérida, on the slopes and in the valleys near the oil wells.

The mountain regions, the only usable space, necessarily include much unarable land. In Venezuela, as in all former Spanish colonies, usable land is rare, and consequently easy to buy or sell at a large profit. The valleys have been monopolized by large proprietors, while farmers on the hills have practiced a primitive agriculture that has aggravated erosion and soil depletion. Driven off by the land's sterility, the farmer soon resumes his destructive labor elsewhere, until one day he decides to look for work in the city.

All of Latin America has experienced the exodus of farmers to the city, but in Venezuela this problem is especially acute. The urban

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population, which in 1936 constituted 35% of the total, today makes up 63%. The present population of Caracas (1,632,000) is larger than Venezuela's entire urban population in 1941.

The exodus from the land was precipitated by a boom in the oil industry caused by investment of foreign capital and equipment. But this second influx of a modern technology—which, on the whole, is still undeveloped in Venezuela—enormously aggravated the country's economic imbalance, since of all industries oil is the one in which the percentage of workers is lowest in relation to production and invested capital. The Venezuelan oil industry, third largest in the world, with a daily output of 3½ million barrels, employs only 33,472 people.

The uprooted population, which lives in brightly-colored wooden *ranchitos* on two mountainsides overlooking Caracas, is not integrated into the urban population. After Betancourt became the first freely-elected President of Venezuela in 1958, the recorded number of unemployed workers in Venezuela rose to 260,000. To this figure we must add the farm emigrants who have never found steady employment. This segment of the population has been roughly estimated at a half-million persons. The percentage of active workers in Venezuela (32%) is one of the lowest in Latin America.

This small percentage can be explained in part by the "demographic explosion." The introduction of vaccination and sanitation has caused a decline in infant mortality and a rise in life expectancy, while the high birth rate common to all underdeveloped countries remains constant in the rural areas and among the uprooted *ranchitos.* In addition, Venezuela's rate of demographic growth is one of the highest in the world (3.37% in 1964). 53% of the population is less than nineteen years of age. Furthermore, the uprooting of *ranchitos* has disrupted family and social structures and caused a disturbing rise in the number of illegitimate births. A significant percentage of the Caracas *ranchitos* is made up of single women who, as maids or laundresses, support themselves and their four or five children born of ephemeral unions.

Betancourt's immediate predecessor, Admiral Larrazabal, head of the provisional government in 1958 after the fall of the dictator Perez Jimenez, left behind him heavy liabilities. His "emergency plan" of large public works was intended to provide employment for a certain number of the unemployed. The government could not meet these social expenditures and also make the investments necessary for fundamental reforms in the economic system. A choice had to be made between a social policy that would leave a mass of uprooted people to

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vegetate in poverty, and a program to root out this poverty by reforming structural imbalances in the Venezuelan economy.

In 1959 Rómulo Betancourt chose the more orthodox economic solution. His abandonment of the Larrazabal plan was one of the causes of the sudden rise in unemployment. A more important cause, however, was a recession precipitated by a withdrawal of foreign capital following the government's announcement of projected reforms. Fear of both the political Right and of Betancourt's plans combined to throw a crowd of rioters temporarily into the pro-Castro camp.

The War Against the Cartel

Betancourt's reform program rested entirely on an oil policy which he had developed over more than twenty years. Profits from oil, soon to be superfluous in a world of nuclear energy, were to give the state the financial means of building more diversified types of industry to assure Venezuela's survival in a post-oil world.

In his *Política y petróleo,* Betancourt explained the reasons he had rejected, at the beginning of his first administration (1945–48),[1] "the idea of possible nationalization by decree":

> We have always avoided, in the early stages of an administration of revolutionary orientation, a measure similar to that upon which the Mexican administration of Lázaro Cárdenas could pride itself. There are great differences between Mexico's situation at the time when she nationalized oil and our situation. Oil was then, and continues to be, an important factor in Mexico's economy, but it was supplemented by other industries which had been appreciably developed. Therefore, the normal development of the country was not seriously disturbed when the international oil cartel decided to boycott nationalized oil. But, in contrast, when we assumed power, almost the entire Venezuelan economy and an appreciable part of its fiscal activity revolved around oil. In 1944, the year preceding the October revolution, 92% of the funds with which Venezuela paid for her imports was provided by the oil industry. In the face of these realities, nationalization of the oil industry by decree would have been a mortal pirouette into the void.[2]

Having no way to declare war on the international oil cartel, the Venezuelan government began a more subtle war whose instrument was the Venezuelan Oil Corporation (*Corporación Venezolana del petróleo*), created in 1960.

This Corporation, intended ultimately to replace the cartel, is like

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[1] Brought to power by the revolution of October, 1945, Betancourt's democratic regime was overthrown by a military coup in 1948.

[2] *Op. cit.* pp. 235-236. Mexico, 1956.

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a dauphin who still lacks the means of power—equipment, troops, tanks. Its role is to verify the cartels' transactions and to enforce their payment of financial obligations imposed by the government. These payments, intended to provide the government with the means of reform and to stop the loss of dividends, were first (in 1945–48) fixed at 50% of the net profit of the cartels, then at 66% after Betancourt's return to power. In 1965, the government collected 47% of the total value of Venezuelan oil production, the highest percentage so far. The Venezuelan Treasury draws 70% of its returns from oil. When we compare the development of the oil industry to that of other branches of the economy, we find that this annual tapping of the cartels' revenues made it possible for the government to "sow" other industries. Between 1959 and 1962, oil production had a mean annual increase of 2.7%, but other industries and agricultural production increased by 8% and 6.3% per year respectively. Oil, which in 1959 accounted for 29% of the gross national product, today makes up only 22%, and was reduced to 20% in 1966, the last year of the plan's four year cycle.

The Corporation has been unable to eliminate entirely the fiscal fraud and exploitative methods of the cartels. At Maracaibo, where oil wells stand along the banks of the lake like an army of derricks, one need only cross the half-mile bridge to discover, at Cabimas, a spectacle of desolation. Half-naked children and emaciated donkeys wander aimlessly in front of the *ranchitos*. Here and there, a black stain on the ground marks the site of an oil well abandoned after careless exploitation of the surface layer. The companies have now removed their activities and their best workers to another area; the other workers were fired. Tradesmen who depended on the community of oil workers are in danger. The village which was the heart of Venezuelan industry is now an encampment of the unemployed. Wealth has engendered poverty and unemployment is aggravated by automation. Oil production has almost tripled since 1948, but the number of oil workers has decreased from 55,170 to 33,472. Six hundred layoffs are expected shortly. And the Federation of Oil Workers has just asked the government and Congress to intervene to stop these practices.

To combat the cartels' cupidity, the government and the Corporation have one effective weapon: the refusal of new land concessions to the cartel—a refusal sometimes accompanied by the revocation of previous concessions that have not been worked after a fixed period of time. In addition, the real estate tax on all oil lands, whether or not presently in use, encourages voluntary withdrawal. The judicious application of these provisions reduced to 8,015,502 acres (as of December

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31, 1964) the total area of concessions, which had risen in 1948 to 41 million acres. Practicing this policy of reduction, the Corporation also offers the cartels an alternative, the public service contract, which the Mobil Oil Company has recently agreed to sign. Mobil had foreseen, for 1965, only insignificant investments, for its concession had by that date reached the optimum point in its development. Unable to obtain new land, the company resigned itself to accepting the Corporation plan.

If this policy is pursued in years to come, the decrease in conceded area, plus taxes on the oil wells, will steadily reduce the cartels' role in the country's total production. By 1984, the date when all concessions expire, the major part of Venezuelan oil will undoubtedly already be produced by the Corporation, either directly or through private groups tied to the government by contracts of public service—a plan which will permit the Corporation to limit the profits of foreign firms and to impose on them financial control.

The Sowing of Oil

Petroleum receipts have served to finance agrarian reform. Oil was "sowed" in the fields: 703 villages sprang from nothing during the five years of Betancourt's mandate; 4,175,000 acres of land were redistributed in lots of 7½ to 750 acres (depending on the nature of the soil) among 66,428 farming families totaling 350,000 persons. Contrary to the assertions of certain sources, the reapportioned land comes in large part (56%) from private properties subject to expropriation. Lands in the public domain accounted for only 44% of the area allotted to workers who benefited from the agrarian law.[3]

The Leoni plan for the coming five years will further accelerate land reform. It provides for drainage of the swamps at Maracaibo (1,240,000 acres), the irrigation of 250,000 acres of arid land, and the settlement there of 2,200,000 families.

By 1969, nine years after the passage of the agrarian law of March 5, 1960, 76% of the workers numbered in the 1960 census (226,000 of 350,000) will have been given land. But in the interval 90,000 new families will have been formed. Taking into account the "demographic explosion," landless workers will have disappeared only after fifteen years of continuous agricultural reform.

Agrarian reform is a matter of time. The stroke of the pen that expropriates the proprietor and provides land for the farmer is never more than a starting point: one must make the land habitable, pass

[3] Of 4,175,000 acres allotted, during the Betancourt mandate, 2,253,474 acres were drawn from private property and 1,873,542 acres from the public domain.

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from extensive to intensive cultivation, and consolidate these gains by building roads of access, canals, houses, sewers, schools. This requires a great deal of time, and delays are multiplied by financial difficulties. Indeed, no state could at one time handle all the expenses—labor, indemnities, provision of livestock, manure, tractors,—demanded by agrarian reform on this scale.

Such a reform program would be fatally burdensome. It is said of the Venezuelan reform—the cost of which for five years of the Betancourt regime rose to 485 million *bolivares* (261½ million for the purchase of land and 223½ million for "consolidation" work[4])—that it is "the most expensive in the world" in relation to the number of people who benefit from it. But we must remember that the cost of an agrarian reform is not measured solely by the number of beneficiaries, but also by the nature of the soil, the amount of work necessary before it can be used, the means of cultivation available to the new occupants, etc.

In applying Venezuela's agrarian law, the directors of the National Agrarian Institute have tried to balance freedom and authority. They were forced to innovate, as their predecessors had left only a negative fund of wisdom. The spectacle of Mexican agrarian reform, ineffectual even fifty-five years after the revolution, and the spectacle of Russia, a wheatland which, forty-eight years after the revolution, has been forced to import wheat from Mexico, Argentina, Canada and the United States, both suggest a bitter conclusion. It seems more difficult to regulate agricultural production than to send rockets to the moon.

The failure of authoritarian methods seems particularly to have struck Venezuelan technicians. They have tried to temper the authoritarianism of a government which designates both expropriable land and the beneficiaries of reform, and gives the latter the means to work the land. From the moment he is set up on a lot, the beneficiary is forbidden to sell his lease, but he may choose the produce he wishes to raise. The cultivation plans of the Agrarian Institute are suggestions, not commands.

This liberal method has encouraged a sharp rise in production: for the first time in history, an agrarian law has been immediately translated into larger harvests. And this boom is the first condition for the success of the reforms.

But this condition, though necessary, is insufficient; freedom, without which success is impossible, includes the freedom to fail. Here is an example of such failure: a community situated near Maracay in the state of Asagua, settled in a fertile valley between two mountain ranges. Each of the village's 86 families received ten acres of land. Here, as

4 In this total is included 36 million *bolivares* for roads of access and 33 million for housing.

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everywhere, the land was free, and the state provided the public works —roads and canals. Upon their arrival, the farmers even found houses built and ready for them. But the earth, containing 40% saltpeter, yields only small harvests of maize. Besides housing and food each family has, on the average, a monthly income of 100 *bolivares*, about $35.00. The beneficiaries merely passed from famine to want, and some are close to giving up.

Communities made up of farmers only are usually more prosperous. At Julia, another community in the fertile valley of Aragua, the farmers received only 7½ acres each. They built their houses and a school with their own hands, from materials provided on government credit. But the remarkably fertile land (it had once belonged to the brother of one of Betancourt's ministers) yields four harvests of maize a year and permits the cultivation of vegetables and fruit trees. The community has already repaid its entire loan (a maximum of 5,000 *bolivares* per family). Each family has, beyond its expenses for housing and food, a monthly income of 300 to 400 *bolivares* ($94.00 to $125.00). The farmers complain, however, of the *camioneros* (middlemen), who profit exorbitantly at the expense of both producers and consummers. The officials of the Agrarian Institute and of the Plan suggest setting up a co-operative store, but here they confront the resistance of individualism. In this place, as in many others, the administration suggests, orients, but does not impose its solutions.

Nevertheless, in the spring of 1965, protests caused by the rising cost of consumer goods forced the Leoni government to devise a plan for cutting down the activity of the middlemen. Apprenticed in the school of reality, Venezuelan reformers are perpetually correcting themselves. They will undoubtedly have to tighten their tutelage over the farming collectivities and to absorb and re-educate unadapted bembers. But the planners reasonably estimate that future stages will be less difficult. Already, in certain regions, the development of reform and the shortage of hired hands have caused the large proprietors to raise their workers' salaries. Growing charges of exploitation will probably cause certain proprietors to sell their land, lowering the value of it in the long run and thereby helping to broaden land distribution through purchase by the state or by the farmers.

The Ruhr in the Desert

Agrarian reform in Venezuela's most important decentralization measure, but not the only one. To relieve congestion in the capital and its environs, the government has created several new areas of industrial growth. The most spectacular is an immense iron manufac-

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turing complex in Mantanzas, on the Orinoco, at the point where semi-equatorial Guiana (savannahs and virgin forests) meets the *llano,* the semidesert prairie. This paradoxical Venezuelan Ruhr in the desert can be explained by the presence of iron deposits which put Venezuela in fifth place among iron-producing countries, and by nearby waterfalls along the Rio Caroni, a source of hydroelectric power that will soon be harnessed by the giant Guri Dam. The navigability of the Orinoco enables large cargo ships to unload their coal on pontoons at Puerto-Ordaz and leave loaded with finished or half-finished iron products. The city of Santo Tome de Guiana which has sprung up around the iron complex will number 415,000 people by 1975.

This vast plan to develop Guiana was originally a much more modest project conceived during the dictatorship of Perez Jiminez. The construction of acid-producing plants, begun in 1957, a few months before Jiminez' fall, was pursued by Larrazabal and Betancourt. In 1961, two and a half years after Betancourt took power, the first of nine blast furnaces in the iron plant was lit.

High iron production the year around will not be possible until 1970, when the Guri Dam will double Venezuelan hydroelectric production. According to plans, the complex should produce 3,860,000 tons of cast iron and acid in 1975—two-thirds for the internal market, one-third for export. The search for new markets will then force Venezuela to adhere to the Latin American free trade zone (A.L.A.L.C.), which already draws together Mexico and eight other South American countires, including Brazil and Argentina.[5]

During a conference in April, 1964, near Caracas, spokesman for the Administration tried to plead the cause of "Latin American integration" to representatives of both small and larger industry who feared that Venezuela's high salaries and high prices would discourage exports and favor imports. Dropping the custom barriers would then result in an invasion of the Venezuelan market by the products of neighboring countries. The representatives of the new industries are resolved to protect a new prosperity which they owe in large measure to credit advanced by the Minister of Development and to private foreign tariffs and quotas. Protection has been practiced with particular effect in the automotive industry. After encouraging the establishment of production plants (for General Motors, Ford and Volkswagen), the government in 1963 forbade the importation of vehicles. The most recent bans affect parts and accesories (tires, batteries, windows, paints,

[6] Other members of the A.L.A.L.C are Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay.

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and solvents), which the national industry will produce from now on.

In 1958 Venezuela relied on imports for 85% of her pharmaceutical needs; she now furnishes 80% of her domestic consumption. In certain fields (paper, razor blades, beer) production is already keeping pace with demand. Since 1957, the production of fruit juices has doubled, as has that of cigarettes. And workshops are beginning to turn out standardized radio and television sets, and air-conditioning apparatus.

To sum up, from 1958 to 1963 the value of industrial production rose by 39% (in terms of 1960 *bolivares*) and imports fell by 30%.

Toward a Ministry for the Uprooted

During the same period, the number of industrial workers increased by only 14%. And in almost all other branches of activity there is a certain disproportion between production and employment. The total number of unemployed workers has remained nearly constant since 1959. In spite of a rise in the gross national product twice as great as the rate of demographic growth (6.70% as against 3.37%), the country cannot cope with its unemployed work force. The redress of structural imbalance in the economy has not led to a proportional redress of social imbalance.[6]

The rupture of the traditional link between production and employment has been caused by automation. In countries which have evolved slowly and regularly, the survival of an important percentage of outmoded equipment requires a large labor force and thus contributes to continued high employment. In the new countries, industry is born under the auspices of automation at a time when the national economy has not yet absorbed a mass of unemployed, uprooted persons. Overdevelopment obstructs the solution of problems of underdevelopment; the sudden appearance of the future aggravates the evils of the past. Venezuela's pilot experience shows that in a young country where the problem of an uprooted mass is severe (and such is the case in the majority of Latin American nations), structural reforms of the economy are certainly a necessary base; but in an era of automation they are not sufficient to solve, at least in an acceptable period of time, the social problems already created by underdevelopment. Latin American governments will perhaps decide someday to create ministries for the uprooted which will work out extra-economic or anti-economic measures (job training, education for women, public works, etc.). But only considerably increased international aid would permit this to happen simultaneously with structural reforms.

[6] This social imbalance is not present in Cuba because a large part of the uprooted population has been enlisted in the militia.

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Jean Bloch-Michel

THE BEN BARKA AFFAIR—ACT ONE

Only muffled echoes of the great scandal in recent French politics have reached the United States. Below, our Paris correspondent reports on the Ben Barka affair, but first it may help to provide some preliminary information.

Ben Barka, leader of a vaguely leftist opposition in Moroccan politics, had been living in exile. He was, apparently, murdered, and the evidence points to complicity on the part of high officials in both the Gaullist and Moroccan regimes. The trial which followed in France came to an abrupt end when Dlimi, an important Moroccan official, dramatically arrived at Orly Airport in Paris and was placed in a prison cell.

Thus, Act I. If and when Act II occurs, the guilt that seems to be shared by both French and Moroccan officials may be exposed. Meanwhile here is a list of the leading characters in Act I:

Figon—*key figure in the story, small-time Paris criminal with long jail record, pimp, deeply involved in the incident, supposedly committed "suicide" when the police came to arrest him.*

Bernier—*political adventurer, occasional journalist of the "Third World," frequented Castroite circles.*

Lopez—*main representative of Air France at Orly Airport, a leading suspect, believed to be government agent, perhaps double agent, some say even triple agent (including work for Moroccan government).*

General Jacquier—*head of French* Sûreté *(secret police) at time of the killing but since removed by de Gaulle.*

Franju—*well-known French film director; had planned to make film on "Third World" using Ben Barka as advisor; served as bait, probably unwittingly, to lure Ben Barka into coming to Paris.*

Oufkir—*Moroccan Minister of Interior, alleged to have personally killed Ben Barka after torturing him.*

Dlimi—*head of Moroccan secret police; his astonishing arrival in Paris caused suspension of trial; now under arrest and investigation by French police.*

Souchon and Voitot—*the Rosenkrantz and Guildenstern of the case; police agents used to trap Ben Barka and lure him to death.*

Mme. Souchon—*wife of M. Souchon.*

General de Gaulle—*General de Gaulle.*

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Were it not for the murder and torture, the Ben Barka affair could only be treated as a joke. Even then, the recent trial would still be a sinister comedy, apart from the events which provoked it. It had, indeed, a few special moments—the testimony of a woman friend of Figon, the outbursts and sobs of Bernier.

What did the trial show us? An accused, Lopez, who does not say everything he knows but sometimes says too much. "But, *Monsieur le Préident,* the reason I went to Orly so early to welcome General Jacquier was that I wanted to find a room that wasn't bugged!" We thus learn—and it has never been denied—that the *salons* of Orly, the rooms reserved for the V.I.P.'s, were stuffed with gadgets to record their conversations. Later, a lawyer was barred from the trial; he had been accused of advising the wife of a policeman, Mme. Souchon, to say that one of her husband's chiefs was the guilty party. And then Mme. Souchon reveals that, when she invited a friend to dinner from whom she wanted advice, she put a recording device under the soup bowl.

Incidentally, magnetic tape plays a very important part in the whole Ben Barka affair. Recordings are taken right and left. But recordings are just as easily lost. Tapes vanish, others turn up with superimposed conversations. Everybody at the trial has a tape ready at the opportune moment, and every lawyer has a tape up his sleeve, just as every magician has rabbits in his top hat.

But there are better things to come. We heard the testimony of a general, head of our secret service, who wanted to prove that his department had good reason to keep clear of the Ben Barka affair. Next came one of the heads of this secret service, a most respectable person who had been severely wounded in the war and deported to Germany. He told the court that he could only offer fragmentary testimony since he suffered, alas, from amnesia. Is there any other country that would express its gratitude to a deserving citizen by making him a secret service agent even though he was afflicted with loss of memory?

Who has lied in the Ben Barka affair? This seems a question all too easy to answer. Except for a few persons who found themselves in court by a stroke of bad luck—Bernier, the movie director Franju, and the young woman who was a friend of Figon—one gets the impression that all of them never stopped lying: accused, witnesses, policemen, more or less secret agents, ministers, prefects and ambassadors. Some lied for reasons of state; others for what might be called reasons of the police, which is like a state within a state.

There were other kinds of lying, too. "You have never ceased lying!" said the Solicitor General to the most talkative of the accused,

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that strange man Lopez, who was brazen enough to assert that he had bought himself an estate in the country with savings he accumulated when he stopped smoking. And he said this at the Court of Assizes, before magistrates in scarlet robes and a jury of nine, chaired by that excellent actress Marcelle Ranson, who must have thought that she had never seen such theater. Lies became so gross that they ceased being lies and turned into innocent jokes, which everyone took for what they were worth.

The judge who was so indulgent to liars and policemen was harsh to other witnesses. A man, "suspected of being the lover of an actress, had testified that Figon's gun had a blue barrel, while the gun he was shown in court and which he was supposed to have opportunely hidden, had a black barrel. No matter; for two hours and with the aid of very precise paraphernalia, an expert "proved" that a black gun barrel could look blue. When this expert was asked whether blue-barrelled guns existed, he answered that they were quite common.

Next came a hardened criminal, client of the lawyer-deputy-witness who was his regular customer. He was accused of having offered money to another witness to silence him. "Not at all," he says, "it was he who offered *me* money." But whereas Maître Hayot was prosecuted for bribing a witness upon the simple accusation of a policeman's wife—the one who put microphones under the dishes—the only reaction to this revelation was general laughter.

Similarly, it never occurred to anyone to ask whether perjury proceedings could be started against a witness-lawyer-deputy whose testimony was found in flagrant contradiction with the testimony of not one or two but five other witnesses. Five liars or one? A question that the presiding judge found not worth asking.

"The question shall not be asked!"—the sentence was made famous by presiding Judge Deleguorgue at the trial of Emile Zola. At that time, the taboo subject was the Dreyfus affair. This time it would seem to be, in some way, the Figon affair, although its dossier was part of the Ben Barka proceedings. The police could simply not lay their hands on Figon—the only man who knew *everything* about the Ben Barka affair—even though everyone knew where he was. Press photographers and journalists were interviewing him at the time. But not all journalists are police informers—although some are, as the proceedings showed—and Figon walked the streets of Paris peacefully, although he was supposedly wanted by the law. When the police finally came to arrest him, he suddenly died. Officially, Figon committed suicide as he was facing

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arrest. But some malicious people say he died too conveniently. They refuse to believe in his suicide. They think that Figon's suicide was too beautiful—for the police, for the secret service—to be true.

One person had some very clear ideas on this question and wanted to pass them on to the court. It was Figon's mother, an honest woman who had loved her dead, wayward son. Who would blame her? She was summoned. Then she was forgotten; she spent eight hours in the witness room and was sent away unheard.

Then came a fantastic and dramatic event. Dlimi, chief of the Moroccan *Sûreté*, the man accused together with Oufkir, the Moroccan Minister of the Interior, of having killed Ben Barka with his own hands, heeded the call of conscience and patriotism. Without the permission of his king—who nonetheless promoted him from major to lieutenant-colonel the very night he committed his act of disobedience—he came to Paris to surrender to justice, eager to tell the truth and to tell it fast.

Not too fast, however. For his first action was very clever: he initiated a complex judicial proceeding which challenged the validity of all that had been done so far. It also permitted him to remain silent. For it was impossible to question him until various authorities had pronounced themselves on the procedural questions he had raised. Dlimi claimed he had come to Paris to talk; actually, he came to keep quiet.

This is a likely explanation. Now that Figon "committed suicide," Dlimi is the only man in Paris who knows everything about the Ben Barka affair. He knows more about it than Lopez, the liar who builds card-castles. He knows everything and—this is more serious—everyone knows that he knows everything. Everyone means not only all the accused but also all the witnesses—policemen, secret agents of all stripes, prefects, commissioners, and ministers. He knows everything and can say it; after all, one does not arrange the suicide of a high foreign official as easily as that of a Frenchman of doubtful antecedents.

But will Dlimi talk? He will certainly threaten to do so. But will he really? If he does, the whole look of the Ben Barka affair will change. It will be remembered that General de Gaulle stated in one of his press conferences that Dlimi and Oufkir had found in France only "ordinary and subaltern accomplices." These accomplices have been, in a way, appointed. Each government service released the most compromised of its men to save the others. The police contributed Souchon and Voitot, two policemen undoubtedly of the "ordinary and subaltern" variety; the secret service offered Leroy-Finville. But behind these sacrificial lambs the main body of suspects remains untouched. The police,

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the *Sûreté,* the *Renseignements généraux,* all of them have not yielded an inch. The purpose of the trial seems to have been not to investigate the circumstances of Ben Barka's death but to defend French institutions threatened by scandal.

"Ordinary and subaltern accomplices"? If that is so, why did General de Gaulle start a general reform of the French police in the wake of the Ben Barka affair? And why was General Jacquier, head of the French secret service, dismissed from his post two weeks later? We are told these things happened because the Ben Barka affair simply proved that the administrative machine needed modernizing. But are the men responsible for the functioning of this machine really above suspicion?

Who will believe these explanations? Who will accept the statement that Oufkir, a former French secret agent, had come to Paris to kidnap and kill Ben Barka, without first obtaining a "cover"—to use the language of espionage—from the French secret service? Who can really believe that the shady characters who aided Oufkir—all of them old Gestapo agents, owners and bouncers of brothels acting in their spare time as police informers and strongmen—left France after Ben Barka's disappearance without the aid of accomplices who were anything but "ordinary and subaltern"? And yet these are the things we are supposed to swallow. This was the purpose of the trial: to try some accessories to the crime, put up to shield the real criminals, and thus deprive the Ben Barka affair of its true character. But the arrival of Dlimi changed everything. The Ben Barka affair is again, as everyone knew it was, an affair of state.

But Dlimi remains silent. His proceedings give time to negotiators. There is no doubt that discussions are taking place right now about what is to be done. One thing will certainly not be done: uncover the whole and simple truth of the Ben Barka affair. The scandal would just be too great. But no longer can everything be hushed up. The accused will still have to be judged. If Dlimi talks, it will be to show that all the accused had good reasons to believe they were acting with the tacit or explicit approval of their superiors. And this must be avoided at all cost. The problem now is—and it is a difficult one—to find an acceptable version of the crime that would permit the condemnation of the accessories and save Oufkir. For Dlimi came to Paris to save Oufkir. If he fails, he will tell all. And that would spoil everything, so it is most unlikely to happen.

The great criminal affairs of the last few years have some points in common. The Israeli secret service kidnapped Eichmann from Argen-

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tina just as the French secret service kidnapped Argoud from Germany and the Moroccan secret service kidnapped and killed Ben Barka in France. But the Israelis and the French received no aid from the Argentine or German police. What is new about the Ben Barka affair is that the French themselves have helped to commit a violation of their own rights. And, of course, the victim was a quite different type of man.

We thought the war was over, but for some people it is not. A conception of the defense of the state, current in wartime, has been preserved in peacetime. The opponent is the enemy, and it is always more simple to kill him than to defeat him politically. Morocco had found it more expedient to murder Ben Barka than to debate with him.

But, for the first time, things cannot be arranged so easily. Ben Barka was neither a criminal nor a terrorist. He was killed because he had tangled with the Moroccan Minister of the Interior and everything leads one to believe that he was murdered with an inexcusable French complicity.

No one knows whether this French complicity will be fully unravelled. But one thing is certain: If the trial is resumed, and Dlimi finds himself in the dock together with the two bewildered policemen Souchon and Voitot, the clownish double agent Lopez, the secret agent Leroy-Finville who was picked as a scapegoat, and poor Bernier who will always have bad luck, the comedy will be over and no one will laugh anymore.

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COMMUNICATIONS

Robert Paul Wolff

On Tolerance and Freedom

In our September-October issue we printed an article by David Spitz entitled "Pure Tolerance: A Critique of Criticisms." Its subject was A Critique of Pure Tolerance, *a new book co-authored by Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington Moore, and Herbert Marcuse. A Comment by Michael Walzer and response by David Spitz appeared in our last issue. Below Robert Paul Wolff comments on the article, and David Spitz briefly replies.*

I could hardly expect that a journal named DISSENT should review our little book favorably, but I assumed that it would choose a reviewer who could read. Professor Spitz imagines that my essay is an attack on Mill. In fact, as even the casual reader should be able to discern, it is an attack on something called "pluralism," which I go out of my way to explain is *not* the theory espoused by Mill. Pluralism, as I characterized it, is an outgrowth of twentieth-century attempts to fuse *some* of Mill's principles with conservative sociological doctrines originally opposed to the classical liberalism of *On Liberty*. My interest in tolerance as a social ideal was explicitly restricted to its role as the virtue, or excellence, of a pluralist democracy.

If Professor Spitz will not discuss the essay I actually wrote, then the only way to foster a dialogue is for me to reply to his criticism as though I had written the essay he thinks I wrote. So let us consider Mill's *On Liberty* and forget "Beyond Tolerance."

Mill's aim, as he states quite clearly, is to present a *utilitarian* defense of the proposition that "the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action in any of their number, is self-protection." In other words, Mill undertakes to show that the adoption of this principle as social policy will lead to the greatest possible happiness for the greatest number of people. Such a claim is obviously empirical in nature, for it is a question of fact whether one policy produces more or less happiness than another. We may legitimately ask, therefore, whether the past century of social experience and sociological investigation throws any new light on Mill's thesis. I think that it does, and that in several important regards the evidence is *against* Mill. Let me mention three major challenges to Mill's teaching:

1. Mill's thesis is couched in terms of a distinction between the internal, or private, sphere of a man's life, and the external, or public, effects of his

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actions. He claims (with no conceivable utilitarian justification, by the way) that society has no right at all to interfere with the internal sphere, and that it may justly interfere with the outward actions only when protecting society from harm or when maximizing happiness. But this distinction between inner and outer, on which Mill's entire argument rests, cannot be maintained in the light of modern theories of the social origins of personality. The autonomous personality which Mill quite rightly admires is not the natural condition of the untyrranized man. It is a specific social product, arising from certain forms of family structure, customs of child-rearing, institutions of education, and ethico-religious practices. The recognition of this fact lies behind the recent emphasis on family patterns in urban ghettos. It is, we now realize, not enough to open the doors to opportunity. We must also teach the disadvantaged to want to walk through them.

2. Mill writes as though individualism, even to the point of idiosyncrasy, were an adequate base for a healthy and stable political society. But it is now a commonplace of social science that men need involvement in intermediate groups and local societies if they are to avoid the evils of anomie and rootlessness. Mill was acute enough as an observer to appreciate the role of voluntary and other associations in industrial society, but he failed to realize how seriously their necessity undermined the foundations of his individualism. Durkheim, Tonnies, and many others have shown us the dangers that lie in formal, legal individualistic freedom unsupported by strong social bonds. Now, it is at least an open question whether the psychological need for community can be satisfactorily met through entirely voluntary human relationships. If it cannot, then there will be sound utilitarian arguments for legally strengthening certain social institutions (for example, by making it difficult to get a divorce), and encouraging others through governmental planning (by building public housing with large apartments in order to support the extended family, say). The welfare legislation sponsored by modern liberals runs directly contrary to Mill's prescriptions. Mandatory social security and old-age medical insurance violate the principle quoted above from *On Liberty*. It is customary for liberals today to change their programs without bothering to reexamine their theoretical presuppositions. One of the points of my essay was to provoke such a reexamination. I appear to have provoked Spitz, but not in that direction.

3. Mill's famous defense of freedom of speech is, as he insists, utilitarian through and through. He does not say that men have an inalienable right to engage in free debate. He merely says that, in the long run, truth will flourish in an atmosphere of freedom. Leaving aside a certain face-saving vagueness in the phrase "long run," this is again an empirical proposition (as is the claim that men will be happier knowing the truth). So it too can be subjected to some sort of empirical test. The first thing to notice is that although virtually everybody subscribes to Mill's dictum, we all assent to its violation in practice. Not even the most dogmatic libertarian would argue that quacks should get a "fair hearing" in our medical schools, or that the strict licensing of new doctors, now firmly controlled by the medical profession,

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should be abandoned. To be sure, osteopaths and phrenologists may publish books and even, in some states, hang out shingles. But it would be absurd to deny that they are systematically discriminated against and hence do not really get a change to present their case fairly to the public. Much the same can be said in the case of lawyers, architects, undertakers, and numerous other professionals. (I do not include academics. In my experience, virtually any kind of nut can get a Ph.D. and a good teaching job somewhere!) As economics, military strategy, social welfare, and penology come to be viewed as "scientific," there is a tendency to define them as matters of expertise rather than policy, and thus to remove them from the domain of public debate. The institutional reflection of this process is the establishment of professional schools and licensing boards in the case of fields like social work and penology, and the transfer of decision-making from legislature to executive in the case of military strategy and (increasingly) economics.

In every society, some set of doctrines, some definition of significant problems and relevant solutions, is embodied in the political and economic institutions. So long as those underlying assumptions are not in question, something resembling "free debate" may perhaps be possible, but when the dispute goes to the very foundations of the existing order, institutional neutrality is not possible. Even to grant the attack the status of a legitimate alternative would be to alter the society. For example, imagine what alterations would be required in our educational system and learned professions if the scientific method itself were to be treated as genuinely open to question!

Our political institutions today functionally embody a certain theory of American democracy which is known as "pluralism." (This was the burden of my essay.) That theory is wrong as a description of American politics, and inadequate as a prescription. The doctrine of tolerance serves, in our society, as an ideological justification for the preservation of pluralist politics. Mill is wrong in claiming that genuinely free debate can take place about all matters of importance to a society, and he is wrong in claiming that such debate, were it possible, would in the long run lead to the greatest good for the greatest number.

If David Spitz will admit that the rules of tolerance favor the established ideas in our society, then we can have a fruitful argument about the real issue, which is the truth of those ideas. But so long as he pretends to a virginal neutrality, claiming merely to be defending "ground rules" of a purely formal sort, I must insist, as I did in my essay, that it is time to move *beyond tolerance.*

A Rejoinder to Robert Paul Wolff

One is hard put to take Professor Wolff seriously. Nearly a third of his essay dealt adversely with Mill; he now chooses to ignore this. About five-sixths of my discussion dealt with the remainder of his paper; he now chooses to ignore this too. This is the more regrettable since what

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Wolff said then and says now concerning Mill is but a restatement of ancient doctrines elaborated at length in the writings of "liberal" and "radical" critics from James Fitzjames Stephen to Maurice Cowling and Willmoore Kendall; and such repetition simply ignores the very considerable literature that refutes it.

The issue that should concern Wolff is this: how can we move "beyond tolerance," and still provide a forum for dissenting ideas? If Wolff were to control the intellectual marketplace, where within his non-pluralistic, nontolerant system would dissenters from his views find an outlet for expression?

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BOOKS

Ben B. Seligman

Keynes and the Future of Capitalism

THE AGE OF KEYNES, by Robert Lekachman. New York: Random House. 324 pp. $6.00.
THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, by Robert L. Heilbroner. New York: Harper & Row. 148 pp. $4.95.
THE MYTHS OF AUTOMATION, by Charles E. Silberman. New York: Harper & Row. 148 pp. $4.95.

Sooner or later someone was apt to characterize the contemporary era as the age of Keynes. It was back in the 1930's that capitalism seemed to have come to a dead end: the great productive system of the West had ground to a virtual halt, leaving millions stranded in unemployment and abject poverty with no prospect for a decent livelihood ,either for themselves or their children. Banks, the central institution of capitalist society, were closing their doors with frightening frequency. Industrialists, always captives of some defunct economist, cut wages in a vain effort to hold on to disappearing markets. And a vast internal migration was set in motion as workers and their kin drifted across the land in ancient autos in search of jobs.

Needless to say, there had to be some response on the part of government. Work camps for youth were established by the incoming Roosevelt Administration; emergency relief was provided; employment offices were opened; and public works were started. The New Deal initiated experiments in social reform, but unfortunately, all these were limited and short lived. By 1938 Roosevelt's forward motion had ceased and the American economy was still bogged down in massive unemployment. It was not until 1940, with the coming of World War II, that America discovered a way to bring about prosperity —massive state intervention and massive government expenditure.

Yet the methods for resuscitating an expiring economy had been described with great persuasiveness some years earlier. John Maynard Keyns had publishd in 1936 a work on theoretical economics which demonstrated that governmental action was precisely necessary to meet the needs of the day. His theory became an elaborate rationalization of desirable social action, and it has been now embodied into the economic folklore of the times.

It is good, therefore, to have Robert Lekachman's serviceable book at hand. It is really three books in one: a biography, gracefully written and drawing mainly on Sir Roy Harrod's monu-

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mental study; an explication of the theory adumbrated by Keynes; and a review of recent economic history set in a Keynesian context. Though Keynes's life story is now well known, one supposes that it is useful to have his felicitous career described again. Son of a Cambridge economist, Keynes came to maturity in a climate of Victorian utilitarianism dedicated to reform as an instrument of perfectability. A close friend of the Bloomsbury circle, he was also a college bursar, banker, mathematician, polemicist, and patron of the arts. He believed in the power of reason and in the innate willingness of people to listen to logic. And when he was frustrated at Versailles in 1919, where he had been a member of the British delegation, he resigned to write a blistering attack on the Paris Treaty and all its works.

Keynes's economics was another matter—this time he was heeded. When he got around in the 1930's to writing his major opus, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money,* the world was ready to listen, even if some of his colleagues were not. In retrospect, it is now possible to say that he helped rescue capitalism by showing how government planning could maintain a reasonable balance and remove some of the defects of private enterprise while allowing it to prosper. Although business men at first disliked the theory, it became the only useful philosophy of business since laissez faire had ceased to be a call to battle.

The theory was based on a few closely related elements. Investment, said Keynes, depended on the capitalists' prospective rate of profit and the rate of interest; employment stemmed from income and investment; the prospective rate of profit was a function of expectations and the cost of capital; and the rate of interest depended on peoples' willingness to surrender liquid assets and on the available stock of money. Thus, if the willingness to hold on to liquid assets fell, interest rates would drop, encouraging businessmen to undertake investment, while income would be stimulated by virtue of the investment multiplier. Some critics unfairly compared the Keynesian system to a Rube Goldberg contraption, but it seemed to work. There were several points of penetration—lower interest rates, lower taxes, or budgetary deficits, all intended to provide a fillip to income or aggregate demand.

The theory generated a heated debate. But it was also quite neutral, as Lekachman acknowledges, since it was simply a mechanism devoid of political values. The various measures suggested by the theory could be used to stimulate national income without regard to the quality of goods that a society provided: digging holes in the ground and filling them with $100 bills would serve just as well as clearing a slum and building new homes. Both Hitler's and Adenauer's Germany could be Keynesian. For the fact is that fiscal and monetary policy by itself has no political content: it depends on *who* benefits from increased or reduced taxes, since a tax cut is a tax cut so far as the total economy is concerned.

Hence, it now becomes quite possible to speak of commercial Keynesianism, as Lekachman so aptly puts it, or of reactionary Keynesianism, as some others would have it. This is the "perception [of] intelligent businessmen that private activity can be aided by a government sympathetic both to busi-

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ness and to high employment." In essence, this characterization may be applied to the economic policies of the Kennedy Administration which placed all its bets on a fiscal policy that helped corporations and the rich, relying on income to trickle down somehow to those who needed it most. Liberal or "socialistic" Keynesianism was conspicuous by its absence. There are some writers who are so fascinated by GNP numbers that they allow this important distinction to go right over their heads (*vide* D. Bell, in *The American Scholar,* Autumn, 1966, p. 713). Furthermore, the size of the GNP today would appear to have some connection with what is going on in Southeast Asia—at least to the tune of perhaps $60 billion ($20 billion direct outlays on Vietnam, with a multiplier of three). The present GNP level is not all a matter of tax cuts.

The liberal Keynesian thinks of the specific unmet needs of the society—the alleviation, or even eradication, of poverty; the improvement of education; the resuscitation of our cities; the building of decent housing; the provision of adequate urban transportation; the cleansing of the air; the purification of water; and the million and one other tasks that face us if we are to have a liveable environment in our time. No amount of fiscal tinkering will *necessarily* provide these specific needs. The "reactionary" Keynesians, among them some trade unionists, believe that a huge GNP automatically solves most of these problems. We know now that GNP does nothing of the sort, for it takes a specific effort directed toward a specific goal to achieve what needs to be done. The effect may be Keynesian, and no one objects to that; but particular ills still require particular treatments. It is to Lekachman's credit that he states these issues plainly.

For the age of Keynes is still one dominated by politics, and on this level the major decisions of our society are made. That we have now substituted the supposed automaticity of the tax cut for the automaticity of the market does not mean that we are all so much better off for it. As Lekachman says, commercial Keynesianism still favors the prosperous and it still holds suspect the public sector, where most of our problems lie unresolved. Whether or not we move toward a more liberal or perhaps democratic socialist intervention depends on the exigencies of political power. And for the latter Keynesian doctrine provides no guidelines.

Yet it is clear that we are moving toward a new kind of social organization. The capitalism we have hitherto known enjoys no sacrosanct status, and there have been, and will continue to be, inexorable economic and political pressures causing it to alter its shape. The historical problem is to try to discern the limits of that transformation, an exciting task to which Robert Heilbroner turns in his fascinating and powerful analysis. While Lekachman does provide some hint of the problems at hand in the last third of his book, the reader must turn to Heilbroner for a thoroughgoing exploration of capitalism's present-day motion. In fact, both books, by two of the most lucid economists of our time, complement each other quite well: while Lekachman sketches the theory of modern capitalism and both discuss how it actually behaves, it is Heil-

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broner who compels us to look beyond the horizon, to try to discern, given present fact, what the future will bring.

The purview adopted by Heilbroner is wide-ranging, portraying the modern capitalist economy in broad strokes. Without eschewing essential detail, he enables us to peer into the future with a clarity unusual for so short a work. And it is a future dominated by one fundamental feature—technology. For the present, says Heilbroner, that is, for the last third of the 20th century, it is more than likely that the private market will continue to be a major arena of economic effort, bending technology to its own uses. While so engaged, the private sector extracts privileges for itself that are enormous. And, of course, these privileges constitute a source of resistance to change and adaptation. Yet privilege, or perhaps more accurately, the right to enjoy the usufruct of society, can have other roots and given alternative social and economic arrangements, it is conceivable that such enjoyment might be distributed in ways not imagined by reactionary Keynesians.

The cost of *present* privilege is great, as Heibroner reveals. Wage poverty for Negroes and unskilled workers, Harlems and Appalachias, tax loopholes for the rich, a continuation of lopsided income distribution with some grotesque consequences at either end, the substitution of ostentation for efficiency and function in consumer goods, and a continued rejection of rational planning in production—all constitute the costs of continued privilege. Yet there is no doubt in Heilbroner's mind that such privilege will be undermined, just as special status for the feudal barons was undermined and eventually destroyed by a capitalism that flowered in the interstices of a cracking medieval order.

Why can one draw a historical parallel of this sort? Because, says Heilbroner, technology and organized knowledge promise to perform a like function in the years to come. They represent forces "sufficiently overwhelming to render impotent the citadel of capitalism." Technology and knowledge are independent of capitalist institutions; they do not owe their existence directly to the captains of industry and they will "profoundly alter the nature of the existing [social and political] terrain." For the fact is, argues Heilbroner, that technology creates social problems that require non-market controls, administrative controls—if you will, government controls. The thrust of technology is indeed toward a society that cries out for administration.

The issue, though, is somewhat more involved than Heilbroner can explore in his short survey. For there is always the fundamental political query—*quis custodiet ipsos custodes?* Who guards the guardians? Who holds political

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power and directs the course of national policy? In any case, the capitalism we have hitherto known, with all the neo-Keynesian modifications, is apt to be eroded still further, and mainly because of technological change. I find it difficult to quarrel with this view; from the standpoint of long-range analysis it has everything to commend it, and there is little to refute it.

Of course, one can always look at employment figures for the last two or three years and on the basis of a momentary trend try to make a case against the Heilbroner view. This, in effect, is what *Fortune* editor Charles Silberman does in his book, and with rather silly consequences. I have already had a go at Silberman in these pages (DISSENT, Spring, 1965), and while I might want to alter the details of my argument somewhat if I were to rewrite that article now, the substance would remain quite the same. As Heilbroner has said elsewhere, what is at issue is not so much the changing hardware, or the alarms of those who note what technology is doing and can do, but rather the ongoing phenomenon of contemporary change rushing us into the future.

For it is a depersonalized future and we ought to face up to the social and political system that will administer it. But for Silberman this is of no great moment: he has a jolly time with Don Michael, Alice Mary Hilton, John Snyder, and others who have dared to discuss what is coming toward us. No crystal ball gazer, he! The hard facts are what Silberman deals with—increased jobs, prosperity, and "the enlarged sphere of human action provided by technology." A sample of his expertise: the packinghouse workers and coal miners of the late 1950's were not victims of automation, but rather of competition. He ought to try telling the workers in those industries that they were solely victims of supply and demand. Furthermore, one would never know from Silberman's analysis of employment data that a little affair in Southeast Asia might have had some impact on the heated economy we now enjoy.

But aside from the details of Silberman's shortsightedness, his book is an awkward paste-pot job, representing little more than a slap-dash arrangement of several articles out of *Fortune*. In addition to the one on automation, which was the subject of my earlier criticism, he has tossed in pieces on teenagers, early retirement, the war on poverty, Jacques Ellul, Marshall McLuhan, and one which purports to show that there is no labor shortage in the U.S. That the implactions of this article clash with the conclusions of others has not occurred to the author. Read singly, in their original place of publication, the articles were interesting, even if one disagreed violently. But slapped together, they make a poor excuse for a book.

What I have tried to say is that Silberman suffers from historical myopia and consequently is a poor guide for readers anxious to know what the underlying turbulence of our society means. Lekachman and Heilbroner are vastly superior; they know their way through the labyrinthine paths of history; they know their economics and their politics. In contrast to Silberman, Lekachman and Heilbroner offer perceptive and profound observations that merit close reading.

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Mao as Philosopher King

IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA, by Franz Schurmann. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 540 pp. $12.50.

Franz Schurmann's book appeared just as the long overdue reexamination of America's China policy began. The timing could hardly have been more opportune. For Schurmann has produced the most significant study to date of contemporary China, a book valuable to both specialists and laymen. He had to be selective in dealing with his vast subject, and he has concentrated on two fundamental elements of the Communist regime: its ideology and organization. He has limited his discussion to the period before 1961, on the fair assumption that most of the important features delineating Chinese Communism were evident by then. The book is the product of the erudition and insight of an outstanding scholar and provides a comprehensive viewpoint for understanding China today. The reader should be warned, however, that Schurmann is no popularizer. His book is massive, detailed, and frequently difficult to read. It is also full of Chinese phrases and frequent digressions on sociological theory.

Schurmann insists that it is necessary to understand the explicit ideology of the Chinese leaders in order to comprehend their actions. This is an important point overlooked by many other writers on contemporary China. They have tended to favor a "tougher" approach, relying often on economic determinism. This reluctance to acknowledge the importance of ideology is more indicative of the biases of our own liberal, pragmatic society than it is helpful in understanding Communist China.

According to Schurmann, the essence of Maoism is its commitment to the dialectical concept of contradictions as the only suitable method for dealing with China's problems. A dialectical method of thought is, of course, common to most Marxists. In his dedication to this method, however, Mao often seems more like a neo-Hegelian philosopher than a practicing Communist politician. Indeed, very few Marxist theoreticians have pursued dialectics with Mao's zeal and consistency and none have come near to possessing his political power.

Mao's analysis of contemporary China posits the existence of a great variety of contradictions.

There are contradictions of value, such as the struggle between "redness" and expertise. There are contradictions in economics, as that between agricultural and industrial development; contradictions in politics, as that of democracy and centralism; and contradictions in society, as those among the different classes. Regarding this last category, for example, the Chinese ridicule the Soviet contention that there are no further class struggles or social contradictions within a socialist society. Indeed, Mao sets a great premium on social tension and is committed to the belief that no society can progress without it.

Schurmann points out that the most

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remarkable achievement of Maoist ideology is the Communists' success in organizing Chinese society. For half a century before the Communist victory, Chinese nationalists and modernizers of all political persuasions cursed their country's fragmentation and compared it bitterly to a "sheet of loose sand." The Maoist regime has put an end to this atomization; it has mobilized the nation down to the lowest levels. In this task its ideology has cemented unity, suggested institutional structures, and provided methods of administration. There have been organizational problems because of Mao's dialectical conception of China and his desire to emphasize contradiction and struggle. But the system holds together.

Schurmann devotes the bulk of his book to the description of the development and structure of Chinese organization. He deals successively with the Party, the government, techniques of management and control, and the administration of the cities and villages. He shows that, until the middle fifties, the Chinese followed Russian models of organization. Thereafter, China began to veer away from Soviet practices in a policy shift which ultimately culminated in the Great Leap Forward. Schurmann analyzes Mao's conceptualization of Chinese society in 1957; and he demonstrates that the Leap was the result of the Chairman's attempt to compensate for or to overcome the contradictions which he felt had developed by that time. After the failure of the Great Leap, the Chinese did not return to the earlier Soviet models; instead, they adopted a rather pragmatic approach to planning, although they continued to espouse the ideological formulations of the Great Leap. Recently, it seems that organization may again be brought into closer alignment with ideology.

The most striking feature of the Chinese approach to organization has been the role of the Party, which has achieved more power in China than in any other Communist Country. Mao, evidently, hopes that the Party—made up of cadres imbued with the correct perspective and continually subject to discipline and rectification—can overcome other contradictions inherent in his vision. Thus, Mao believes that the Party can be both red and expert; it can permit decentralization without the loss of control; it can coordinate society and yet fight bureaucracy; it will work hard but not demand incentives. The recent attacks on the Party during the Cultural Revolution may indicate that Mao feels his hopes were misplaced.

Schurmann intimates that the Maoist ideology of contradictions is simplistic. This seems an understatement. If Schurmann's analysis of the Great Leap is correct, for example, it would appear that logical categories, frequently uninformed by technical knowledge and carried to extreme lengths, led to the adoption of policies that were both gratuitous and destructive. But Schurmann also portrays the dialectical viewpoint of the Chinese as more ingenuous than it really is; his tendency to truncate discussions of the Chinese ideology excludes a consideration of its broader goals.

Although these goals are implicit in Schurmann's analysis, he should have discussed them in detail; for they serve to direct and to limit the dialectical elements in Maoist ideology and, hence, they influence decisively the whole course of China's development.

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Thus, Mao is committed to a radically collectivist and egalitarian view of the ideal society, a position which seriously curtails his economic options. Because he wishes for a high degree of power, for himself and his advisors, the forms of political activity he believes possible and desirable are also severely limited.

It is this particular desire for power embedded in the Maoist ideology which Schurmann tends most to understress. He mentions the Chinese leaders' failure to discuss the contradiction they feel exists between the Party and the masses. He explains this omission by saying that, since they conceive of the Party as the organizational expression of the will of the people, to admit such a contradiction would be "akin to a Hegelian negation of the self." This is true, but specific political considerations must also have led to the decision to limit dialectical theorizing. Schurmann also avoids discussing the role of power in his description of Chinese organization. But his excellent case histories demonstrate its importance, particularly in the considerations that led to the crucial shift away from Soviet models of organization.

Schurmann has demonstrated the role of ideology in contemporary China. The crucial problem now seems to be whether the Maoist ideology, which has contributed effectively to revolutionize and organize China, can achieve other positive results. Obviously, a wide variety of benefits have accrued to the Chinese people from successful organization.

Nevtrtheless, it would appear that Maoism, with its dogmatic simplicity and particular set of goals, is poorly suited to attain worthwhile results beyond those which follow directly from organizing the country. This has been apparent in its uneven record in the most critical area of all—economic development.

The Great Leap may have set the Chinese economy back for years, and the real possibility that such a mistake could be repeated is disheartening. Maoist ideology requires a degree of control over the populace and a level of continuous tension within society that might be justified if other goals, especially economic ones, were being efficiently achieved. But the achievement of such objectives is encountering needless difficulties primarily because of the controls and tensions generated by the ideology itself.

JOHN SCHRECKER

1967 PEACE CALENDAR

We have received from our friends at the *War Resisters League* an advance copy of their 1967 Peace Calendar and Appointment Book. ($1.50; purchasable directly from WRL, 5 Beekman Street, NYC 10038.) Beautifully printed and containing a well-chosen selection of verse on the theme of war/peace, this is a calendar which everyone will find useful—and the proceeds will be put to a worthy end.

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LETTERS

Vietnam Policy

Editors:

You have published a good deal of material on Vietnam, and Irving Howe's articles analyze the situation well. His analyses seem to lead to definite conclusions, but he has shied away from making such conclusions. Some individual editors have taken clear positions, but the magazine, and the chief editors, do not seem to have made up their minds. Howe's article in a recent issue gives all the arguments for getting out, and then comes to the conclusion that we ought to stop bombing North Vietnam and try to negotiate; and his current article ends with "let there be . . . peace." But this is not a position; it is a series of hopes, pious or otherwise, and hedging, and non-positions. It need not be repeated that we *have* stopped bombing the North, and not much came of it; and our fairly noble leaders *have* been offering to negotiate, and nothing has come of that either. This is not a field in which there is a third camp; the choice is stay *or* leave. Some time the editors must make their choice, may we hope that this time will come soon?

WALTER GOLDWATER

IRVING HOWE *replies:*

DISSENT does not take collective "positions": each editor speaks for himself. Since Mr. Goldwater singles me out, let me give my own views and if any editor wishes to disagree, he will of course be able to do so.

American policy in Vietnam is reactionary and thoroughly to be rejected. I believe the war disastrous, politically and morally. I want to see it come to a rapid end, and I want to see the removal of *all* foreign troops from Vietnamese soil. That means, to avoid any ambiguity, the removal of U.S. troops.

The question then is: how can this end best be achieved? My view is that the "demand" for unilateral withdrawal can at this time have no significant political consequences. It is simply a statement of desire or preference, not a political strategy. The only way I can see right now of perhaps bringing enough popular pressure to bear on the Johnson Administration so that steps will be taken to end the war, is to keep insisting that the U.S. formally declare its readiness to negotiate with the NLF-Vietcong, immediately cease bombing the north, and refrain from any steps to escalate the war. I also think it important to keep hammering away at the demand that the U.S. cease using napalm in either North or South Vietnam, so that the country will not be utterly devastated in the next few years. And finally it seems to me entirely appropriate and relevant that the peace movement demand from the Johnson Administration an unambiguous statement of readiness entirely to withdraw from Vietnam upon the completion of peace negotiations.

Now it is possible that even if the U.S. took all these steps, the Communists in Vietnam would still refuse to negotiate. That would then require a serious reconsideration of proposals by those forces in the U.S. which want to see the war ended. But in such an eventuality, the political situation would have been so sharply changed, and the repercussions of such change would be so enormous, that it seems quite impossible right now to say with any assurance what would then have to be done or said.

The example of French withdrawal from Algeria is sometimes cited. Very well. But it should be recalled that de Gaulle did not simply pull out of Algeria one foggy night. He put forward a series of proposals, and he created a political atmosphere which enabled the Algerians to enter negotiations with France. In turn, the negotiations were the fact that made possible—led to—peace and the withdrawal of French troops. This is precisely what I want to see happen in regard to Vietnam.

The Italian Communists

Editors:

Italian Communism is perplexing enough without the introduction of distortions which mar an otherwise useful piece by Peter Schmid ("The Perplexities of Italian Communism," DISSENT, Sept.-Oct., 1966). He calls the P.C.I. "charming—and most dangerous" because

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they "partake of all the Italian virtues and vices." Mr. Schmid then seductively leaps to the "remarkable" increase in the Communist vote concomitant with the shrinking in party membership.

In fact, the Communist vote has been reduced. It is, I agree, at a dangerously high level (26%, according to Mr. Schmid). But simple inquiries by any foreigner or any tourist would obtain for him the frank confession of Communist voters to their cynical, *Realpolitik* reasons for their vote: a lever to move the Christian Democrats or the ruling coalition toward the direction of making life more bearable; a way of shaking up the politicians who are all too quick in forgetting their campaign promises; a way of "getting back" at the shrugging oppression of Church and state.

It is the Italians themselves who are charming—and dangerous in their reckless maneuvering of the ballot (and automobilies). But not the Party.

EDWARD H. TUMIN
ROME, ITALY, OCTOBER 6, 1966

More on Tolerance

Editor:

We must take issue with David Spitz's approach to the problem of tolerance as expressed in his "polemic against Marcuse, Moore, and Wolff." His treatment of the subject is not only contradictory but a totally inadequate approach to the whole question of social values, as we shall attempt to show.

There is an initial difficulty in identifying points of disagreement due to the vague and undefined manner in which the term, tolerance, is used. However, all of the various usages can be sorted out into two distinct categories: tolerance as a method, and as an end in itself. We will treat them in that order.

At one point Mr. Spitz calls tolerance "a method by which we may correct our errors and improve our understanding." According to him, tolerance fosters not merely clarity of thought but also "the common good," "diversity," "the scientific method," etc. Leaving aside the vagueness with which these concepts are discussed, and the author's chronic tendency to merge all of them until they are indistinguishable from the notion of tolerance itself, we will restrict ourselves to commenting solely on tolerance as a method. Tolerance as a method, like any other method, derives its value from something else—namely, the end which it serves. Therefore, in this context, to argue for the value of tolerance is to argue for the value of the various ends just cited. However, even a careful reading fails to reveal any awareness on the part of the author of this logical relationship. The value of the ends are simply assumed. This is a very disingenuous way to avoid the really important questions, for it is the ends themselves that must first be established. But even assuming their establishment, tolerance would have to be shown to be both logically and empirically consistent with those ends.

The lack of clarity concerning the distinction between means and ends probably accounts for the confusion of tolerance with an end in itself. As an end in itself, tolerance would be a norm. A norm is a prescription for action, a standard to which all behavior must conform. It was probably to describe this notion that the term "pure tolerance" was coined. Now, it is a simple matter to show that tolerance as a normative standard is a meaningless concept since it contains a logical contradiction. To be a standard the command to "be tolerant" must be universal; that is, it must apply in all cases. But this is clearly impossible, for to apply universally, it would have to apply even to acts of intolerance. If Mr. Spitz really wished to make tolerance the "fundamental rule," he would find himself in the embarrassing situation of having to violate it each time he applied it. What else can the application of a "rule" to human behavior be but an act of intolerance? If we apply a *rule,* we are *ruling out* certain categories of behavior. If that is not intolerance, words have lost all their meaning.

Why, then, does tolerance maintain so important a place in political theory? It is our belief that the wish to avoid rejecting, to avoid ruling out, any form of behavior is responsible for the wide acceptance of tolerance as a norm. Tolerance imposes no burden on the believer—it in-

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structs him merely to be passive. The fact that tolerance can be revealed as an inconsistent norm will probably do little to dislodge it as a habit of thought and practice. As a practice, tolerance is a mask for passivity, a false standard which permits the illusion of principled inaction. As an ideology, tolerance prejudices even the attempt to formulate the true standards of social behavior.

It is only as a method that tolerance may have some relevance. David Spitz and others writing in the same tradition preclude, however, an attempt to determine this relevance by confusing it with a norm of behavior.

ALAN ESSNER and S. MAGZAMEN

A Reply

The ends-means ploy so engagingly discoursed upon by Messrs. Essner and Magzamen reduces itself to this: any principle or act (as means) is to be judged and valued only in relation to—i.e., as it achieves—its end.

This ancient but quite naive proposition begs many questions, e.g., of the openness or multiplicity of ends, or the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic ends, or the fact that means and ends cannot be judged separately but must be taken together as interrelated parts of a total situation. These difficult and complex problems do not seem to perturb my two critics, and they require more space than has been allotted me in which to deal with them here.

It may be enough to point out some consequences of their own position.

1. Since any aesthetic work—a painting, a poem, a novel—is to be judged by the values it promotes, only those efforts are worthy that achieve the right values. In certain circles, this is known as the doctrine of Socialist Realism.

2. Since power is meaningless unless it achieves the right ends, tyrants—who are not philosophers and therefore do not know the right ends—have no power. This was the teaching of Socrates in the *Gorgias,* but fortunately not of Hobbes.

3. Since democracy is a government "for the people," it is foolish to ask "incompetent" people what they want; instead, it is proper to give them what they need. This is currently known as Guided Democracy, or People's Democracy—or Marcuse's Democracy.

4. Finally, since freedom and tolerance are simply methods by which men seek to achieve the right goals, other methods that realize those goals may be preferable. However, since "coercion" is not a nice word, let us, with Rousseau, say that this is only a way of forcing men to be free.

Messrs. Essner and Magzamen are welcome to this position. I want no part of it.

DAVID SPITZ

We have received comments by Paul Goodman and Tom Kahn on Richard Flacks's article "On the Uses of Participatory Democracy" which appeared in the November–December issue of DISSENT. For reasons of space, we have to save these comments for our next issue.—ED.

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A SPECIAL REPORT

H. Brand

U. S. ECONOMIC POLICY: FROM FDR TO LBJ

None of the basic issues in economic policy have been resolved in the years during which the Democrats have governed; wage and price norms, the distribution of the tax burden, the level and direction of public expenditures, all remain controversial. Yet, the role of government in maintaining high levels of employment has virtually ceased to be questioned by those who otherwise would be in the best position to obstract it. The obvious immediate reason is the success of fiscal policy. However, this success capped rather than initiated a transformation in the political attitudes of business and in the conception it has had of its place in the American political economy. Mere acquiescence by business, earlier in the postwar period, in the changes wrought by the New Deal and in the role of government in stabilizing the economy has gradually changed into acceptance. This acceptance is based on a political context that today is radically different from that of the New Deal. The ascendancy of business during the postwar period, the rise of a professional middle class, liberal in politics but conservative in social outlook, the quiescence of labor, the persistence of ethnic blocs, and the demise of agrarianism have of necessity been reflected in the attitudes of the leading men of the Democratic party. These men no longer seek to countervail the power of business. Rather, they seek to link up with it and to use it to implement their policies. Naturally, their policies must, and do, suit both partners; they bear the stamp of alliance.

A comparison of Johnson's with Franklin D. Roosevelt's objectives and achievements shows the extent to which the relationship of forces has changed since New Deal days. Under Roosevelt, new regulatory institutions were created—the Securities and Exchange Commission, the National Labor Relations Board. Banking was subjected to stringent rules; the Federal Reserve was centralized. TVA was one of seven autonomous regional development bodies projected. Planning boards were set up. An unprecedented, large-scale investigation of corporate concentration was launched. The organization of labor was encouraged—"a good democratic antidote for the power of big business," said Roosevelt.[1] These and similar acts tended to shift economic power into the public arena, where it became accessible to democratic control.

As a politician, Johnson is no less

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skillful than Roosevelt, nor is his policy more conservative. But circumstances do not permit him, and he seems in any case not willing, to transcend given institutional limits. His legislative achievements generally continue established patterns. In some instances, there is a broadening of the police powers of the federal government (as in the area of civil rights) and a modest degree of innovation in the forms of public action (as under the antipoverty program). But Johnson skirts contests of power where institutions are involved.

The Roosevelt Administration was unable to implement economic policy *against* businessmen. But neither was it willing, until the late thirties, to pay the price for their collaboration—halting further reforms. The result was inability to cope with large-scale unemployment. Johnson does not, and probably will not, face this particular dilemma. He does not intend to reform economic institutions. He can deal with unemployment today so that it will not rise above 6% or 7% of the labor force, although some of the chief means of doing so — work-training camps and low-grade make-work jobs—simply disguise it. However, he or his successor will be confronted with problems of deepening social inequality of which racial conflict is but one expression and work camps a troubling manifestation.

Inequality is embedded in the social and economic processes of capitalist society. It tends to worsen; and the history of labor and other democratic movements over the last 100 to 150 years can be read as a history of resistance to that tendency. Gains from evolving technology and productivity are appropriated by strategically located private groups and corporations; protection of the losers remains minimal and is adopted only under intense political pressures; the position of large social strata is threatened or deteriorates.

"We have permitted a trend toward a polarization of the population," Nathaniel Goldfinger of the AFL-CIO has said,

> . . . perhaps as much as half of the labor force, essentially production and maintenance-type workers, who are subject to frequent unemployment and part-time work, who have suffered severe income losses, and who are generally subject to very slow improvements in real income, and who are simultaneously lectured about wage restraints, costs, prices, and the balance-of-payments problem. At the other end is a group of about 20% of the labor force, consisting of managerial, professional, and higher paid technical personnel—with rising employment opportunities, rapidly increasing incomes and capital gains, who are not faced with guide lines for their income improvements . . . This condition . . . is a potential threat to our society.[2]

It is a threat which has not been lessened by the success of the economic policies of the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations. Given the political context of the sixties, these Administrations have eschewed any "Deals"—Square, New, or Fair—which would imply a reshuffling of the cards in favor of the disadvantaged. Instead, they have adopted policies promoting economic growth, i.e., enlarging the national income without changing its relative distribution. This has been the preference of enlightened business leaders since the beginning of the century, only that they did not at first

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conceive of government providing more than a favorable legal and regulatory environment for effecting their objectives. This "policy" failed when the depression revealed the inability of business to ensure sustained growth as a basis of mitigating class and group conflict. But it is now being carried out more successfully under the aegis of a close government-business partnership.

Under this partnership, which has matured over the past few years, economic policy operates, quite in the Keynesian sense, to regulate the volume of investment and effective demand—but not their direction. The autonomy of corporate business and the private market remains unimpaired, even though the Democratic Administration acts at times as the senior partner. William Beveridge's injunction that full employment in a *free* society must be patterned in accordance with social priorities, that demand must as far as possible be socialized, has been turned into its opposite; avoidance of priorities and privatization of demand are among the political conditions of the partnership. The income tax, which could be an effective engine of redistribution, has to a large extent been subverted into a means of allocating social wealth for purposes of private investment. At the same time, the very industries which have the highest rates of productivity advance and labor displacement have benefited most from investment subsidies and liberalized depreciation allowances. Such measures, contribute to intensifying the duality in the economy between high-productivity and low-productivity sectors. It is a revealing comment on the Great Society that wealthy corporations and individuals are forgiven billions in taxes, much of which they invest to further enhance their gains—but minimum wages cannot be raised lest jobs disappear.

Tax Policies: The Neglect Of Social Needs

The tax policies of the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations have converted American business to Keynesianism. The price of this conversion has been the regressive character of those policies, whatever their merits in prolonging the upward phase of the business cycle. They have diminished the already eroded progressivity of income taxation, have spurred investment in industries that have high rates of labor displacement, and have, by stimulating private markets, intensified the imbalance between private consumption and public service.

The Kennedy-Johnson tax policies have indeed succeeded in initiating a great investment boom, which by its very nature cannot last; full or near-full employment has been attained but is not likely to be maintained.[3] However, they have entrenched the conventional structure of private demand, where advances in productivity are so rapid that only very large and unsustainable gains in output can raise employment levels. They have contributed to an enormous rise in profits and cash flow, acting as a virtual bribe to industry to keep prices stable. This has surely improved the competitive position of American exports, although at high domestic social cost. However, wages have not similarly benefited and they are restrained by the insecurity that rapid, tax-subsidized technological change breeds.

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It is interesting to note the extent to which the tax policies of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations have reinforced those of Eisenhower's. The 1954 tax reduction and reform act was no less motivated by the desire to stimulate investment and long-term growth (thus to yield more jobs) than the successor acts of 1962 and 1964. In commenting upon the 1954 act, Dan T. Smith, an outstanding tax expert and adviser to the Republicans, wrote early in 1955: "The question is sometimes asked as to why any relief of this sort is needed when the economic system has grown as spectacularly as it has over the last 15 years. . . . [This] growth . . . has been in an environment characterized by war, threats of war, emergency defense programs, and inflation. All of these artificial stimuli have served to foster and, in many instances, to finance economic expansion. As one looks forward to normal growth, the importance of restoring normal incentives and removing punitive tax provisions becomes clear."[4]

It is true that vital differences have existed in overall fiscal policies between the Republican and Democratic Administrations. The Republicans in their tax policies clearly favored the well-to-do; the Democrats merely left the latter's privileged status untouched. The Republicans cut taxes on consumer incomes relatively little. The Democrats, in line with Walter Heller's criticism of the 1954 measure,[5] attempted to "balance" the investment incentives they granted by raising disposable incomes via personal income tax cuts. The Republicans, faced with the need to take up the slack left by lower military outlays at the end of the Korean War, adhered to the dogma that the private sector would gather sufficient momentum on its own to assure economic growth; to them, "high" taxes represented an "obstacle" on the path to growth as it did to the Democrats. The Democrats officially abjured any belief in "neo-stagnationism"[6] but acted as if they had few doubts about what would happen in the absence of strong fiscal policies.

The Democrats had a broader conception of the functions of fiscal policies, but operationally this conception did not extend beyond the social horizon of the Republicans. Walter Heller, in the article referred to above, complained that the "allocative effects" of the 1954 tax revisions were such as to

> . . . underemphasize consumer markets. . . . [A] tax policy which seeks to promote full utilization of resources through higher profit margins and preferred treatment of investments in fixed assets, [by] and large . . . encourages resources to remain in their present uses. They can earn higher after-tax profits and special investment bounties without submitting to the possibly chilling effects of the market, which might well be necessary if the alternative route were taken of increasing consumer disposable income as a guide to allocation of producer goods.[7]

To be sure, Heller here assumes away the wide area of manipulation to which consumer desires are subject, and which go far to vitiate the "test of the market." Nevertheless, his pro-consumer bias is morally refreshing.

But the tax policy of the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations stopped far short of following the advice implicit

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in Heller's 1955 article. It gave priority to investment incentives on grounds opposite to Heller's. 'Investment induced by consumer demand," said Secretary Dillon in defending the 1962 investment tax credit, "suggests primarily expansion using existing kinds of equipment and techniques, rather than more efficient and larger quantities of capital per worker and, therefore, greater productivity.[8]

The investment tax credit, together with liberalized depreciation allowances which accompanied it, entrenched the existing structure of production from the supply side; the 1964 income tax reduction, which must be regarded as part of the same concept of the role of taxation in the economy, did so from the demand side. Its social effects were entirely conservative. A major government measure that cost $12 billion in terms of lost revenue channeled not a cent to those most in need of additional funds. Proposed and enacted in the name of economic growth, it did nothing for social growth; if anything, it stunted it. Early in 1964, Walter Heller indicated that problems of poverty had to yield precedence to stepping up expansion.[9] Such an order of procedure ignored the relationship that exists potentially between raising low incomes and promoting economic growth.

According to Ida C. Merriam, writing in the *Social Security Bulletin* of October 1963,[10] if social security benefits were raised to merely 50% of retired workers' average pre-retirement earnings, and to 75% of those of retired couples, and eligibility were broadened to 90% from 70% at the time she wrote) of the population aged 65 or over, then the increase in benefits would come to $11.5 billion. If there were a system of cash insurance benefits for all workers in private industry, it would, at stipulated levels of adequacy, require outlays of $2.2 billion a year, and if workmen's compensation and unemployment insurance were brought to comparable levels of adequacy, $2 billion would be added to the total of current expenditures for these purposes. The tax cut, in addition to intensifying inequalities in income, resulted in a relative reduction of the means potentially available for the elimination of poverty and deprivation.

Lack of serious tax reform and the use of taxation in redirecting social wealth to private purposes have been matched by stringent budgetary policies. The role of the administrative budget has been deliberately curtailed, and its austerity stressed. To be sure, *The Budget in Brief, Fiscal 1966*[11] shows that expenditures for health, labor, welfare, education, and housing, and community development account for a rising share of federal payments to the public—15.2% in 1956, 23.4% in 1961, and 29.3% in the 1966 fiscal year (which began July 1, 1965). This is progress, but it is highly qualified. First, most of the rise in federal payments has occurred in the Social Security trust funds. These are financed not from general revenue but from employment taxes, which fall either on employees who foot half of the tax bill, or on consumers, to whom the employers' share is most likely shifted, and who generally belong to the same income brackets as the employees. This is, of course, not an argument against the social security system; it does mean that the latter's redistributive ef-

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fect is limited, quite aside from the fact that social insurance taxation itself is regressive. *Budgeted* expenditures for the categories listed above have indeed risen from 3% of federal payments in 1956 to 9% in fiscal 1966 (the proportion has declined again as defense spending has resumed its upward trend). But this rise must also be viewed in light of the partial shift in public assistance and educational expenditures from the states and localities to the federal government, and in proportion to the urgency of the needs to which it has been a response.

Over the past decade, population has increased by 18%, but the number of those most dependent upon public services—youth and children (under 18) and persons over 65—have climbed by 30%. Nor does this crude yardstick convey the increasing dependency of some larger population groups. Between 1956 and 1963, the number of persons receiving public assistance rose 30% (to 7.5 million), but while assistance to the aged declined somewhat, reflecting broadened eligibility for Social Security payments, that to families with dependent children soared 76% (to nearly four million). Generally speaking, dependency has been growing much more rapidly than population, and hence compels—as a matter of social necessity and not patronizing "compassion" — relatively large increases in per-capita outlays for the required support.

Tax and expenditure policies are responses to social needs, but the form and scope of the response is shaped not so much by objective evaluation as by political contention. The federal budget is a major focus of political contention; the problem for those who struggle to involve the federal government more intensively in tasks of social reconstruction is to broaden the arena of contention—make the budget bigger, prevent its size from being predetermined by tax rates that are too low. The possibility of incurring deficits must not obscure the hard fact that, in an economy dominated by private interests, revenues received exercise an imperative constraint upon the budget; and that, in conjunction with the budget, taxes remain the principal means of allocating resources to where they are needed most.

The success of the economic policy initiated by Walter Heller has, to be sure, enlarged the "fiscal dividend"—the increase in tax revenue due to economic growth. But the use of the "dividend," in reducing taxes to begin with and, more recently, in financing the war in Vietnam, signifies that the political interests determining fiscal policy and the budget remain weighted overwhelmingly on the conservative side. A different use of the "dividend" is, of course, not precluded but it hinges on greater awareness of the social meaning of fiscal policy on the part of the civil rights movement, labor, and left-wingers, and all those concerned with abolishing poverty.

Government as Capitalist: Underpinings of "Keynesianism"

Keynesian theorems have articulated the economic policy of the Kennedy-Johnson Administration, but it would not be possible to explain the prosperity and relatively low unemployment that have prevailed since 1941 in the U.S. as consequences of Keynesian prescriptions. Even the success,

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such as it was, of countercyclical measures can be attributed only in small part to Keynesianism. All-important to the success of the "new economics" in the U.S. has been the enormous growth of the government's role as investor and innovator.

Labor's economic policy has, at least since the thirties, rested on essentially underconsumptionist premises: Higher wages and benefits, together with broad social welfare programs, would augment purchasing power and the propensity to consume, and so create and sustain expanding markets and investment opportunities. Leading sectors of American business have also traditionally favored high wage levels, but business has offered stiff resistance when its economic power was at stake. Ford was the first to grant $5 a day to his workers, but he was the last in his industry to recognize their union. Business has evidently settled for a political solution of the savings-investment problem, but one that is consumption-oriented, not consumer-oriented. The solution of those who, following Keynes, believed that incomes from property should be reduced and eventually eliminated in the interest of greater equality of functional incomes, of less capital accaccumulation, and of higher levels of personal consumption relative to saving, has been rejected. Instead, "demand management" as Oscar Gass has dubbed Democratic economic policy,[12] has been adopted, but far from "managers" conducting it in the interest of consumers, the "managers" eschew egalitarian objectives and reinforce the distinctly capitalist framework of the economy by emphasizing the strategic role of private investment and the conventional incentive of profitmaking. Moreover, "supply management," ignored by Gass, is safely left in the hands of corporate giants.

Demand management occurs via direct subsidization of investment. At today's level of industrial technology and corporate practice, such subsidization tends to speed up the rate of obsolescence of equipment and plant and thus helps to create ever new outlets for capital accumulation. But inseparable from (and probably indispensable to) this process is the role of the government in absorbing a substantial share of the excess savings yielded by an ever more productive economy. These savings are to a great extent applied to nonproductive end uses. However, these uses require large-scale public and private investments. The extent to which this has happened is difficult to quantify, but a few examples give an idea of the magnitudes involved.

The book value of facilities built by industry to support directly or indirectly American war potential and comprising only those which, for tax purposes, were certified by the Treasury under certificates of necessity, between 1951 and 1959, amounted to a total of $39.5 billion. This sum constituted 15% of industry's total spending on plant and equipment in that period.[13] Again, it is hard to say how much investment defense expenditures have induced over the past few years, after the switch in the fifties to missile systems, and the adoption in the early sixties of multiple strategies. The value of defense procurement in the 1964 fiscal year was $26.2 billion; that of orders for major equipment alone was $16.7 billion, or 7-8% of total new

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orders in the durable goods industries. The extent to which procurement for defense has given rise to orders for durables not classified as defense goods might be calculated by means of input-output analysis. However, knowing the values involved would tell us little about what would happen if non-defense goods were substituted. Markets would likely be glutted, prices would fall, investment would be reduced, unemployment would rise. The economic effect of large expenditures for defense goes far in preventing this from happening.

Murray Weidenbaum has calculated that defense-space orders represent but a small share of the total sales of such companies as General Electric, Westinghouse, International Business Machines, Radio Corporation of America, etc. However, this says nothing about the possible leverage that military-space work, relatively small though it be, exerts upon total company operations. The experience gained from such work has usually been in the technologically most advanced areas. Highly integrated firms, who are strategically located at the frontiers of technology where intracompany transfer of knowledge is no problem, are likely to derive benefits from military-space work which is proportionately much greater than is suggested by the "small" share it represents of their total sales.

Federal funds expended for research and development (R & D) are also likely to have induced a broad range and substantial amount of investment. It may well be true that the magnitude of federal R & D—$14 billion in fiscal 1965, of which 95% went for defense and space purposes—stands in no relation to actual or potential "civilian" applications. But this is immaterial in the present context. R & D activities in the aircraft and missile industry, according to the National Science Foundation, "have permeated the entire industrial spectrum from spacecraft, missiles, and electronics, to fuels, plastics, textiles, and cryogenics. It has become normal practice for several thousand firms representing every segment of industry to be involved in the R & D associated with a single major space project."[14]

Government-financed R & D has unquestionably accelerated the transformation of technologies—in instrumentation electronics, control systems, power sources, and types of fabrication. In modern industrial societies such transformations have invariably given rise to new investments. In atomic energy, a vast area of capital-intensive investment has opened up, destined to transform electric generating technology; the Atomic Energy Commission's plant, valued at $8.6 billion in 1964, while devoted almost entirely to the production of fissionable materials for weapons, has yielded a fund of experience to the plant's private operators, which has been obtained without risk and which has laid the foundation for a new industry. In computer technology, the government has played a role only in the initial stages of development. However, as part of its administrative rationalization, as well as of the defense-space effort, the government bought or leased nearly 2500 digital or analog computers in fiscal 1966, around 10% of the total then in operation, representing 25-30% in value. Thus, the government has become the single most important market for computers—which are at

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the very core of technological transformation—and the rapidity with which the American computer industry has been expanding domestically and abroad would be unthinkable without the virtually guaranteed outlets in government agencies.[15]

The process of capital accumulation has, in the U.S. as elsewhere, become largely government-induced and government-sustained. The government may itself create new markets, which give rise to secondary investments, or it may prop conventional markets through "demand management." The Keynesian assumption, reflected in the economic doctrine of the American labor movement that the propensity to consume must be raised to keep the economy going, has lost force: High rates of investment *can* be maintained, and the price of capital need not be low (and it has not been) without deliberately raising the consumption of households. Tre Democrats, as well as the Republicans under Eisenhower, have solved the savings-investment equation, at minimal risk ot institutional change, in part by accelerating technological transformation, and in part by strengthening the sources of *conventional* demand—those sources, that is, whose strengthening does not involve the raising of the consumption function. If, as Daniel Bell has written, productivity is not allocated in a meaningful way, it is nevertheless allocated by the political process.

Investment Subsidies: Boon to Business—Bane to Labor

The tax bounties and the guidelines liberalizing depreciation allowed to industry by the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations are prime examples of the way the political process disposes of the social surplus. The new guidelines resulted in effective tax savings estimated by the Department of Commerce at $1.2 billion in 1962, when they were first applied; at least as much will be saved annually in future years. The investment tax credit of 7%, also instituted in 1962, reduced industry's tax liabilities by over $1 billion in 1962.[16] The Treasury has estimated that, under certain assumptions, the tax credit will entail a revenue loss of around $20 billion in the 1962-72 decade, i.e., a gain of the same magnitude to those eligible for it.

The combined effect of the new guidelines and the tax credit was "to increase the profitability of a typical investment in new equipment by over 25%—or equivalent to a reduction in the corporate profits tax from 52% to 38%," according to Secretary of the Treasury Dillon.[17] Necessarily, the more capital-intensive the industry, the more it benefited (and will continue to benefit) from these measures. Manufacturing and mining, which account for half of all corporate depreciation, took 70% of the added deductions under the new guidelines; railroads, too, reported a more than proportionate share.[18] These are industries with a record of rapid displacement of labor; and the position of labor was, in effect, weakened further by the relative cheapening of the price of capital via government subsidies.

In this respect, the Council of Economic Advisers' *Report to the President on Steel Prices* (April, 1965) is revealing. According to the *Report,*

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employment in steel dropped by 95,000 or 13% between 1957 and 1964, while output per man-hour (productivity) rose 16%. Meanwhile, cash flow—the sum of after-tax profits and depreciation allowances, and ". . . the best single measure available today of the profitability of a firm or industry"[19]—rose to nearly $2.1 billion in 1964, 10% or $155 million above the 1957 level. Figuratively, for every $1,631 increase in cash flow over the period, one worker was displaced. Although labor-displacing technological advances have been intensifying in steel, and are likely to accelerate in future years, promising "to bring substantial cost savings . . ."[20] and although steel's relative decline in the input or user industry has lowered and will likely continue to lower its economic weight, the government granted the industry an effective tax bounty of $250 million in 1964 alone, 12% of industry's cash flow; $190 million in 1963 (11%); and $142 million in 1962 (10%).

Similarly, the textile industry was the beneficiary of tax subsidies (liberalized guidelines plus the tax credit) totalling $58 million in 1962 alone, notwithstanding the fact that productivity gains had been particularly high in this industry, owing to rapid modernization and closing of obsolete mills. According to Solomon Barkin,[21] the average annual increase in the industry's productivity was 5.4% between 1949 and 1957, well in excess of the norm for manufacturing as a whole. Barkin details the technological changes which underlay these gains; we cannot repeat them here. They were accompanied by a steady decline in the industry's labor force, output of textiles remaining unchanged between 1948 and 1963. However, looking at trends in output in the intervening years, we note that since 1957-59, output has risen 34%, while the number of employees in the industry has dropped 3%. In more recent years, employment has edged up somewhat in response to strong recovery in production. But the basic labor-displacing effects of capital investment in the industry are clearly in evidence from the long-term trends noted. These trends cannot but reassert themselves, considering that the industry's expenditures on plant and equipment have, partly under the spur of the tax advantages granted to it, risen by 66% since 1962, and now exceed $1 billion a year.

The capital boom that has been experienced since 1966 attests to the success of the policy advocated by the CEA—to raise the rate of capital formation relative to GNP—and the measures taken in implementing it. But the very success makes future problems of manpower displacement and employment more, not less, worrisome.

The CEA, of course, has been aware of these problems, but it has advocated that it should minimize the likelihood, even while admitting the possibility, that the rate of technological advance will continue to accelerate, that rates of gain in productivity will remain "healthy, but not unprecedentedly large"; they are in any case inexact, and automation is comparable in impact to previous technological change.[22]

The subject of productivity is difficult, esoteric, and ridden by disputes; its technical terminology often disguises ignorance of underlying facts, fostered by lack of adequate industry

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and establishment data, which the Bureau of the Census or the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) are unable to secure; there is also reluctance on the part of economists to raise issues of distribution as between "capital" and "labor." Hence, the CEA's ambivalence is understandable. However, recent computations by the BLS reveal a decided steepening in the rate of productivity gain in manufacturing, from an annual average of 2.4% in the 1947-59 period to 3.2% in 1959-64. The added gain in the latter period was attributable mainly to white-collar employees, whose productivity advanced by 2.5% a year, which is not surprising: According to census data, the value of factory shipments of computing and accounting equipment nearly doubled between 1959 and 1964, compared to a much slower rise over the 1953-59 span; shipments of electronic computer systems alone have tripled in the last five years. Combined with the rationalization of white-collar work, the change in the technology of white-collar work is effecting a kind of quantum jump in white-collar productivity. A considerably slower rate of increase in white-collar employment in recent years would seem to support this finding.

In *Productivity Trends in the United States* (Princeton, 1961), John W. Kendrick states that "total factor productivity reveals a distinctly higher trend since World War II than that which prevailed in the three prior decades," and that ". . . there was a remarkable acceleration in manufacturing productivity in the 1920's."[23] In guessing at the reasons, Kendrick alludes to the then rapid spread of the "scientific management movement," the expansion of schools of business administration, the beginning of an organized industrial research and development effort, the swiftly rising levels of education, and such innovations as mass production techniques. But if these factors caused the curve of productivity gain to slope upward after 1919, the technological and organizational innovations that occurred after World War II can scarcely be denied an analogous role in causing a further steepening in that curve. Falling capital-output ratios, denoting increases in the efficiency of capital, represent additional evidence of rapid, self-generating technological change—as well as an additional argument against government-sponsored investment incentives.

Subsidization of private investment can only strengthen these tendencies. The tax credit and liberalized depreciation have indeed contributed to raising employment levels over the past 3–4 years, and to reducing unemployment. But this has created a situation that is inherently unstable. It requires ever larger increases in output in the capital-intensive industries to expand employment; these increases are normally not sustainable even to maintain the expanded employment, to say nothing of sustaining expansion in employment itself. In the early postwar and Korean War period, every 1% gain in manufacturing employment yielded a 2.5% gain in output; in the early sixties, the ratio had risen to 4%. The growth rate of "potential GNP," the rate necessary to keep unemployment at a constant 4% of the civilian labor force, has risen steadily, according to calculations of the CEA, from 3.5% annually in 1955–62 to 3.75% in more recent years; for 1965–70 it is es-

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timated at around 4%. This acceleration in the required rate of growth of GNP is more likely due to faster productivity gains than to a more rapid increase in the labor force, although the CEA has not taken a position in this respect.[24]

One may argue that the instability arising from the operation of the "private" sector can be offset, when need be, by heavier government expenditures. This is true, but it begs the question which is a political one. A now famous computation by the Department of Labor in its *Manpower Report of the President* of March 1964 showed that of the 4.3 million new nonfarm jobs that opened up between 1957 and 1963, 93% were due to increases in public demand (including government procurement from private firms); only 7% of the gain in jobs was generated by growth in private demand. Yet, the basic problems of unemployment remained: In 1963 the male unemployment rate averaged 5.7%, compared to 4.3% in 1957, even while labor force participation of men had fallen to 78.8% of the male working-age population from 82.7% in 1957. Thus increases in public demand offset only a part of the lag in private demand. Moreover, public enterprise and Administration operate according to canons of efficiency and economy more and more like those of private corporations. They will not absorb redundant manpower, except in marginal positions, and outside regular status. For their less "productive" services, they maintain a low-wage sector of their own: New York City's subprofessional hospital employees, for example, currently receive an average annual wage of $4,200.[25]

Incomes Policy: Perpetuating Inequity

The subsidizing of industry places the wage-price guideposts of the Democratic Administrations in a new light. The conception which underlies the guideposts is similar to that on which the antitrust laws are based: In an economy dominated by powerful oligopolies, the market fails in distributing income to the "factors" of production on principles of equity; hence government must act as its proxy in fulfilling this function. The guideposts stipulate that the average level of money wages must not rise faster than the trend in national productivity. Prices are to remain stable. With rising productivity, volume would expand, while unit costs would decline. Of the increased revenue, labor would receive its conventional share. *"Equity" is thus understood to be the perpetuation of the prevailing division of the national income between capital and labor.*

However, the guidelines do provide implicitly for a redistribution of income among industries, in that high-productivity industries are expected to reduce their prices, presumably to the extent that their profit margins are in excess of "average" and invite above-average wage demands; while low-productivity industries would be permitted to raise prices, and the wages they pay could rise relatively faster than wages paid by high-productivity industries. In sum, the guideposts intend that prices and wages converge towards an "average" level, their premise being that industries such as steel, autos, chemicals (and, more recently, textiles) will voluntarily surrender pricing and costing practices which are the essence of their economic power; while industries like

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apparel, retailing, and many services, all of which are rife with cut-throat competition, are in a position to raise prices and wages. Be that as it may, an incomes policy of sorts is perhaps necessary, in a political economy in which socialist alternatives are not visible. However, the guideposts are but a *pretense* for an incomes policy, for they cannot be considered separate from other recent economic policies, of which the investment tax credit, liberalized depreciation, and large-scale reduction of corporate income taxes have been major facets.

With industry's capital costs being partially subsidized, profits rise even while prices remain stable, or nearly so. Yet, although prices do not reflect true social costs, the appearance of price stability is used to argue wage restraint; as part of this specious argument, minimum wages are kept below poverty levels. The wage-price guideposts, when viewed in the context of economic policy as a whole, thus seem rather a hoax.

Nowhere are the fallacious assumptions of current income policy exposed more poignantly than in the obstacles raised to higher wage floors. As of summer 1965, there were still some 2.1 million men and women working in nonfarm industries, earning $1.25 an hour or less. But let us take $1.75 as a minimum wage floor, yielding, as it does, an annual pretax income of about $3,500, just above the $3,100 officially designated as the "poverty level." (The average hourly wage in manufacturing was $2.62 in 1965). In 1965 there were an estimated 7.4 million persons, or roughly 10% of all the employed, who earned $1.75 or less (half of them earned $1.40 or less). True, many of the people with such small earnings were part-time workers and lived in families with other breadwinners. Yet, low wages remain a major cause of poverty. Of the 15 million children who live in poor households, six million live in families where there is a worker who has a full-time job the year round.[26]

The industries where low wages prevail and whose spokesmen have expressed the greatest resistance to higher minimum wage floors cannot usually dominate their markets; higher floors would shift the entire wage structure in the industry upward; businesses in these industries are often localized; risks, incurred from the rapidity of shifts in living habits, transportation technology and locational patterns, tend to keep capital investments relatively low and fragmented among small owners. It is a situation which induces a dog-eat-dog psychology, and employer-employee relationships can be particularly exploitative. Yet, some of these (retailing, tourist services, hospitals) are among the fastest growing industries in the U.S. and absorb proportionately more labor than technologically more advanced ones. This makes low minimum wage floors and inadequate coverage especially disturbing.

The usual argument against minimum wage coverage or a higher minimum floor used by representatives of such industries is that jobs would be lost, either because business would have to close or because they would have to discharge less productive employees. And it has lately become fashionable among some economists to argue that the employment of inexperienced and unskilled labor is prevented by exorbitantly high wage

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levels. However, if wages of such labor ran merely midway between the legal minimum and the manufacturing average, they could not even be called "living wages," a level for which the trade unions fought for decades, but which large strata of workers have not yet attained.

Distasteful as such arguments are, they cannot be dismissed lightly. Reputable economists who raise them may be reproached for viewing the problem in isolation, for failing to question why minimum wages can be "too high" when social productivity is so obviously inexhaustible.[27] They may still be right. Higher minimum wages generally have not caused serious disemployment; the increases, which have usually been made in times of cyclical upswings, have been small, gradual, and on levels which remain pitifully low.

A low-productivity sector thrives on a ready reserve of underemployed labor which is lacking in adequate education and in aspiration. Higher minimum wages can make the price of such labor less cheap, but the problem is to tighten the labor market so that minimum wages, for want of takers, cease to be an issue at all. There are a number of ways of doing this, in addition to creating more jobs than there are jobseekers—stipends for students, family allowances which permit women to stay with their children, adequate old-age pensions. High job vacancy rates would still constitute an essential approach; there is ample evidence that upgrading of workers to better paying, more highly skilled jobs accelerates with declining unemployment. However, experience in nearly all advanced countries has shown that, no matter how low unemployment is, a relatively large marginal sector persists. If its elimination is to serve human ends—those of the worker and those of the user of his product—large-scale social services must be created, or existing ones extended and deepened, not only in order to intensify the demand for labor, but also that the jobs which become available may dignify those who hold them.

Growth and Poverty: The Persistence of Market Forces

Over the postwar period, gross national product has grown at an average annual rate of more than 4%, in constant dollars, as has the Federal Reserve's index of industrial production. Disposable income has risen at twice the rate of population increase. All these measures have accelerated in recent years. Yet, the proportion of people living in poverty in the early sixties as in the late forties was roughly the same. Harlem and Chicago's South Side have grown but they have not changed. On the contrary, while the statistics of income and housing show no deteriora tion in the material standards of the poor, social conditions have worsened. Illegitimacy rose dramatically, from 101 births per 100,000 unmarried women in the childbearing ages in 1945, to 225 in 1963. Unemployment rates among Negroes in 1965 were 40% higher than they had been in 1948—both years of strong cyclical expansion. While Federal subsidies fostered the concentration of capital in agriculture and thus contributed to raising agricultural productivity by 6% a year, they also helped make ever more farm workers "marginal": A million persons a year have left rural areas since 1950, and large numbers of them swelled the marginal proletariat of the cities. The

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economic base of the cities has been decaying rapidly, as central city-suburban income differentials have widened, and as a growing proportion of industries has located away from them.

In the July 1965 *Social Security Bulletin,* Molly Oshansky could write that ". . . well over a fifth, and perhaps as many as a third, of our children (are) growing up in dire poverty or haunted by its specter"—mirroring a statement that had appeared 15 years earlier in the *Report* of the Subcommittee on Low Income Families of the Joint Economic Committee, which said: "We have found that approximately one-fifth of the Nation's children are in farm and nonfarm families receiving $2,000 or less in annual income."[28] The aged are no longer exposed to destitution in the same degree as formerly, but social security payments remain niggardly at around $100 a month per retired worker, and perhaps $160 per aged couple. Although many of the elderly draw additional income from employment, savings, and homes they own, over two-fifths of the population 65 years old or more must subsist on incomes below the $2,500-a-year poverty line computed by the Social Security Administration. In 1947, according to Oscar Ornati, the proportion of people who lived below levels of minimum adequacy in 1947, by 1947 standards was 27%; in 1960, the proportion of people who lived below levels of minimum adequacy by 1960 standards was 26%. In 1947, 39% of all persons lived below standards of minimum comfort; in 1960, the proportion was 40%.[29] While the modern welfare state has prevented immiserization, it has not been able, because it has not been designed to abolish or even narrow the gap between low incomes and standard family budgets.

Some will argue that it is rhetoric to contrast the record of economic growth to that of inequality and persistent deprivation. For the contrast implies that "nothing has changed," an implication hard to accept, especially by those who identify the progress in technology of man's mastery over nature with that of society. It is hard to accept also by those who have witnessed, or taken part in, the advance in political power of workers and farmers, and the growing influence of the universities. Are things not being done? Has large-scale unemployment not been banished? Have Social Security and unemployment insurance, inadequate though they may be, not become firmly established principles of income maintenance? And who in responsible position today would deny that the evolution of technology imperils jobs, regions, communities—problems for which the automatism of the market provides at best only partial solutions.

Still, one wonders how much *has* changed during the postwar period in terms of the institutional web that determines the fate of individuals. Market forces are no longer relied on entirely to perform functions of adjustment to the business cycle and technological change. Nevertheless, adjustment policies largely subserve existing market relations. The market and the price system continue to stamp the relations among social classes; they still largely determine the distribution of income and the allocation of resources. Official manpower, educational, and area development programs, as well as housing and urban renewal policies

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are meant to bolster the market economy, and are keyed to its criteria of profitability. The government's policies promoting economic growth are deliberately designed to strengthen conventional markets and market relations.

The market is, of course, indispensable to the distribution of goods and services, and to a minimum of restraint on freedom of choice. But this its organic function remains all the more subordinate to its political function as an instrument of economic power, as the "forces" of the market become more concentrated and less "blind." Whatever changes have occurred since World War II, they do not include a weakening in the social power of business, of its far-reaching control over the social surplus, or of the juridical system safeguarding property rights. They do include a growing interpenetration of government and business which ensures the proper disposal of savings in forms that will not unduly disturb the continuity of vested interests. This interpenetration has positive aspects, but only because of the failure or weakness of democratic forces: if the choice be between urban renewal for the rich or no urban renewal, it is preferable to have urban renewal for the rich. That this type of choice is so often imposed shows how little the relationship of forces in American society has changed. Technological advance and economic growth are not tantamount to social progress, and in a class society they tend to obstruct it.

One of the basic principles of President Johnson's conceptions is the need of society to expand in order to resorb the apparently growing number of groups and persons who are excluded from the normal processes of production or rejected by corporate bureaucracies and their welfare schemes. Yet, society must not suffer changes in structure, nor shifts in the acquisition and control of wealth, nor surrender of privilege. Given these stringent conditions, economic growth suggests itself as the only major means of expanding society, making possible, as Elinor Graham has put it in reference to the war on poverty, the addition of "new roles . . . to the job structure," and the creation of "new status rungs . . . in the social ladder."[30] Yet, while thus new "constituences" may arise, theorems of pluralism hardly apply to the process; the loci of social power are not shifted by the accretion of marginal sectors, particularly as it occurs under the aegis of established interests.

Economic growth in America takes the specific form of rapid accumulation of capital, with the government as a major innovator and provider or guarantor of investment capital. Thus economic growth is not welfare-oriented; on the contrary, given the virtual absence of social controls other than profitability, it is a detriment to welfare and threatens to become more so as the evolution of technology accelerates. Economic growth in the U.S. cannot be separated from high levels of defense and space expenditures; it is idle to speculate whether these are "necessary" to it or not, especially since they are made primarily in response to the international situation, which, to be sure, they also condition. The political circumstances in which they would be substantially less significant and in which nondefense outlays would "replace" them cannot realistically be envisioned at present. "Wasteful" disposal of the social sur-

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plus is but one example of the contradiction between economic growth and social welfare; and, as Seymour Melman has shown, large portions of defense and space spending are simply wasteful, even in terms of the criteria of the supporters of current military policies. The contradiction between growth and welfare manifests itself in many other ways: slums persist in the face of an office boom of heroic prportions, which makes older but still useful structures rapidly obsolete. Hunger prevails in much of the world, despite intensified investment in agriculture, with crops either partially warehoused or held down by acreage restrictions. Unemployment remains high and human capabilities are misapplied despite unfilled social needs universally recognized as urgent.

The kind of economic growth, which fiscal and monetary policies combined with the government's innovative and regulatory role have promoted, cannot but speed up the rate of labor displacement; it has not succeeded in reducing unemployment much below the level of 4%. It even had to be slowed down when that level was reached because pressure on prices would swiftly translate into reduced profit margins and thus threaten to abort growth altogether. It may appear that large-scale labor redundancy will not be permitted in modern society; but labor redundancy does prevail in the great urban centers and, although obscurely, in rural areas too. The "Great Society" has failed to frame the institutions necessary to reduce it. Some observers, however, have predicted that economic planning will become a major means of coping with this problem and with that of technological change generally.[31] But the economic policies of the Democrats have in tendency been anti-planning. Their "Great Society" envisions integration without equality; better services, but no modification of the profit motive; less public poverty, but a reduced taxation. They grant large subsidies to business but attach no such strings as levels of employment, quality of training, and location of new plants. They fear inflation as much as their Republican predecessors, and more than full employment.

The rapid growth in population, the poverty of large segments of humanity, the ramifications of technology, the loss of nature—all these threaten the social fabric, require more forethought, more coherent policies, widely disseminated knowledge. Present economic policies cannot cope with, and if anytring aggravate, these problems. Planning along lines of social priorities, which takes in account the international effects of domestic measures, might indeed begin to resolve these problems; but this is an unlikely prospect for this country.

Such planning would entail: basic change in the allocation of resources; control over the location of industry; channeling of human effort, through appropriate incentives, into socially desirable vocations and endeavors; revision of the tax structure in the direction of equity; the raising of real income through expanded public services. The ideological foci of America's urban underclasses remain too blurred to lend force to the advocates of priority planning; and the dominance of corporate interests is too secure to make it a serious political option at present.

"Project planning," corporate plan-

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ning, more precise formulas relating revenue costs to social benefits—all have long become acceptable as part of the functions of growing public and private bureaucracies. But such types of planning take place within, and are designed to underpin, institutions whose entire mode of existence is linked to the accumulation of capital —institutions rooted in surviving ideologies of social Darwinism that sanction the competitive appropriation of wealth. This institutional system, archaic in many respects and barely able to cope with mounting internal pressures, is also being tested by ceaseless international crises. Trese crises lay claim to the "fiscal dividend" some liberal economists had hoped and still hope to apply to social investments. Thus, even mild social palliatives are not forthcoming or, at best, are yielded up stingily.

Such a conjuncture of institutional patterns and international events does not permit much optimism. It does not, however, predetermine developments. International crises are likely to polarize rather than unify public opinion in America. Social struggles, given the country's traditions and the flexibility of its political setup, cannot easily be repressed. Thus, there remains, and will remain, room for growth of social intelligence. And that is as much a precondition for planning in terms of human needs as the political struggle for it.

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2. Arthur M. Ross, editor, *Unemployment and the American Economy,* 1964, p. 80.
3. "The rate of investment required to maintain full employment is not maintainable. . . . A boom level of investment . . . rushes headlong into excessive capital accumulation. . . . A boom level of investment, maintained for several years, causes the stock of capital to increase so rapidly that further investment eventually becomes unprofitable. It is this that sounds the death knell of every boom. History reveals . . . that the boom level of investment is considerably in excess of the maintainable rate." *Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth and Stability,* Papers Submitted by Panelists Appearing Before the Subcommitte on Tax Policy, Joint Economic Committee, November 9, 1955, p. 14.
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30. Elinor Graham, "The Politics of Poverty," in *Poverty as a Public Issue,* Ben B. Seligman, editor, New York, 1965, p. 249. This essay is the best political analysis of the motivations and purposes of the War on Poverty the writer has come across. The book as a whole is a first-rate introduction to the range of political and economic issues involving poverty in America.
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